II.
REVIEW OF CRITERIA
II.
REVIEW OF CRITERIABefore dealing with these interrelated criteria, it is necessary to acknowledge that the overriding criterion we must follow is the federal constitutional requirement of population equality as established in Reynolds v. Sims (1964) 377 U.S. 533) (state legislative districts); and Kirkpatrick v. Preisler (1969)
[Page 7]
394 U.S. 526 (congressional districts). Technical issues concerning the degree of equality required are discussed at a later section of this report.
B. Voting Rights ActTwo sections of the Act directly affect our task, but in different ways. Section 2, as amended in 1982, has two subsections. Subsection (a) is a substantive prohibition of any voting procedure that "results in" denial or abridgement of a racial or lingual minority's voting rights "as provided in subsection (b)." Subsection (b) states that a violation of subsection (a) is established by a showing, "based on the totality of circumstances,"
[Page 8]
that members of a protected class have less than an equal opportunity "to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." The section expressly disavows establishing any right of proportional representation but permits consideration of the extent of minority candidates' success in getting elected.(7)
Section 2 has been the basis for scores of lawsuits, typically prosecuted in federal court by members of protected groups, claiming that methods of electing candidates to office, such as the demarcation of legislative district boundaries, unlawfully dilute minority votes. Though most of these suits are directed at voting procedures in southern states, a substantial number have arisen in northern or western states, including California. (E.g., Garza v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1990) 918 F.2d 763; Romero v. City
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of Pomona (9th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 1418; Gomez v. City of Watsonville (9th Cir. 1988) 863 F.2d 1407.)
In preparing our re-districting plans, we determined that it is important to eliminate, or at least minimize, any possibility of their being challenged under section 2. The ultimate success of any such challenge would depend not only on the composition of the new districts themselves but also on evidence, not now before us, of historic voting patterns or socio-economic data, and probably also on resolution of open legal questions concerning interpretation or application of the Act. Rather than speculating on such evidence, or attempting to resolve all such legal issues, we have endeavored to draw boundaries that will withstand section 2 challenges under any foreseeable combination of factual circumstances and legal rulings.
The other relevant section of the Act is section 5 (42 USCA § 1973c). It applies only to states or counties in which fewer than half of the residents of voting age were registered to vote, or voted, in the presidential elections of 1964, 1968, or 1972. (See § 4(b), 42 USCA § 1973b(b) [voting registration determined by Director of Census].) The section requires that any redistricting or other change of voting procedures in those jurisdictions be cleared in advance either by the federal district court in Washington, D.C., or by the Attorney General. The usual practice is to submit a proposed change to the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, after which the Attorney General has 60 days in which to interpose an objection.
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Four California counties -- Kings, Merced, Monterey, and Yuba -- are covered by section 5. All have relatively small populations that include the assigned personnel of large military bases, who are unlikely to register to vote. Because objection by the Attorney General could result in costly delays in the electoral process, we have taken special steps (which we shall describe) to avoid any possibility of disapproval with respect to the covered counties.
Department of Justice regulations explain that a change affecting voting is subject to disapproval under section 5 "if it will lead to a retrogression in the position of members of a racial or language minority group (i.e., will make members of such a group worse off than they had been before the change) with respect to their opportunity to exercise the electoral franchise effectively," citing Beer v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 130 (see also Lockhart v. United States (1983) 460 U.S. 125). (28 C.F.R. § 51.54(a) (1991).) Particular attention is paid to whether the proposed change would comply with section 2. (Id., at § 51.55.) Thus, with respect to the four counties covered by section 5, our obligations are to avoid any worsening of the voting positions of racial or language minorities and to comply with section 2 itself.
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ber districts, from each of which the voters were to elect three to eight members of the North Carolina legislature. The court pointed out that the 1982 amendment to section 2, newly prohibiting any voting procedure that "results" in abridgement of voting rights, "was largely a response to this Court's plurality opinion in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), which had declared that, in order to establish a violation either of § 2 or of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, minority voters must prove that a contested mechanism was intentionally adopted or maintained by state officials for a discriminatory purpose" (478 U.S. at p. 35, emphasis added).
