

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In November 2005, large-scale destructive rioting by second and third generation immigrant youth shook France and alarmed the rest of Europe. News of the death of two boys of North African origin who had allegedly died escaping the police in the suburbs of Paris sparked weeks of unrest in the country's *banlieues*. A few years earlier, ethnic tensions between communities of South Asian origin and White Britons in several northern English towns culminated in violent clashes, causing millions of pounds in property damage. Today, these towns are strongholds of the openly xenophobic British National Party, which also made strong gains in Greater London's 2006 local elections. In Germany, police reports indicate that right-wing violence has increased significantly in recent years, while fifteen thousand marched to protest recent racist killings in Antwerp, Belgium, where the xenophobic Vlaams Belang holds over one third of the seats on the city council.¹ The hostility expressed by segments of Europe's White population is said to be matched by immigrants' oppositional stance towards the culture and institutions of their destination countries (cf. Klausen 2004). These confrontations have prompted some to declare an inevitable clash of cultures that has allegedly been long simmering within Europe's ethnically diverse borders (Huntington 1996). In short, relations between immigrant² communities and

¹ On Germany, see *Berliner Zeitung*, "Schäuble: Nicht wegsehen, engagiert vorgehen." May 23, 2006. The murderer of the killings in Belgium was a young man whose relatives were members of the Vlaams Belang, see *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, "Belgier demonstrieren gegen Rassismus." May 26, 2006. The Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) was called Vlaams Blok until the Belgian High Court banned it for being racist and forced a remodeling of the party.

² The following uses the term "immigrant" to apply to both first and later generation immigrants. It also employs the term "ethnic minority" to signify immigrant populations, reflecting both common parlance and the fact that most of Western Europe's numerically sizable minority groups have recent immigrant origins. In the following chapters, which track specific groups over time, I use both terms interchangeably. I acknowledge that some find the terms "immigrant" as well as "ethnic minority" offensive and have instead opted for the term "person with a migration background," a terminology I will not use for stylistic reasons. I use the term "native" to refer to the White indigenous population.

their host societies appear to be at their lowest ebb since the inception of mass immigration in the 1950s. Prominent observers consider the integration of immigrants “the greatest problem of [the] continent”³ and media pundits opine about Europe’s “next Holocaust” (Sardar 2005). Scholars and policymakers in the United States have also been expressing serious concerns about the linkage between Europe’s apparently failed record of immigrant integration and the spread of Islamic terrorism.⁴

The present popular preoccupation on the failures of immigrant integration is empirically inaccurate and conceptually flawed. Empirically, a focus on immigrant conflict obscures the fact that cases of peaceful immigrant incorporation abound. Except for minor incidences, France’s widely-publicized disorders did not instigate copy-cat rioting in neighboring countries. In Great Britain, the city of Leicester, home to a large Indian-origin population and hailed as a beacon of harmonious multiculturalism, has inspired the Blair government’s integration agenda (Home Office 2001a). In the city of Frankfurt, Germany, where over thirty percent of residents belong to ethnic minorities, right-wing parties have not been able to score electoral victories in years.⁵ Recently, much media attention has been devoted to the ethnically diverse city of Marseille, which has been spared from the country’s

³ This statement was made by Timothy Garton Ash, see *The Guardian*, “This is not only a French Crisis - all of Europe Must Heed the Flames.” November 10, 2005.

⁴ The Washington D.C.-based Migration Policy Institute, a nonpartisan think tank, deemed the integration of Europe’s Muslims the number one global migration issue of 2005, ahead of linking security and immigration controls in a post-9/11 world, or U.S. immigration reform more broadly (see www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?id=350). In 2006, the emphasis on Muslim integration continued when the top issue was European countries’ apparent abdication of multiculturalism in favor of assimilation (see <http://migrationinformation.com/Feature/display.cfm?ID=540>). U.S. scholars concerned with American security also consider the incorporation of Muslim in communities in Europe a major concern; see, for example, Leiken on the “emergence of homegrown mujahideen in Europe” (2005: 121) and Francis Fukuyama, who attributes the rise of Islamic fundamentalism to Europe’s unwelcoming and ultimately alienating immigration and citizenship regimes (“America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy.” Lecture delivered at Yale University, April 10, 2006).

⁵ See Bürgeramt, Statistik und Wahlen (2000) for election results during the 1990s.

riotous outbreak in the fall of 2005.⁶ Just over a decade earlier, however, Le Pen's victories had turned this multicultural port city into "the racist capital of Europe" (Singer 1991: 376). The case of Marseille thus suggests the importance of disaggregating the concept of immigrant conflict. Different types of behaviors should not be lumped together into one "immigration problem," as is commonly the case; immigrants attacking police and property represents a distinct phenomenon from violent clashes between natives and immigrants.

In short, after half a century of mass immigration to Western Europe, we observe considerable variation in the incidence and type of immigrant conflict over time within and across countries. Moreover, different immigrant groups tend to be involved in different types of immigrant conflict, even within one country. Drawing on a cross-national comparison between Great Britain and Germany as well as on subnational variation in immigrant-native and immigrant-state conflict within in Great Britain from the 1950s until today, this study begins with a series of puzzles. First, when contrasting patterns across countries, one finds that local immigrant conflict in Germany has been much less pronounced than in Great Britain. By the mid-1980s, when large-scale immigration had occurred in both countries for three decades, Britain had witnessed local successes of anti-immigrant parties, riots between immigrants and natives as well as major instances of urban unrest involving immigrants. Germany had experienced none of these. Second, within Great Britain, the occurrence of immigrant-state conflict and immigrant-native conflict has differed strikingly across different groups of immigrants. Whereas immigrant-native conflict has tended to occur between South Asians (originating from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) and Whites, such conflict has been

