Electronic Voting - Overview and Issues

Introduction

Problems with vote counting in the 2000 presidential election prompted a broad effort to upgrade voting systems across the country. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) is the key federal initiative in this effort. It provides funds, promulgates general standards for voter registration and election systems, and establishes an Election Assistance Commission to administer the law. The four members of the commission were confirmed by the U.S. Senate in December 2003, setting the stage for the regular disbursement of HAVA funds to the states.

The central aim of the election reform effort is to move away from punchcard and lever systems to electronic voting systems, of which there are two basic types. Optical scan systems retain the paper ballot, which the voter marks with dots that are read electronically. Optical scan systems create a tangible record that can be used in recounts, and maintain consistency between ballots cast absentee and at the polls, but printing ballots is a complex and costly business. Touch-screen voting systems, also known as direct recording electronic (DRE) voting systems, dispense with the paper ballot altogether and operate much like an ATM machine. Touch-screen systems easily accommodate multiple languages and even have audio capabilities, making them attractive for meeting accessibility goals, but require a parallel printing system of some kind in order to provide a tangible record of the vote.

Both optical scan and the newer touch-screen systems have their advocates, but enthusiasm for them has been dampened by a range of concerns, voiced most strongly by observers in the computer science community. Most of the concerns relate to touch-screen systems, and they focus on:

• Hardware/Software Reliability. On the hardware side there are concerns that mechanical failures in touch-screen machines arising from electrical outages and other causes may leave votes uncounted or miscounted, with no means of recovery. On the software side computer scientists and others warn that software deficiencies in some electronic voting systems may affect election outcomes. Of particular concern are alleged flaws in software from Diebold, Inc., one of the major vendors of electronic voting systems. Critics note that vendor software is not amenable to outside testing because it contains secret proprietary code, and that vendors do not share the results of internal testing.

• Verifiability. If in a touch-screen system the record of votes cast exists only in digital form, there is no independent way to confirm that the votes were recorded accurately, and thus no way to conduct a reliable recount. Many observers contend that the solution is a voter verifiable paper trail, i.e., a print record of the voter's choices. In one proposal under wide consideration, the print record would be on a secure log that the voter could view on the touch-screen machine. The voter could confirm that his/her choices were accurately recorded, but would not have a personal copy of the print record. Section 301 of the HAVA legislation requires "a permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity," and states seeking HAVA funds will have to comply, but the specifics of the paper record are still to be determined.

  The paper trail requirement is not without controversy. Depending upon how it is implemented, the requirement may make elections more expensive, lengthen the time it takes to cast a ballot, and make elections more prone to delay and interruption from printer malfunctions. Many election officials voice these concerns, and note further that print records may be no more immune from post-election manipulation than old-fashioned paper ballots.

• Security. There is concern that touch-screen voting systems are not secure enough to prevent hackers from accessing voting data and manipulating results. A widely reported Johns Hopkins study noted that a voter could easily replicate and alter the smartcard used to program a particular Diebold touch-screen machine to "cast multiple ballots without leaving any trace." Critics claim that the touch-screen voting industry has been slow to address electronic security issues, and note that election officials lack expertise in the area. The situation may improve as standards and certification mechanisms for touch-screen systems improve.

Internet voting, i.e., voting on one's personal computer and sending the ballot electronically to the election office, has great potential for making elections more convenient and accessible, but concerns regarding verifiability and security are greatly magnified in the Internet environment, and there is consensus that Internet voting is at present too risky for general implementation. However, with continuing advances in encryption and other security measures, Internet voting is likely to become more prevalent, and Defense Department experiments and pilot projects are leading the way. In the interest of improving voting opportunities of overseas military personnel, the Defense Department conducted a pilot in the 2000 election called the Voting Over the Internet (VOI) Pilot Project, and planned a larger pilot for the 2004 election called the Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE). Unresolved security concerns led officials to cancel the SERVE pilot in early 2004 before it was implemented.

In sum, views about electronic voting fall into two basic camps. On one side are those who put a premium on accessibility and improving political participation. They welcome electronic voting on the ground that its advantages outweigh security and reliability concerns--which in their view will always plague voting systems to some extent. On the other side are those who put a premium on security and reliability, and the need to maintain voter confidence in the electoral process. In their view, unless electronic voting is backed up with a verifiable record of some kind, the risks are too great--the potential for mishap and mischief looms too large.

E-Voting in California

California counties use a number of voting systems, all of which must be certified by the California Secretary of State. The Voting Systems section of the Secretary of State's website describes the certification process, and lists both the certified systems and the specific systems in use in California counties. There was controversy following the October 2003 recall election because some counties used versions of touch-screen software that had not been certified.