Referring to section 2(b)'s requirement that proof of a violation be "based on the totality of circumstances," the court quoted from a Senate Judiciary Committee Report, approving the amendment, a list of "typical factors" that might be probative. (Id. at pp. 36-37.)(8) These factors were derived principally from
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two cases arising in Texas and Louisiana respectively (id. at p. 37, fn. 4) and pertain largely to historical aspects of discrimination and racial polarization. "The Report stresses," says the Court, "that this list of typical factors is neither comprehensive nor exclusive," and that "'the question whether the political processes are "equally open" depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the "past and present reality"' [citation] and on a `functional' view of the political process. [Citation.]" (478 U.S. at p. 45.)
The Court then turned to the African-American plaintiffs' claim that the use of "multimember, rather than single-member, districts in the contested jurisdictions diluted their votes by submerging them in a white majority, thus impairing their ability
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to elect representatives of their choice." (478 U.S. at p. 46; fns. omitted.) The Court listed three "necessary preconditions" to the sustaining of such a claim:
"First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district." (Id. at p. 50, emphasis added.)
"Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive." (Id. at p. 51, emphasis added.)
"Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." (Ibid.)
Despite the court's formal reservation of the question whether these prerequisites are "fully pertinent" to a claim of vote dilution caused by "the splitting of a large and geographically cohesive minority between two or more multimember or single-member districts" (id. at p. 46, fn. 12; cf. id. at p. 50, fn. 16), lower courts have assumed their applicability to claims of vote dilution by single-member districts (see Jeffers v. Clinton (E.D.Ark. 1989) 730 F.Supp. 196, 205; Neal v. Coleburn (E.D.Va. 1988) 689 F.Supp. 1426, 1435), and we likewise assume their applicability to the single-member districts that we propose.
We can avoid section 2 challenges to our new districts by eliminating the possibility of a minority group's proving any one of the three Thornburg prerequisites. The information from which our districts are drawn is furnished by the 1990 federal census,
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which tells us, as to each census tract, the total number of persons together with the numbers in particular categories of age, race, and Latino origin.(9) From that data, we can judge whether minority groups are "sufficiently large and geographically compact" to satisfy the first Thornburg prerequisite. The second and third prerequisites, however, depend on what analyses of election results would show about a minority's political cohesiveness and about white majority bloc voting. In this area, the federal census is of little help.
We have therefore drawn district lines so as to avoid either (1) unnecessary fragmentation of any sufficiently large, geographically compact protected minority group(10) into two or more districts, or (2) overconcentration of such a group in a single district. By thus preventing the dilution of the votes of any minority group that could qualify under the first Thornburg prerequisite, we can eliminate the possibility of section 2 challenges regardless of whether a group could fulfill the second or third prerequisite. Accordingly, we turn to an examination of the first prerequisite.
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interpreting this phrase. We believe that the key to its meaning lies in the view, expressed in Thornburg, that congress intended the determination of a section 2 violation to "'depend[] upon a searching practical evaluation of the "past and present reality" . . . and on a "functional" view of the political process" (478 U.S. at p. 45, quoting from the Senate report).
The court in Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ. (M.D. Ala. 1988) 686 F.Supp. 1459, seized upon this passage from Thornburg in holding that the prerequisite of geographical compactness was met by a minority group who lived within an irregular strip of land, just inland from Mobile Bay, which appears to be approximately 20 miles long and, at some points, less than a mile wide. As the Dillard court explained, "[t]he degree of geographical symmetry or attractiveness is . . . a desirable consideration for districting, but only to the extent it aids or facilitates the political process. . . . For example, a district would not be sufficiently compact if it was so spread out that there was no sense of community, that is, if its members and its representatives could not effectively and efficiently stay in touch with each other; or if it was so convoluted that there was no sense of community, that is, if its members and its representative could not easily tell who actually lived in the district. . . . [B]ecause compactness is a functional concept, the number and kinds of factors a court should consider may vary with each case, depending on the local geographical, political, and socio-economic characteristics of the jurisdiction being sued." (686 F.Supp at 1466.)