⁶ See, for example, *Le Monde*, "Pourquoi Marseille n'a pas explosé." December 15, 2005. One year after the riots, however, immigrant youth in Marseille attacked the police and set fire to a bus; see *The New York Times*, "Attackers Set Fire to Bus in Marseille, Wounding One." October 30, 2006.

much rarer between Blacks⁷ (hailing from Africa and the West Indies) and Whites. Conversely, Blacks have been predominantly engaged in anti-state behavior, but South Asians have been less likely to have done so. Given that these two groups started to arrive in Britain at around the same time, have the same Commonwealth status and hence British citizenship, have been subject to the same social and economic conditions and national political swings and share a host of socio-economic characteristics, this is a perplexing finding in need of explanation. Third, the incidence of immigrant conflict has also varied widely across time and space, as well as within space over time. Leicester, the above-mentioned beacon of multicultural harmony, was in fact denounced as one of Britain's most racist towns only a few decades earlier (Troyna and Ward 1982). London's East End has been a flashpoint of immigrant-native confrontations for many years, but even here some areas are affected more severely by inter-group strife than others. The city of Birmingham has witnessed its share of anti-state rioting on the part of its immigrant population, but the xenophobic National Front consistently failed at the polls. Nottingham had one violent episode of anti-immigrant rioting, but was soon after declared a harmonious town (cf. Lawrence 1974: 1). Similarly, London's northwestern boroughs have largely escaped immigrant conflict. Finally, the northern town of Bradford was the site of violent clashes between Pakistani-origin and White males in 2001, almost fifty years after initial – peaceful – Pakistani settlement in the area.

What explains these patterns? Why do some countries observe fewer instances of immigrant conflict than others? And why, within countries, are relations between immigrants

⁷ I follow the now common British usage and employ the term “Black” to refer to first or later generation immigrants who originate from the West Indies or Africa. This group is also sometimes labeled “Afro-Caribbean.” The term “South Asian” refers to immigrants and their descendants from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. These two groups constitute the majority of Britain's nonwhite immigrants. Note that from the 1960s through the 1980s, many accounts refer to all nonwhite immigrants in Britain as “Blacks.” This term was often used to express the shared immigrant experience of racism and discrimination in Great Britain.

and host societies peaceful in one town and conflictual in another? Finally, why are some groups in the same country prone to immigrant-native conflict, but less likely to be engaged in immigrant-state conflict, and vice versa? The central argument proposed in this dissertation claims that variation in economic scarcity and immigrant political power explains differences in immigrant conflict across time, space, and immigrant groups. Immigrant conflict occurs when there is a shortage of resources desired by both natives and immigrants. When immigrants can back up their claims for scarce economic goods with pivotal votes, incumbents will allocate these resources to this new constituency. Natives are in turn likely to protest such resource allocation by turning against immigrants. Conversely, in the absence of political leverage, immigrants are left with few resources during times of economic shortage. This state of affairs may leave natives content, but is more likely to cause immigrants to engage in conflictual relations with the state. The following pages will show how national immigration regimes crucially affect levels of economic scarcity and immigrant political power and how these national institutions in turn interact with differences in the local economic and political circumstances in the areas of immigrant settlement to explain variation in on-the-ground immigrant conflict across countries, cities and immigrant groups.

1.1 Immigrant Conflict

To understand the incidence of contemporary immigrant conflict, I start with the premise that not all confrontations involving immigrants are the same and group immigrant conflict into two theoretically and empirically distinct phenomena: immigrant-native and immigrant-state conflict. *Immigrant-native conflict involves the sustained confrontation between members of the immigrant and the native populations in a given locality.* While minimal, this definition nevertheless clarifies a great deal of what immigrant-native conflict does and does not capture. First, my conceptualization involves a temporal and a spatial dimension, in that inter-group conflict needs to be sustained, covering a period of at least five

years and it must occur in a given locality. In my definition, a series of confrontations (defined below) in a specified location add up to a situation that can be characterized as immigrant-native conflict. I select a lower threshold of five years to exclude short-term anti-immigrant agitation that commonly accompanies initial immigrant settlement. Rapid demographic change associated with immigration often provokes antagonism among a small cross-section of the native population; I investigate under what conditions such hostility becomes entrenched over time and cause for collective opposition.

Confrontations between immigrants and natives must be hostile if they are to constitute inter-group conflict, but they need not be violent. Electoral success of xenophobic parties with fiercely anti-immigrant platforms is thus an indicator of inter-group conflict, as is the formation of social movements that campaign for anti-immigrant policies (such as compulsory repatriation or exclusion of immigrants from public services) as well as groups that organize to defend immigrants' physical safety. Violent attacks and non-violent demonstrations directed against individuals, groups, or properties based on their membership status as immigrants or natives count as indicators of immigrant-native conflict. Empirically, these indicators tend to occur together, as right-wing parties and pressure groups legitimize or even foment racially-motivated attacks and street demonstrations by pro-immigrant lobbies to protest racist attacks that start out peacefully may turn into violent disorders. While these violent events are indicators of immigrant-native conflict, care must be taken to differentiate this "home-grown" type of violence (which counts) from "imported" acts of such violence (which do not necessarily count). A street disturbance instigated by skinheads who traveled from elsewhere in the country to invade the immigrant area of a town is thus not a reliable sign of local immigrant-native conflict; it depends on the extent to which the local population takes part. Together, these measures are meant to capture both the incidence and the severity of immigrant-native conflict. I pay particular attention to intergroup violence and local

collective action. For example, a situation where political elites try to foment anti-immigrant sentiment by injecting xenophobic rhetoric into political debates, but where local anti-immigrant organizations do not emerge, xenophobic parties founder at the polls, and violence against immigrants does not increase as a result does not constitute immigrant-native conflict.