California has been a leader among the states in revamping its county election systems. In March 2002 California voters passed the Voting Modernization Bond Act (Proposition 41) providing $200 million to "purchase modern voting equipment and replace outdated punch card (chad) systems." The measure established a Voting Modernization Board which is disbursing the funds to the counties. A county-by-county status report is available.

In December 2003 California Secretary of State Kevin Shelley released My Vote Counts: California's Plan for Voting in the 21st Century, which outlines California's plan for complying with the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). The state expects to receive over $100 million in HAVA funds. In November 2003 the Secretary of State issued a position paper on the deployment of touch-screen voting systems in California. While not actually part of the HAVA plan, the position paper addresses the HAVA requirement for a paper audit trail:

Accessible VVPAT [Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail] Required - As of July 1, 2005, all local jurisdictions purchasing new DRE voting systems may only purchase certified DRE voting systems that contain a VVPAT feature which is fully accessible and allows every voter—including individuals with disabilities and those who benefit from having alternative language access—to vote privately and independently.

The guidelines follow upon the July 1, 2003 report of the Secretary of State's Ad Hoc Touch Screen Task Force. Some observers felt that Shelley's new guidelines went too far, or were at best premature. In a November 21, 2003 press release the California Association of Clerks and Election Officials called the Secretary of State's requirement of a verified paper audit trail “without justification,” noting that “No test at either the state or federal level has ever found that current electronic voting machines should not be used,” and that “There is no certified voting system that can provide a voter verified receipt.” Press reports indicated that voting system manufacturers would take action to meet the California requirements. On January 21, 2005 Secretary of State Shelley finalized paper audit trail standards for California, which require in part that touch-screen machines have a “paper record display unit” that allows “a voter to view his or her paper record copy while preventing the voter from directly handling the paper record copy.”

Following the March 2004 primary election, the performance of Diebold touch-screen systems used in some California counties came under increased scrutiny. In public hearings conducted by the Secretary of State's Voting Systems and Procedures Panel, it was confirmed not only that uncertified versions of Diebold software had been used in some counties, but that some of the software had been inadequately tested and had performed poorly, resulting in lost and miscast votes. On April 30, 2004 Secretary of State Shelley, following the recommendations of the Voting Systems and Procedures Panel, decertified Diebold's Accu-vote TSx system, used in Kern, San Diego, San Joaquin and Solano counites. In his decertification order, Shelley banned the purchase of all new touch-sceen systems unless they provide a paper trail and meet other conditions, and ordered counties with touch-screen systems to provide paper ballot backups for subsequent elections. Observers viewed the Secretary of State's order as a compromise taking Diebold to task for its most egregious failures, but preserving most touch-sceen voting for the November 2004 election. A July 6, 2004 federal disrict court ruling upheld Shelley's order.

In September 2004 Secretary of State Shelley's VVPAT directive was made a statute when Governor Schwarzenegger signed SB1438 requiring all voting machines to provide a paper audit trail in time for the June 2006 primary. The implementation deadline in Shelley's VVPAT directive was July 2006. In requiring VVPAT technology to be in place for the June 2006 primary, SB1438 effectively advanced the implementation deadline by six months. In January 2005 Shelley certified the first VVPAT system for California, the Sequoia VeriVote system.

Newly appointed Secretary of State Bruce McPherson decertified a revised version of Diebold's TXs system in a July 27, 2005 letter to Diebold. (McPherson became Secretary of State in March 2005 following Kevin Shelley's resignation.) After extensive testing, the revised TXs system was found to have unacceptable levels of screen freezes and printer jams. Shortly thereafter, in an August 3, 2005 decision, McPherson informed E-voting vendors that their contracts with counties would have to include a commitment to meet not-yet-finalized HAVA guidelines. The move was seen as a protection for counties, which must choose HAVA-compliant systems by January 1, 2006.

VVPAT requirements for touch-screen systems in California were further strengthened when, on October 7, 2005, Governor Schwarzenegger signed SB370, requiring that VVPAT printouts be used in recounts and for the one-percent post-election manual audits required in all elections. Election officials viewed SB370 as imposing an onerous new mandate, but VVPAT supporters viewed the legislation as imposing a needed check against election fraud.

Reports and Commentaries

Making Votes Count: an Archive of Editorials on the Flaws in the Mechanics of Our Democracy. New York Times, June 11, 2004-

A series of New York Times editorials focused on election reform issues.

Alexander, Kim.
"The Perils of Computerized Voting," California Journal, v. 35, no. 5 (May 2004), p. 32-36.
Alexander is president and founder of the California Voter Foundation.