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We fully agree with this functional view of geographical compactness. Accordingly, in the context of statewide redistricting in California, particularly in rural areas where considerations of communication and access are of considerable importance, section 2 need not control formulation of plans where minority voters are not, functionally, geographically compact.
A majority of registered voters, on the other hand, is not a prerequisite to a section 2 claim. (Dickinson, supra, 933 F.2d at p. 503; Solomon, supra, 865 F.2d at p. 1574; McDaniels, supra, 702 F.Supp. at p. 592.) As pointed out at an earlier stage of the Solomon case: "Minority voter registration figures are inherently
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unreliable measures in vote dilution cases because the very lack of minority political power responsible for the bringing of the section 2 action also may act to depress voter registration." (Solomon v. Liberty County, Florida (11th Cir. 1988) 865 F.2d 1566, 1574 [vacated on grant of rehearing en banc].) But though not part of any threshold requirement, voter registration or turnout may be considered in fashioning a remedy that will enhance the minority group's opportunity to elect the candidate of their choice. (Dickinson, supra, 933 F.2d at p. 503.) However, we would note that there are difficulties in developing reliable minority registration data.(11)
At least one court has considered not only age but citizenship in determining whether the minority group would constitute a majority of eligible voters within a district. (See Romero v. City of Pomona, supra, 883 F.2d 1418, 1425.) For several reasons we have assumed that citizenship would not be a factor in determining fulfillment of Thornburg's first prerequisite. Since an application for naturalization resembles vote registration in that both require individual initiative, lack of citizenship is arguably more
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akin to nonregistration than to underage as a measure of ineligibility to vote. Moreover, rejection of the dubious citizenship test theoretically results in conferring Thornburg standing on more minority groups than if the test were accepted. Thus, district lines based on such rejection will more effectively preclude possibilities of section 2 claims.
Though we have not relied on voter registration or citizenship statistics in determining what groups are entitled to vote protection under Thornburg, we have occasionally considered such data in determining how best to divide up a minority group who cannot be accommodated in a single district in a way that will maximize the group's voting potential.
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other Thornburg prerequisites. (Campos v. City of Baytown, Tex. (5th Cir. 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 [African-Americans and Hispanics treated as one minority group if cohesive as a whole]; see Romero v. City of Pomona, supra 883 F.2d 1418, 1426-1427 [African-Americans and Latinos not combined because found not to be politically cohesive].)
Accordingly, in areas containing substantial numbers of more than one of the state's principal minority groups (African-American, Asian, and Latino) of which two or three combined, but no one alone, would be large and compact enough to qualify under Thornburg, we have assumed political cohesiveness and endeavored to protect the combined group's voting potential in accordance with section 2.
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"the interests of clarity and uniformity." (McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist. (1988) 851 F.2d 987, 944; accord, Brewer v. Ham (5th Cir. 1989) 876 F.2d 448, 455-456; Skorepa v. City of Chula Vista (S.D.Cal. 1989) 723 F.Supp. 1384, 1391; see Garza v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 918 F.2d 763, 770, fn. 2; Karlan, "Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the Voting Rights Act" (1991) 77 Va. L. Rev. 1, 31-32.)
The high court's recent decision in Chisom v. Roemer (1991) U.S. [111 S.Ct. 111], however, contains a stronger recognition of the possibility of an "influence" vote-dilution claim by a minority voter group too small to constitute an intra-district majority. In Chisom, the court sustained the right to challenge elections of state judges under section 2. The majority opinion, joined in by six justices, reasoned that the right to an equal opportunity "to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice" (§ 2(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b), emphasis added by the court) is a unitary right, and that judges are "representatives" within the meaning of section 2(b). (111 S. Ct. at p. 2365.)