Whereas immigrant-native conflict encompasses the sustained confrontation between members of immigrant and native communities, *immigrant-state conflict involves the sustained confrontation between immigrant communities and state actors in a given locality.*

Similar to my conceptualization of immigrant-native conflict, my understanding of immigrant-state conflict is based on the manifestation of anti-state behavior in a particular location over time. Anti-state behavior can take peaceful forms, for example the dissemination of views opposing the state's actions and expressing distrust in state institutions, but can also be conducted violently, for instance, when immigrant groups cause property damage to impose costs on the state or clash with representatives of the state on a small and large scale. As the next chapters will show, the police often act as the local representative of a state that is perceived to act in discriminatory ways and conflictual relations between immigrant groups and the police thus indicate immigrant-state conflict.

1.2 Explaining Variation

1.2.1 National and Local Variation in Economic Scarcity and Immigrant

Political Power

The main focus of this dissertation is the study of immigrant conflict as it occurs in the localities where immigrants settle. Local immigrant integration does, however, not occur in a vacuum. National institutions crucially impact the recruitment and settlement of immigrants, shape immigrant incorporation into domestic economic structures and define the limits and opportunities for immigrant political participation in the host countries.

Immigration regimes vary in all of these dimensions. Some countries deliberately follow

economic rationales and carefully plan and execute the immigration and settlement of foreign labor by integrating this workforce into their labor market institutions and welfare states. Others might also open their borders to economic migrants, but take few measures to assist these workers in their search for housing or employment. Still others might pay less attention to the economic needs for and accommodation of foreign labor, but allow large-scale inflows of migrants for political reasons, for example due to historical obligations arising from colonial or wartime experiences.

Once settled in the new country, migrants also have differential access to political rights. Some countries bestow these newcomers with enhanced political privileges, allowing them to participate in local elections or to naturalize as citizens of the destination country, while others set strict limits on the scope for immigrant political behavior. Countries differ widely in the laws that govern whether, when, and which immigrants can become citizens of their destination countries. Moreover, there is variation within and across countries (as well as within countries across immigrant groups) with respect to the extension of the local franchise to non-citizens.⁸

The ways in which the state allocates economic and political goods to immigrants thus varies across immigration regimes. These differences in the national economic and political frameworks further shape and interact with variation in local *economic scarcity* and *immigrant political power* to produce varied paths of immigrant integration and conflict on the ground. In the context of this study, *economic scarcity* characterizes a situation in which there is a shortage of goods desired by both immigrants and natives. The supply of these goods is fixed in the short-term and can result in zero-sum competition. In cases of

⁸ EU citizens can cast their vote in local elections in all member countries; non-EU residents can vote in local elections in Belgium, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. In Spain and Portugal, residents originating from certain countries, mostly former colonies where Spanish and Portuguese citizens enjoy reciprocal rights, can participate in local elections. For cross-national differences in citizenship regimes, see Brubaker (1992), Weil (2001) and Howard (2006).

immigrant conflict, the state often exercises direct or indirect control over the allocation of these resources, which most commonly include public services such as public housing or area-based government grants. The importance of state-controlled resources derives from the fact that under certain circumstances, specified below, the state is more responsive to anti-immigrant agitation (and obviously to anti-state action) than the market. As we will see later on, the availability of material goods that are in demand among both immigrants and natives, such as housing, employment and public services varies across countries based on their immigration regimes. Furthermore, it also varies across local immigrant destinations, especially in settings where national immigration regimes do not take steps to guide immigrant settlement. Immigrants often locate in cities where opportunities for employment are initially abundant, but municipal infrastructures might otherwise not be well equipped to handle large inflows of newcomers. Over time, changes in the availability of employment will also affect overall demand for public services and economic scarcity; all else equal, immigrants (and natives) put greater strains on public services as their incomes decline.

Second, we also observe differences in the potential for *immigrant political power*. An immigrant group is considered to be politically powerful if its vote is influential in deciding the outcomes of elections. Several institutional and behavioral features determine immigrant political power. Institutionally, the most important variables are citizenship regimes and voting laws. While access to citizenship and the ballot box are necessary preconditions for political power, the competitiveness of elections and/or the extent to which parties rely on the immigrant vote to keep them in power also determine whether a given immigrant voting bloc will be pivotal. My definition of immigrant political power thus privileges formal political participation of immigrants that can vote in local and/or national elections over informal, pressure group activity by immigrants who are barred from casting ballots in these electoral contests. Socio-demographic characteristics of immigrant groups

interact with these formal laws to determine immigrant political power. Similar to native political power, numerical concentration relative to the relevant electoral boundary and organizational capacity to turn out on Election Day are preconditions for electoral clout. In contrast to native political power, the next chapter will illustrate how features of a group's ethnicity (e.g., kinship ties and social networks) impact its potential political power by influencing its migration and settlement patterns and by affecting its organizational capacity and turnout.

1.2.2 A Theory of Immigrant Conflict

This dissertation develops a theory that explains when and why immigrant-native conflict and immigrant-state conflict occurs. I will argue that the ways in which the political process shapes the distribution of material resources in settings characterized by economic scarcity determines the incidence of both types of conflict. Variation in immigrant political power will in turn decide which type of conflict we observe.