Lucas, Greg.
"State Bans Electronic Balloting in 4 Counties: Touch-screen Firm Accused of 'Reprehensible,' Illegal Conduct," San Francisco Chronicle, May 1, 2004.
San Francisco Chronicle

Hoffman, Ian.
[Investigative Series on Touch-screen Voting], Oakland Tribune, 2004-2005].
The series includes these stories:

"Paperless E-voting Era Ends: Touch-screen Machines with No Printable Record Used for the Last Time in California on Tuesday," Nov. 9, 2005.
"Bill: Paper Trail Required for E-voting: Governor Passes New Legislation Ensuring Accuracy of Electronic Voting Machines," Oct. 9, 2005.
"E-Voting Receipts May Be Useless: California Secretary of State Says Paper-trail Recounts Problematic," Aug. 17, 2005.
"E-Voting Machines Rejected: State Says Diebold Failures in Massive Mock Election Could Translate to Problems at Polls," July 29, 2005.
"E-Voting Stays, But with Conditions," May1, 2004.
"Panel Won't Pull Plug on E-Voting," Apr. 29, 2004.
"E-Voting Rhetoric Flies in Oakland," Apr. 24, 2004.
"Decertification Urged for Some Touchscreens," Apr. 23, 2004.
"Diebold Apologizes for Failure," Apr. 22, 2004.
"Diebold Knew of Legal Risks," Apr. 20, 2004.
"E-Voting Probe Finds No Reason for Glitches," Apr. 13, 2004.

League of Women Voters of the United States.
Helping America Vote: Safeguarding the Vote. Washington, DC, July 2004.
"Debate over how to fulfill the requirements of the [Help America Vote Act] has focused on new technology, both new voting machines and computerized statewide registration systems.Yet, as election officials well understand, new, sophisticated technology alone will not solve the ills that surfaced in the 2000 presidential election. Sound administrative practices are equally necessary to ensure that elections are run both fairly and accurately."

Federal Voting Assistance Program (U.S.). Security Peer Review Group.
A Security Analysis of the Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE), by David Jefferson and others. Jan. 21, 2004. Warns of security vulnerabilities in the Internet-based SERVE system of the Department of Defense.

O'Donnell, Paul.
"Broken Machine Politics," Wired, Jan. 2004, p. 144-147, 168-169.
"The dark secret of running elections is that the people in charge have never been able to rely on the security of voting machines, computerized or otherwise. Much of what they call electoral science is actually just safeguards that have grown up to prevent fraud, beginning with close observation of voters at the polls. DREs are supposed to improve on existing systems, but really they're just a way to keep up with newly revealed problems endemic to the existing system."

"A Paper Trail for Voters [editorial]," New York Times, Dec. 8, 2003, p. A30.
"America's election apparatus needs to move firmly and quickly into the computer age. But the public must feel secure that each vote is really counted. At this stage, a voter-verified paper trail offers the public that necessary security."

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service.
Election Reform and Electronic Voting Systems (DREs): Analysis of Security Issues, by Eric A. Fischer. Washington, DC, Nov. 15, 2003.
"Given the worsening threat environment for information technology and the findings of several studies and analyses discussed in this report, at least some current DREs clearly exhibit security vulnerabilities. Those vulnerabilities pose potential but not demonstrated risks to the integrity of elections, in that no proven cases exist involving tampering with DREs. Observers differ in their views about whether these potential risks are significant enough that they need to be addressed urgently or whether they can be addressed incrementally."

U.S. Dept. of Justice. Office of Legal Council.
Whether Certain Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems Comply with the Help America Vote Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, by Sheldon Bradshaw. Washington, D.C., Oct. 10, 2003.
Binding ruling that a voter-verifiable paper record does not violate either of the two laws. A response to claims from disability advocates and some election officials that a voter-verifiable paper trail does not safeguard the interests of sight-impaired persons.

Stromer-Galley Jennifer.
"Voting and the Public Sphere: Conversations on Internet Voting," PS: Political Science & Politics, v.36, no. 4 (Oct. 2003), p. 727-731.
Examines theoretical tensions inherent in Internet voting as a public act and a private act.

National Association of Secretaries of State.
NASS Statement on Security of Voting Systems. Sept. 15, 2003.
Recommends that the resolution of verification and security issues be left to the new Election Assistance Administration.

Granger, Sarah.
The Trouble with e-Voting. Aug. 11, 2003.
Granger is a project director for the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, Palo Alto, Calif.