The Chisom dissent argues that judges are not "representatives" and that section 2(b) confers two separate rights. Otherwise, says the dissent, "minorities who form such a small part of the electorate in a particular jurisdiction that they could on no conceivable basis 'elect representatives of their choice' would be entirely without § 2 protection." (Id. at p. 2371.] The majority replies in a footnote: "The dissent argues that our
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literal reading of the word 'and' [in section 2(b)] leads to the conclusion that a small minority has no protection against infringements of its right `to participate in the political process' because it will always lack the numbers necessary 'to elect its candidate,' post at 2371. This argument, however rests on the erroneous assumption that a small group of voters can never influence the outcome of an election." (Id. at p. 2365, fn. 24.)
In Armour v. State of Ohio (N.D. Ohio, Sept. 4, 1991) F.Supp. [Dock. No. C88-1104Y; recommended for publication]) the majority of a three-judge district court (28 U.S.C. § 2284), over a vigorous dissent, sustained a section 2 claim that the boundary between two single-member districts for election to the lower house of the Ohio legislature diluted the vote of the plaintiff minority group regardless of whether the group would be large enough to form a majority in either district. In reaching this result, the majority relied on the foregoing footnotes in Thornburg and Chisom.
Without undertaking a definitive resolution of the validity of section 2 "influence" claims, we recognize that their legal grounding is sufficiently strong to call for our using every reasonable effort to avoid their being asserted against our redistricting proposals. Accordingly, we have aimed to maximize the voting potential of a geographically compact minority group of any appreciable size even where it would not constitute a majority in the particular district.
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C.
Population EqualityAside from the federal constitutional limitations, Article XXI, Section 1 of the California Constitution requires that "the population of all districts of a particular type shall be reasonably equal." This section, enacted after Reinecke IV, has been interpreted by the Attorney General as incorporating the more restrictive population requirements contained in Reinecke IV that the "population of Senate and Assembly districts should be within 1 percent of the ideal except in unusual circumstances, and in no event should a deviation greater than 2 percent be permitted." (Reinecke IV, supra, 10 Cal. 3d at p. 411; see 64 Opn. Atty. Gen. 597, 613-615 (1981).) Since we have been directed by the Supreme
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Court to follow the Reinecke IV criteria, we have no occasion to determine whether this higher standard is also required by Article XXI.(12)
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an apportionment of Missouri's congressional districts with a maximum deviation of 5.97 percent.(13) The court rejected Missouri's attempted justifications as being ad hoc and "haphazard," and not applied in a systematic, uniform manner throughout the state. (Id. at p. 535.)
In Karcher v. Daggett (1983) 462 U.S. 725, these principles were the basis for invalidating New Jersey congressional districts with a maximum deviation of 0.6984 percent. The court first held, principally because of evidence of other plans with lower deviations, that the districts "did not come as nearly as practicable to population equality," and therefore, "the burden shifted to the State to prove that the population deviations in its plan were necessary to achieve some legitimate state objectives." (Id. at p. 740.)
The court described how the state's shifted burden could be met. "Any number of consistently applied legislative policies might justify some variance, including, for instance, making the districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between incumbent Representatives. As long as the criteria are nondiscriminatory [citation], these are all legitimate objectives that on a proper showing could justify minor population deviations. See, e.g., West Virginia Civil Liberties Union v. Rockefeller, 336 F.Supp
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395,398-400 (Senate District W. Va. 1972) (approving plan with 0.78 percent maximum deviation as justified by compactness provision in State Constitution)." (Id. at pp. 740-741.)
The court stressed the necessity for specificity and consistency:
The State must . . . show with some specificity that a particular objective required the specific deviations in the plan, rather than simply relying on general assertions. The showing required to justify population variations is flexible, depending on the size of the deviations, the importance of the State's interests, the consistency with which the plan as a whole reflects those interests, and the availability of alternatives that might substantially vindicate those interests yet approximate population equality more closely." (Id. at p. 741.)
New Jersey's attempted justification of the challenged redistricting was held clearly inadequate. The only justification seriously advanced was preservation of minority voting strength, but that explanation applied to only two of the state's 14 districts and could not justify the deviations of others. (462 U.S. at pp. 742-745.)