My theory of *immigrant-native conflict* is based on the following propositions. I begin with the assumption that the native population will only engage in anti-immigrant behavior if such actions are believed to deter immigrants from acquiring scarce resources. This in turn implies that the actor who controls the disbursement of these goods is sensitive to anti-immigrant agitation, or that the costs that such confrontations inflict on immigrants themselves are sufficiently high to discourage them from accepting these scarce goods, or both. A corollary of this implication is that immigrant-native conflict is more likely if the state, rather than the market, allocates scarce resources. In settings where the state distributes goods, deserting ruling parties in favor of candidates that advocate anti-immigrant policies is intended to increase the costs associated with pro-immigrant resource allocation borne by the governing party. Anti-immigrant organizations and rallies are meant to bring attention to the grievances caused by immigration to a wider audience, some of whom will also abandon

incumbents unless policies that appear to favor immigrants are changed. Additionally, anti-immigrant violence and ensuing cycles of reprisals also cause some voters to seek out parties who advocate repatriating immigrants, which, these parties claim, would decrease the incidence of violence.⁹

In settings where the market allocates resources, the scope for *effective* anti-immigrant activity is more limited. Not only are market actors less sensitive to local voting patterns, during times of economic recession they also generally face few incentives to give into demands for resource allocations that favor natives, unless this serves their economic interests anyway.¹⁰ Harassment and violence directed against migrant settlers would have to supplant an electoral backlash and impose sufficiently high burdens on immigrants for them to refrain from taking up market-based resources, mainly jobs, which may in turn threaten their livelihoods as well. Given these assumptions, I expect that competition over scarce resources that are allocated by the state will be more likely to lead to sustained immigrant-native conflict than competition over scarce resources allocated by market actors.¹¹ It is important to underscore that the analytical distinction is not based on the type of goods per se, but on the actor who has control over the disbursement of these goods. State-owned

⁹ The National Front in Britain adopted this strategy in the 1970s and 1980s (see below); today, the British National Party disseminates reports of immigrant-on-native violence during election campaigns.

¹⁰ For example, in several European countries (including Germany) that had imported large numbers of guestworkers in the 1950s and 1960s, employers had, by the 1970s, a growing interest in sending back this source of cheap labor which was seen as an impediment to the modernization of production. Employers even provided subsidies for the return journey. For a similar argument in the context of contemporary low-skilled migration to the United States, see Barry Chiswick's editorial in the *New York Times*, "The Worker Next Door." June 3, 2006.

¹¹ It appears that debates about *immigration* policy thus tend to focus on jobs and wages, whose distribution is generally directly affected by a state's immigration laws. Debates about immigrant *integration* more often appear to revolve around immigrants' use of state-based resources. Note that I am not arguing that market-based competition will not lead to anti-immigrant attitudes. In fact, a growing body of research, briefly reviewed below, documents links between individuals' position in the economy and their preferences over immigration policies. I simply claim that *acting* on these attitudes will on the whole be less effective in bringing about the desired outcomes if the market is solely responsible for the allocation of resources.

housing, public employment or area-based government grants are goods that are linked directly to government control; but the state also affects resource allocation among immigrants and natives through, for example, regulations that give natives preferential treatment in obtaining jobs or through ethnically-based training and employment quotas.¹²

If natives engage in anti-immigrant behavior to protest the state's allocation decisions, what determines these distributional choices in the first place? I begin with the simple assumption that the ruling political parties¹³ charged with allocating resources to their constituencies will only disburse scarce goods to immigrant groups if the expected gains exceed the expected losses associated with such actions. This implies that political parties will only appeal for immigrant votes on the basis of material resources if they assume that the impact of the potential electoral backlash of such action is smaller than the boost delivered by the new immigrant voting bloc.¹⁴ In the case of naturalized immigrants or those who have access to local voting rights, this calculation is in turn based on the concentration of the immigrant vote relative to the relevant electoral boundary and the organizational capacity of immigrants to induce their co-ethnics to turn out on Election Day. However, if immigrants are barred from the ballot box, ruling parties are generally not expected to distribute scarce goods to immigrants at the expense of their native constituencies, unless legal requirements

¹² Jones-Correa (2001a) has argued that inter-ethnic strife is often based on competition for state-based goods because the supply of the latter is usually relatively fixed and competition as a result zero-sum in nature. I would agree that, in the context of state-based resource allocation, zero-sum competition further increases the odds of immigrant-native conflict, but it is not the zero-sum character alone that leads to sustained conflict.

¹³ For the purposes of this discussion, I conceive of political parties as unitary actors. The issue of immigration and immigrant integration of course often causes internal fissures within parties, as the current debate over U.S. immigration reform illustrates. See also chapter two for a brief discussion of political divisions over immigration in the British case. Given competing constellation of interests, pro-immigrant actions are often only undertaken if they made electoral sense, as correspondence held at the Labour Party Archives in Manchester as well as evidence gleaned from local studies, both discussed in the next chapters, conveys. As a result, my theory conceptualizes political parties as strategic unitary actors.

¹⁴ In calculating this tradeoff, ruling parties take into account actions of the opposition parties who may pander to White natives and thereby increase the electoral backlash associated with pro-immigrant resource allocation.

force them to do so. Note also that political parties enjoy much greater leeway when appealing to immigrants on the basis of goods that are not in short supply or not desired by natives.¹⁵

If immigrant political power induces inter-group conflict when resources are scarce, I argue that it is the absence of such power during economically hard times that is likely to compel immigrants to engage in violent and non-violent conflict with the state. As with immigrant-native conflict, this proposition rests on the assumption that local political actors will only address immigrant needs in times of resource scarcity if the gains associated with the immigrant vote exceed the losses incurred by the anti-immigrant vote that such resource allocation might trigger. I also assume that engaging in anti-state actions on the part of immigrants can be intended to highlight the grievances that are seen to have been caused by state neglect. Since the local political process is less receptive to demands by groups that cannot reward politicians at the polls, and local politicians cannot make credible commitments to these groups, acting against the state represents an alternative channel to articulate demands.¹⁶ Actually disenfranchised immigrants who cannot vote or effectively disenfranchised immigrants who fail to translate their votes into electoral power may thus hope to effect a change in state practices by engaging in anti-state behavior.