Johns Hopkins Information Security Institute.
Analysis of an Electronic Voting System, by Tadayoshi Kohno, Adam Stubblefield, Aviel D. Rubin and Dan S. Wallach. (Technical Report TR-2003-19). July 23, 2003.
Widely reported study which found security flaws in in Diebold’s AccuVote-TS voting terminal software. Includes a link to a rebuttal by Diebold and a rejoinder by the authors.

California Secretary of State's Ad Hoc Touch Screen Task Force.
Report. Sacramento, July 1, 2003.
"Local jurisdictions, if they desire independent verification on their systems, should have a range of verification options to choose from, including paper-based and electronic options."

League of Women Voters of the United States.
Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Voting Machines and HAVA Implementation. Washington, DC, 2003.
"The LWVUS does support an individual audit capacity for the purposes of recounts and authentication of elections for all voting systems, including, but not limited to, DREs. The LWVUS does not believe that an individual paper confirmation for each ballot is required to achieve those goals. An individual paper confirmation for each ballot would undermine disability access requirements, raise costs, and slow down the purchase or lease of machines that might be needed to replace machines that don't work."

However, at the League's biennial convention in June 2004, delegates passed a resolution rescending the League's support for paperless voting machines. The resolution supports "voting systems and procedures that are secure, accurate, recountable and accessible."

Gritzalis, Dimitris A., ed.
Secure electronic Voting. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003. Table of Contents.

California Internet Voting Task Force.
A Report on the Feasibility of Internet Voting. Sacramento: California Secretary of State, Jan. 2000.
"At this time, it would not be legally, practically or fiscally feasible to develop a comprehensive remote Internet voting system that would completely replace the current paper process used for voter registration, voting, and the collection of initiative, referendum and recall petition signatures."

Selected Websites

American Association of People with Disabilities
See its Disability Vote Project.

Black Box Voting (Bev Harris)
Journalist Bev Harris' website, which tracks problems with electronic voting machines, with a particular emphasis on political conflict of interest issues involving voting system manufacturers. Includes the full text of her book Black Box Voting: Ballot Tampering in the 21st Century (High Point, NC: Plan Nine Publishing, Oct. 2003).

California. Secretary of State. Voting Systems and Procedures Panel.
Links to the minutes and actions of the panel are included in this "Voting Systems" page on the Secretary of State website.

California Voter Foundation
Includes a Voting Technology section which states: "It is the position of the California Voter Foundation that any voting system that does not require a voter to directly mark on the ballot must still create a verifiable audit trail of each ballot cast that can be viewed by the voter at the time the ballot is cast; given today's technology the only practical voter-verifiable audit trail is a paper ballot image." Kim Alexander, CVF president, tracks the latest California developments in her web log.

Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund (DREDF)
"Serves as a guide for California disability rights advocates in their efforts to influence the accessibility of the voting process. It includes information about California and federal voting laws, new voting technology, as well as other relevant links and news articles."

Election Assistance Commission
"The United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC), an independent bipartisan agency, is authorized by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to serve as '...a national clearinghouse and resource for the comparison of information' on various matters involving the administration of Federal elections."

Election Central (Warren Slocum)
"The Web's 1st blog on verified voting, election reform & democracy, by Warren Slocum." Slocum is Chief Elections Officer & County Clerk-Recorder-Assessor, San Mateo County, California.

electionline.org (Election Reform Information Project)
"Non-partisan, non-advocacy website providing up-to-the-minute news and analysis on election reform."

Electronic Frontier Foundation
See the E-Voting section, which states: "E-Voting technology is promising, but its benefits should not obscure its dangers. Without basic auditing checks, these machines dramatically increase the chances for undetectable election fraud. This archive is a resource in the fight for accountable elections and responsible voting technology."

Electronic Privacy Information Center
See the Voting section, which highlights recent developments and reports.

Federal Election Commission.

League of Women Voters of the United States
See in particular the Election Reform section.

National Association of Secretaries of State
Focuses particularly on implementation of the Help America Vote Act.

VerifiedVoting.org
Founded by David L. Dill, Professor of Computer Science, Stanford University. Its call to action is a Resolution on Electronic Voting, which begins: "Computerized voting equipment is inherently subject to programming error, equipment malfunction, and malicious tampering. It is therefore crucial that voting equipment provide a voter-verifiable audit trail..."

VotersUnite!
“VotersUnite! is a national non-partisan organization dedicated to fair and accurate elections. It focuses on distributing well-researched information to elections officials, elected officials, the media, and the public; as well as providing activists with information they need to work toward transparent elections in their communities.”

Voting System Performance Rating
A coalition of reform advocates, election officials and voting machine makers focused on electronic voting standards.