We are satisfied that our proposed congressional districts comply with these Karcher guidelines. Our maximum deviation is only 0.49 percent, compared with almost 0.7 percent in Karcher itself, and 0.78 percent in the West Virginia reapportionment case that Karcher describes as "justified by compactness provision in State Constitution" (462 U.S. at p. 741). All of our proposed
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districts are fully, specifically, and consistently justified by the state policies expressed in the California Constitution (art. XXI) and in Reinecke IV, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 402, 410-414, or by the overriding federal policies implemented by sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act. We note Karcher's examples of possible nondiscriminatory state justifications, "for instance, making districts compact [and] respecting municipal boundaries" (462 U.S. at p. 741) reflect our own Reinecke IV criteria (10 Cal.3d at pp. 411-412).
The Democratic Congressional Delegation contends that their plan should be chosen over any rival plan because it achieves almost perfect population equality (a deviation of no more than nine persons from the ideal district population of 572,308). We reject that contention. As Justice Stevens, who joined in the majority Karcher opinion, observed in his separate concurring opinion in that case, "the goal of perfect population equality is an inadequate method of judging the constitutionality of an apportionment plan." (462 U.S. at p. 750.) Karcher clearly permits the congressional districts that we propose, with a maximum deviation of less than 0.5 percent and specifically justified by legitimate, consistently applied state and federal policies.
Moreover, there is an affirmative policy reason for not insisting on virtually exact equality. The districts that we recommend are composed of entire census tracts. These tracts normally range from 2,000 to 6,000 persons in size and, as explained in Reinecke IV, "an effort has been made by the Census
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Bureau to make them homogeneous as to social characteristics and to use prominent natural or manmade geographical features as boundaries. Thus, following, rather than disregarding, census tracts will aid in establishing natural, well defined legislative districts and will aid in obtaining valid pertinent socio-economic data about such districts." (10 Cal.3d at p. 413, fns. omitted.)(14)
The plans submitted to us with near-zero population deviations are based on census "blocks" instead of tracts. Formulating districts on a block basis is enormously expensive. A block, as used by the Census Bureau, is just that -- a block in a city or suburb. The approximately 6,000 census tracts in California are made up of about 400,000 blocks. The cost of computer, software, and experts to deal efficiently with this greater amount of data is exponentially higher than a comparable system in which the bulk of the redistricting work is done by census tracts. Indeed, the cost would be prohibitive for any private person or group having
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resources short of those available to the Legislature.(15)
Thus, the result of insisting on an exactitude that requires formulation of districts by census blocks, instead of tracts, would be to limit the ability of many groups, including those representing minority voters, to participate meaningfully in the reapportionment process by presenting alternate redistricting plans, such as the one offered to us by the Mexican-American Legal Defense & Education Fund (hereafter MALDEF). Such limitation on community participation would undercut our duty to "'afford all interested parties the opportunity to be heard'" so that "'[t]he court [will] be fully informed with respect to all of the possible criteria that might be adopted for reapportionment and with respect to all of the specific implementations of such criteria that might be ordered into effect.' ([Reinecke I] 6 Cal.3d at pp. 601-602.)" (Reinecke III, 9 Cal.3d at 167 [cited in Wilson v. Eu, supra, 54
[Page 29]
Cal.3d 471, 473, as the basis for the court's direction that we hold public hearings].) This policy of maximum community input for any court-ordered plan, followed in 1973 as well as in 1991, clearly justifies, under Karcher, the minor deviations necessary to enable redistricting to be done on a reasonably exact census tract basis instead of a census block basis that would be prohibitively expensive for most interested persons and groups.
Widespread participation in the redistricting process is also an important policy to be furthered under the Voting Rights Act. The Attorney General has recognized this in the regulations for preclearance under section 5. Among the factors the Attorney General considers in determining whether to preclear a voting procedural change, such as redistricting, are the "extent to which the jurisdiction afforded members of racial and language minority groups an opportunity to participate in the decision to make the change" (28 CFR § 51.57(c)) and the "extent to which the jurisdiction took the concerns of members of racial and language minority groups into account in making the change" (28 CFR § 51.57(d)). The participation called for by these provisions should not be restricted for those unable to afford the enormous cost of unnecessarily exact redistricting.(16)
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D.