¹⁵ The identification of group claims is thus critical. Note that Wilkinson's influential theory of ethnic riots is based on the important assumption that minorities "will be willing to 'bid low' in terms of what they demand from majority parties across most issues in order to maximize their security" (2004: 142). In chapter five, I show how immigrant-native conflict escalates when minority groups raise the costliness of their bids by supplementing religiously-based claims with demands for state-based economic resources.

¹⁶ I thus reject the hypothesis that "greed" will cause ethnic minorities to engage in anti-state behavior. While looting certainly occurred during anti-state riots in Britain, research has shown that in most cases, looters were not locals or ethnic minorities, but were Whites who traveled from outside to take advantage of an ongoing riot (Keith 1993). The "greed versus grievance" question has been extensively debated in the context of civil war; see Collier and Hoeffler (2004) for an argument favoring greed and Fearon and Laitin (2003) for a study that highlights the importance of opportunities (such as rough terrain or weak state capacity), rather than group antagonisms, in explaining civil war onset. See Kalyvas (2006) for an alternative account of violence in civil war.

Why should such action pay? Violent-anti state behavior is intended to impose direct costs on the local state through property damage and police injury and more general costs in the form of social instability. Incumbents fear a reduction of the local tax base caused by property damage as well as a decline in future investment in areas that are prone to violence. An official dealing with immigrant integration in Frankfurt, Germany, acknowledged, for example, that one reason why the city's mayor tried to keep immigrants "happy," was to prevent riots which would cause investors to flee.¹⁷ Moreover, some voters will punish incumbents for their failure to keep the peace. To avoid future violence, state actors will have to take immigrant demands into account. Additionally, anti-state behavior can send a signal to higher levels of government that are concerned with the maintenance of law and order and social peace. As the next chapters will show, national policymakers fear the emergence of potentially militant non-state actors and are inclined to address these actors' grievances in order to forestall violence. In contrast to local politicians, national governments might also be better able to internalize the locally-occurring native backlash that might ensue if immigrant grievances are addressed, seemingly at the expense of natives. Moreover, such a backlash might be muted if local natives figure that they cannot affect national (as opposed to local) policy. Finally, in line with my conceptualization of the use of violence (explicated below), I do not claim that all actors involved in violent anti-state actions intend to impel the state to change its behavior, but that such intentions represent an important component of immigrant-state conflict.

The causal logic of the above propositions is encapsulated in Figure 1.1.

¹⁷ Interview with the author, October 2005.

Fig. 1.1: Immigration and Conflict

		Immigrants Possess Local Political Power	
		no	yes
Economic Scarcity	no	No conflict	No conflict
	yes	Immigrant-State Conflict	Immigrant-Native Conflict

My theory of immigrant conflict explains the varied incidence of immigrant-native and immigrant-state conflict across Germany and Great Britain, and across immigrant groups as well as locations within Great Britain. The cross-national comparison will show that the institutions underlying Germany’s guestworker migration put the country’s immigration experience in the upper-left corner of the above diagram. Guestworkers were recruited during times of economic prosperity and the state, together with employers and unions, assisted in their settlement, accommodation and employment. The immigration regime aimed for economic integration, but ruled out political incorporation as guestworkers could not vote in local elections and German citizenship remained difficult to obtain. When resources became scarce, competition between natives and immigrants in the settlement locations was greatly reduced as the state followed the guidelines of the guestworker scheme which put native economic needs explicitly ahead of those of the migrant workforce and the latter lacked the political leverage to induce state actors to disburse economic goods to them. Moreover, Germany’s immigration regime helped to prevent instances of anti-state behavior because its laws forced or persuaded economically unsuccessful migrants to leave the country. Since the 1990s, the rules guiding the guestworker regime are no longer operative,

the German economy experienced a lasting recession, and steps have been taken to naturalize guestworkers and their descendents. The probability of both types of immigrant conflict has increased as a result. While the present focus is on the guestworker regime and its effects on immigrant conflict, I will also show how the sudden influx of migrants – ethnic Germans and asylum-seekers – whose status gave them privileged access to state resources during a time when these goods were in short supply caused brief but fierce local-level anti-immigrant mobilization.

In contrast to Germany's guestworker immigration, postcolonial immigration to Great Britain occurred in the relative absence of state intervention. Immigrants from the West Indies and the Indian subcontinent generally found accommodation and employment without state assistance, but unlike their German counterparts, these postcolonial migrants had access to full political rights, including British citizenship. Variation in immigrant groups' use of their electoral potential and differences in economic conditions on the ground together explain varied patterns of immigrant conflict across groups and areas of settlement. A comparison between Black and South Asian immigrants will demonstrate that settlement of immigrants from the West Indies, while concentrated in particular cities and towns, is quite dispersed at the level of the electoral ward.¹⁸ In contrast, Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi migrants have settled in close-knit communities that are concentrated both across and within towns. Moreover, strong ethnic ties among South Asian immigrants – much less in evidence among their Black counterparts – have contributed to this group's ability to deliver the “ethnic vote.” In short, South Asians tend to possess local political

¹⁸ In Great Britain, electorates vote for local candidates at the ward level. Candidates who win ward elections secure a seat on the council at the level of the local authority (also called district or, in the case of Greater London, borough). The party that wins the greatest number of seats controls the council. In Greater London, which contains 32 boroughs, local elections are held every four years in two-to-three-member wards, where candidates are elected according to plurality. In most areas outside of London, elections are held three years in a row, with no elections held in the fourth year, in single-member, first-past-the post wards (at every election, a third of the council seats from all wards are contested).

power (putting them in the right column), but political clout tends to elude Blacks (putting them in the left column). When economic resources are scarce, South Asian immigrants are much more likely than their Black counterparts to acquire these valued goods and in turn become targets of anti-immigrant agitation, resulting in immigrant-native conflict (lower-right box). Absent political power, immigrants are much less likely to claim state-controlled resources, leading them to protest against state neglect (lower-left box). Variation in immigrant electoral power and economic conditions also explains the incidence and type of immigrant conflict across locations, holding constant the immigrant group in question.

The next chapter will elaborate how tight social networks in the sending countries facilitate both chain migration and concentrated settlement while also influencing the political behavior of immigrants in their destination country. The fact that these networks are much more pronounced among settlers from the Indian sub-continent than they are among migrants from the Caribbean islands or Africa produces tangible political results in the new country, which in turn shape the type and incidence of immigrant conflict that these ethnic groups will be engaged in. At the level of the locality, political competitiveness will decide whether immigrants' electoral potential translates into effective local political power. If it does, competition over scarce material goods will ensue and immigrant-native conflict will follow; if it does not, the local state has no incentive to address immigrant demands for scarce material resources and immigrant-state conflict will result. In short, variations in the functions of ethnicity in the home country lead to political outcomes in the destination country, which in turn interact with economic conditions and electoral institutions to produce variation in immigrant conflict.

1.2.3 Assumptions, Concepts and Scope Conditions

The logic of immigrant conflict as laid out above makes several assumptions pertaining to the relationship between immigrant political representatives and their

constituencies and between the local state, local goods and immigrant groups. First, groups that possess political power are assumed to make claims for economic goods if their members are in need of such goods. This is often, but not always, the case. Second, and related, the use of political power refers to substantive and not merely descriptive representation.¹⁹ Non-immigrant politicians can thus represent the interests of their minority constituents if the latter use their electoral leverage to induce them to do so. By contrast, immigrant leaders who are elected into town halls but who, intentionally or unintentionally, fail to deliver goods to their co-ethnic constituents do not in fact use their group's electoral power to attain valued resources. In this case, natives have few reasons to stage anti-immigrant campaigns, and immigrants have more reasons to protest against the political leadership, even if it contains co-ethnics. Third, the model assumes that the local state exercises control over the distribution of state resources. Empirically, many goods that are in demand among both immigrants and natives, such as state-subsidized housing, access to local public services, public-sector employment and area-based government grants are indeed under local control, or, in the case of some central/federal government grant programs require considerable assistance from the local state. However, when the local state has no discretion over the disbursement of these goods, local immigrant electoral power will matter much less in affecting patterns of resource allocation and hence immigrant conflict. The same is true at the level of the immigrant group. Some migrants are entitled to certain government goods and local officials are required by law to allocate these goods to them, even if the former have few political rights. In this case, immigrant status effectively substitutes for electoral leverage. According to the general logic of the argument, natives should also protest such allocation rules in settings when such goods are scarce and when the state might prove

¹⁹ See Pitkin (1969) for a distinction between substantive and descriptive representation and Mansbridge (1999) for a discussion of how the latter can enhance the former.

responsive to native claims. The central theme running through these assumptions is thus that the mechanism linking immigrants to conflict is their capacity to claim scarce economic resources from the state; political power is often the precondition for this ability.

In addition to these assumptions, the theory developed here and tested in the following pages encompasses conceptualizations of violence and immigrant mobilization that need to be spelled out in some detail. *Violence* is one important component of immigrant conflict. This is not to say that violence itself cannot be further disaggregated and shown to exhibit its own patterns and mobilizational cycles.²⁰ But in my study of immigrant conflict (which occurs in otherwise peaceful settings), I assume that the initial causes of violence, directed against immigrants or natives on the one hand and state institutions on the other, are identical to the causes of immigrant conflict. My analysis thus assumes that individuals who engage in anti-immigrant or anti-state violence do so in a goal-oriented way.

Ascribing rationality to violence is contentious,²¹ but I do so for the following reasons. First, in the context of immigrant conflict, violence directed against ethnic groups or state institutions often serves a specific communicative function. The empirical evidence will illustrate, for example, that natives commit attacks against immigrants in order to deter

²⁰ See, Brubaker and Laitin (1998), Horowitz (2001) and Kalyvas (2006) for analyses that disaggregate and explain violence.

²¹ The interdisciplinary literature on hate crime identifies both expressive and rational motivations in the commission of such violence; chapter six of this dissertation provides a brief review of this literature. For a more extensive treatment, see Dancygier and Green (forthcoming) and Green et al. (2001). Based on research in Scandinavia, Björger (1993) labels anti-immigrant attacks comprising arson, bombings and shootings “terrorist violence” to underscore that these types of attacks are meant to achieve a specific objective; but he goes on to state that: “...in most cases, these various [instrumental and expressive] motives are woven together in a complex way. Acts which on the surface may appear to be mainly motivated by racism and opposition to the current immigration policy, may, on closer inspection, turn out to have just as much to do with the perpetrator’s wish to present a particular image of himself to his peers and social surroundings” (40). Kalyvas (2006: 23-28) provides a detailed discussion of the varied aims of political violence and argues that “the instrumental use of coercive violence constitutes a central aspect of the phenomenon [in civil wars]” (28). In the context of the ethnic riot, Horowitz sums up the tension between expressive and rational motivations as follows: “Since the riot involves passion and calculation, the sources of explanation reside in realms appropriate sometimes to psychological and sometimes to strategic behavior. Violence has so many wellsprings of action that the varied repertoire of the fox, rather than the single-mindedness of the hedgehog, is more appropriate to the explanatory task” (2001: xiv).