The State Constitution, Reinecke, and the Voting Rights ActThese three sets of requirements constitute the foundation on which the redistricting plan is built. We have previously described the Voting Rights Act, the federal imperative. Here, we discuss the commands of the state, as expressed in the Constitution and by our Supreme Court, and their interrelationship with overriding national policy. Further, while the state criteria which we are directed to follow come from two sources -- Article XXI of the Constitution and Reinecke IV, several of the Reinecke IV criteria, on close examination, simply express in different words the basic criteria contained in Article XXI.(17)
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Equalization be elected from a single-member district (subd.(a)), that districts of each type be numbered consecutively from the northern boundary of the state to the southern boundary (subd.(d)), and that the population of all districts of a particular type "be reasonably equal" (subd.(b)). The first two of these provisions require no further discussion. We have previously dealt with the federal constitutional requirements of population equality.
The remaining two requirements of California's article XXI are central to our redistricting responsibility and require further discussion:
"(c) Every district shall be contiguous."
"(e) The geographical integrity of any city, county, or city and county, or of any geographical region shall be respected to the extent possible without violating the requirements of any other subdivision of this section [i.e., contiguity and population equality]."
To determine more specifically what was intended by these two provisions,
we turn to the Ballot Pamphlet analysis and arguments to the voters for
the statewide election of June 3, 1980. Such material is often relied upon
in construing constitutional provisions. (See Delaney v.
Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal. 3d. 785, 802-803 [ballot argument
identifies the principal "mischiefs" at which the constitutional amendment
is directed]; White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal 3d. 757, 775 [ballot
arguments are accepted sources from which to ascertain voters intent and
intent of voters governs interpretation of constitutional provisions enacted
by them].) provisions. (See Delaney
v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal. 3d. 785, 802-803 [ballot arguments
are accepted sources from which to ascertain voters intent and intent of
voters governs interpretation
of constitutional provisions enacted by them]);
White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal 3d. 757, 775 [ballot argument
identifies the principal "mischiefs" at which the constitutional amendment
is directed].) [Corrected
text.]
[Page 32]
The ballot arguments opposing the proposition asked, "Why is not `geographic regions' defined?" and questioned whether the
[Page 33]
provision concerning the geographic integrity of city and county boundaries would "water down" the provision concerning "equal population:" "[W]ill protecting the integrity of cities and counties elasticize the meaning of `reasonably equal'?" The proponents responded: "City and county boundaries can be ignored only if necessary to comply with the equal population requirement. That is how Proposition 6 will prevent cities and minority communities from being arbitrarily divided to gain partisan advantage or to draw 'safe' districts for incumbents."
"l. As required by the federal Constitution, the districts in each plan should be numerically equal in population as nearly as practicable, with strict equality in the case of congressional districts. . . . The population of Senate and Assembly districts should be within 1 percent of the ideal except in unusual circumstances, and in no event should a deviation greater than 2 percent be permitted. . . .
"2. The territory included within a district should be contiguous and compact, taking into account the availability and facility of transportation and communication between the people in a proposed district, between the people and candidates in the district,and between the people and their elected representatives.
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"3. Counties and cities within a proposed district should be maintained intact, insofar as possible. [Citations]
"4. The integrity of California's basic geographical regions (coastal, mountain, desert, central valley and intermediate valley regions), should be preserved insofar as practicable.
"5. The social and economic interests common to the population of an area which are probable subjects of legislative action, generally termed a 'community of interest' [Citation] should be considered in determining whether the area should be included within or excluded from a proposed district in order that all of the citizens of the district might be represented reasonably, fairly and effectively. Examples of such interests, among others, are those common to an urban area, a rural area, an industrial area or an agricultural area, and those common to areas in which people share similar living standards, use the same transportation facilities, have similar work opportunities, or have access to the same media of communication relevant to the election process.