the latter from appropriating “their” resources and that immigrants may engage in confrontations with state actors or participate in anti-state riots to signal their dissatisfaction with state practices. Second, violent acts do not occur in a vacuum, but are embedded in specific political contexts, economic conditions and social environments. In the case of violence targeted against ethnic minorities, criminologists, sociologists and anthropologists have demonstrated that such attacks are part of a larger process of victimization and proliferate when they enjoy the tacit or explicit support of a wider cross-section of the “perpetrator community” (Sibbit 1997: 103),²² whose racist resentment, I will show, is in turn a function of the local political economy. Collective actors, such as xenophobic political parties, have also been shown to use anti-immigrant violence strategically (Taylor 1981, van Donselaar 1993: 52).²³ My analysis of immigrant-initiated violence against state actors will also demonstrate that such behavior follows a systematic pattern that is tied to the articulation of collective grievances on the part of immigrant groups. I follow those who conceptualize anti-state violence as an instrumental action,²⁴ but I do not aim to propose an all-encompassing, macro-sociological or social-psychological theory of political violence. While an abundance of such theories on this topic exist, it has been generally acknowledged that the wide reach of the phenomena that they seek to explain, ranging from revolutions and secessions, to riots and strikes, has resulted in a poor fit between theoretical predictions and

²² See, for example, Björger (1993), Bowling (1993) and Foster (1999).

²³ In Great Britain, the extremist National Front (NF) has used violence against immigrants for at least two purposes: first, to recruit members among young males and second, to provoke retaliation from immigrants in the hope that inter-group violence would escalate to such an extent that middle-class voters would vote for the NF as the only party that would put an end to an untenable situation by repatriating immigrants and banning further immigration (Taylor 1981). Leftist groupings have also employed violence as a resource. According to della Porta’s study of left-wing political groups in Italy and Germany, “when volatile material conditions and ideological factionalism weakened a movement organization, *militancy became its only unifying principle*...activists with a long experience in radical organizations used violence as a strategic choice to try to motivate the alienated urban youth” (1995: 107; emphasis in original).

²⁴ On rationality in riot behavior, see, for example, Piven and Cloward (1971), McAdam (1982) and Fording (1997) for the American context and Wieviorka (2005) for the French case.

empirical outcomes.²⁵ Rather, I specify under which conditions we are likely to observe immigrant-state conflict and assume that immigrants pursue certain objectives when they engage in such conflict. At a minimum, these structural conditions can be shown to be conducive to immigrant-state violence; at best, they can be shown to motivate individual decisions to engage in such behavior. In short, this study does not argue that violent behavior on the part of natives or immigrants is never expressive or follows only one motivation, but it does claim that the strategic use of violence by groups and individuals represents a crucial feature of immigrant conflict.

Immigrant conflict is distinct from *immigrant mobilization*. More generally, ethnic mobilization – the organization of groups along ethnic lines – is a necessary condition for ethnic conflict to occur. Indeed, scholars have argued that the relative ease of mobilization of ethnic groups who share the same language, territory, culture or preferences contributes to the emergence of ethnic conflict (Bates 1983). However, social and political cleavages do not necessarily indicate which linkage mechanisms connect politicians with voters (Kitschelt 2000), and we observe ethnic mobilization for non-ethnic as well as for non-conflictual purposes. The Democratic Party’s recruitment of immigrant electorates in the 1930s thus certainly occurred along ethnic lines, but this mobilization served to build a coalition in support of the New Deal (Gamm 1989). Ethnic mobilization for ethnic purposes is also a routine occurrence in plural democracies, but such action need not impinge at all upon members of ethnic outgroups. In the case of immigrants this is especially likely to be true, as this group requires specific goods and services, such as assistance with the setting up of cultural and religious infrastructures, or with access to local and state bureaucracies and immigration authorities, all of which are more easily achieved through organization at the

²⁵ Horowitz (2001: 34-42) reviews these theories (e.g., frustration-aggression theory, relative deprivation theory and resource mobilization theory) and provides a critique.

group level and through connections with these organizations and their leaders at the level of the individual. As one Pakistani-origin councilor in Bradford put it: “Pakistani councillors here have to do ten times as much work as white councillors because we have to help people who do not understand the British system.”²⁶ In short, being linked to one’s ethnic group “provides a convenient handle for political organization to press claims on government and to interpret government to group members” (Horowitz 1985: 81). Scholars have thus attributed the link between ethnic mobilization and political machines in the United States to immigrants’ need for a “buffer against an unfamiliar state and its legal minions” (Cornwell 1964: 30). At the same time, ethnic mobilization of this kind familiarized immigrants with the American party system and “fostered their integration into American life” (ibid: 33), thus sowing the seeds of its own destruction. For this reason, ethnic leaders of immigrant groups might even intentionally stall the assimilation of their co-ethnics, since the status of these intermediaries is inversely related to their groups’ assimilation to the new country.²⁷

Empirically, ethnic mobilization can of course trigger immigrant-native conflict when the pursuit of these ethnic goods constitutes a threat to native interests. The building of a mosque may thus be presented as a threatening proposition, taking away funds and land for the building of a church or undermining the native population’s sense of identity, for example. By the same token, ethnic mobilization for non-ethnic purposes, such as gaining access to certain occupations traditionally held by natives only, can become framed in zero-sum terms. In sum, ethnic mobilization for ethnic goods can lead to ethnic conflict as can

²⁶ *The Times*, “Asians seize on fast route to Westminster.” September 30, 1994. This councilor went on to argue that the special needs of migrant communities and their co-ethnic representatives’ appreciation for these needs required the election of co-ethnic MPs.