". . . . It is clear that in many situations county and city boundaries define political, economic and social boundaries of population groups. Furthermore, organizations with legitimate political concerns are constituted along political subdivision lines. Therefore, unnecessary division of counties and cities in reapportionment districting should be avoided. " (Reinecke IV, 10 Cal. 3d at pp. 411-412; fn. omitted.)
"As to all of the recommended criteria, their applicability,
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priority and scope, other than population equality, depend on circumstances indigenous to the area under consideration. To the extent required by the federal Constitution, population equality controls." (Id. at p. 414.)
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ballot argument concerning "contiguous districts," the proponents talked of "adjacent territory and not widely separated areas" and the "preservation of the integrity of geographic regions." The argument criticized "odd-shaped districts" connected only by "corridors along beaches, highways and waterways." In more detail, the Masters in 1973 recommended the preservation of the "integrity of California's basic regions (coastal, mountain, desert, central valley and intermediate valley regions). (10 Cal. 3d at p. 412.) The territory included within a district should be contiguous and compact, taking into account the availability of transportation and communication." (Id. at p. 411.) In addition, "social and economic interests common to the population of an area [e.g.] an urban area, a rural area, an industrial area or an agricultural area" (Id. at p. 412.) should be considered.
From this we conclude that districts be should be contained, insofar as possible, wholly within one of the major geographic regions of the state. While "geographic regions" is not further defined in the constitution, the acceptance by the Supreme Court of the Masters' definition is compelling. We believe, at a minimum, this requires recognition of the division between northern and southern California by the Tehachapi Mountains and of such major regions as the San Joaquin and Sacramento Valleys, the coastal areas of northern and central California, and the Mojave and other desert areas east of the Sierra Nevada and north of the San Gabriel Mountains.
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There is one possible conflict between the Voting Rights Act and Article XXI involving cities: where a geographically compact minority group is located partly within and partly without a city. (The southern part of Sacramento is an example.) In some areas of California city annexations are a common occurrence; thus it is possible that minority areas remain divided either by intent or by effect, thus indirectly diluting the vote of the affected minority groups. In areas where such a situation exists, and where a minority influence district could be created, we have given precedence to keeping geographically compact minority groups together rather than maintain city boundaries.
[Page 39]
areas with few roads crossing them; 50 to 100 miles separates populated areas on either side of these ranges.) Similarly, the values expressed in the concept of contiguity, community of interest, and respect for local government boundaries -- the concept of "functional compactness" -- is completely consistent with the concept of "geographically compact" minority districts. Indeed, use of these criteria reinforces the Voting Rights Act's guarantee to minority groups to have an equal opportunity "to participate in the political process." (§ 2(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (b).) As suggested above, political effectiveness can be enhanced by membership and participation in community affairs: candidates for public office can be recruited and nurtured, local media may be better utilized (including the foreign language press), grassroots organizing and campaigning are more viable. As suggested in the June 1980 ballot arguments in the form of Article XXI, use of these criteria can avoid the creation of "districts that are confusing, unfair and unrepresentative."
In sum, we find the criteria underlying the drawing of district boundaries, i.e., criteria found in the federal and state constitutions, in the Voting Rights Act, and in the decision of the California Supreme Court in Reinecke IV, not only reconcilable, but compatible. The criteria have guided our deliberations and informed our decisions.
E.
Combining Assembly Districts to Form Senate Districts[Page 40]
"6. State senatorial districts should be formed by combining adjacent Assembly districts, and to the degree practicable, Assembly districts should be used as congressional district boundaries." (10 Cal 3d at p. 412.)
"The resulting legislative districts [which pair Assembly districts to form Senate districts] will be more comprehensible to the electorate and the task of administering elections would be considerably simplified, thus saving money and insuring greater accuracy." (Id. at p. 413.)
We find these conclusions as persuasive in 1991 as our predecessors
did in 1973. Further, the concept of "nesting" adjacent Assembly districts
to form senatorial districts has not posed any Voting Rights Act problem.
While we can imagine circumstances in which this might occur, in our plans
it did not. We have so drawn the senatorial districts.