²⁷ This relationship between ethnic leaders and their constituents also extends to the economic realm. See Kwong’s account of Chinese entrepreneurs in New York City who draw “a veritable color line that keeps their [Chinese] workers from all external contacts” and who use their economic status to “maintain social and political control of the community” (2001: 83-84).

ethnic mobilization for non-ethnic goods. Nevertheless, it is necessary to draw analytical and empirical distinctions between ethnic mobilization and ethnic conflict and to investigate under which conditions the former induces the latter.²⁸

In light of these assumptions and conceptualizations, I expect my argument of immigrant conflict to hold in *democratic settings where immigrants settle legally*. The majority of immigrants that arrived in Western Europe during the postwar decades fall within these scope conditions.²⁹ For obvious reasons, electoral leverage cannot be a factor in immigrant conflict in non-democracies. It may be the case that certain migrant communities have a degree of political power in non-democracies because they represent the support bases of the political regime and as a result may also enjoy privileged access to state resources. While this may incur the wrath of natives, the costs associated with anti-immigrant actions in these settings, i.e., likely punishment by the ruling elites, and their doubtful effectiveness might deter natives from doing so. Such costs could also deter immigrants from engaging in anti-state behavior. Another important scope condition refers to the actual settlement of migrant groups in the specific locations and their relationships with indigenous communities and political actors in these areas. Migrants that are perpetually in transit or that settle for a short period of time only, such as political refugees whose claims for asylum have been denied after a brief stay, do not fall in this category. Finally, my theory of immigrant conflict applies to legal immigrants, but might be less accurate in predicting immigrant conflict when it comes to illegal settlers as illegality greatly reduces the scope of immigrant behavior. Illegal immigrants might not claim resources for fear of native reprisals and the unwanted

²⁸ Chandra (2001) provides a very useful discussion along these lines, clarifying the conditions under which demands made by ethnic groups may lead to ethnic conflict.

²⁹ France has probably had the largest number of illegal immigrants in Western Europe, but many of these were eventually legalized.

exposure that ensues and their illegal status and fear of deportation could also inhibit them from participating in violent or non-violent anti-state behavior.

1.3 Implications

My theory of immigrant conflict produces several implications for the study of intergroup conflict and ethnic politics. First, this study shows that it is important to disaggregate contemporary immigrant conflict into the two types proposed here. This distinction is first of all warranted on empirical grounds. But it also sheds light on the operation of “racism” or “prejudice” in contemporary democracies. So far, I have not said much about racism as it exists in Europe today, either at the level of the individual or within the functioning of governmental and nongovernmental institutions. This is not because I dispute its relevance. Indeed, individual countries as well as the European Union have implemented laws to combat both kinds of racism and to facilitate the incorporation of immigrants and ethnic minorities on a more equal footing with the majority population.³⁰ Rather, I seek to uncover how differences in national and local contexts produce varied incentives for individuals and groups to behave in racist ways, which in turn lead to different outcomes: immigrant-native conflict, immigrant-state conflict, or no conflict at all. My approach is thus not necessarily inconsistent with macro-sociological theoretical accounts that trace the origins of race and racism and their construction in contemporary societies,³¹

³⁰ The European Union implemented the “Racial Equality Directive” in 2000, which aims to uphold the principle of equal treatment in employment, education, and access to social services and public goods irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. For accounts of national approaches to discrimination and racism, see, for example, Bleich (2003) who examines how Great Britain and France have developed distinct policy frameworks to fight racism and pattern social interactions across ethnic lines. In addressing how these two countries have tackled the “ethnic dilemmas” that accompany the integration of culturally distinct immigrants into these liberal democracies, see also Favell (1998) who illuminates the ways in which different philosophies of integration – French republicanism on the one hand and British multiculturalism on the other – fare in their quest to marry ethnic diversity with political stability, civility and tolerance. For a comparative investigation of anti-discrimination measures and racial inequality in Great Britain, France and the United States, see Lieberman (2005).

³¹ For an introduction to these theories, see Back and Solomos (2000) and Winant (2000).

but it illuminates how even within the confines of one larger historical backdrop behavioral manifestations of prejudice or racism vary as individuals respond strategically to given contexts.

This conceptual framework links up with the study of ethnic conflict more generally, where contextual factors have been shown to exert important incentives on group behavior whereas the association between prejudice and conflict still remains tenuous.³² It also speaks to recent scholarship on the operation of racism in the American context, which recognizes the institutional and organizational underpinnings of racist *actions*. Here, scholars have criticized the field's preoccupation with studying racism as an irrational, social-psychological phenomenon at the level of the individual on the one hand, or as a deep-seated, structural component of American society and institutions on the other. There remains, however, "surprisingly little theoretical or empirical analysis of what leads individuals to commit racist acts."³³ This study aims to do just that.

In doing so, the dissertation takes into account not only the actions of natives, but also takes seriously the behavior of immigrants. I build on others who show that environmental factors importantly shape the political behavior of ethnic groups³⁴ and of immigrant groups specifically.³⁵ But I also show that within the same institutional

³² In their review of the scholarship on prejudice and ethnic conflict, Green and Seher (2003) document that the establishment of an empirical association between bigoted beliefs and bigoted actions still eludes this field.

³³ Frymer (2005: 373). See Bonilla-Silva (1997) and Frymer (2005) for a review of macro-sociological theories of racism, a critique of the existing scholarship on race and racism and for calls to view racist behavior as a rational response to specific institutional environments. For recent research that takes contextual determinants of *attitudes* towards ethnic outgroups in the United States into account, see Oliver and Mendelberg (2000), Oliver and Wong (2003), and Gay (2006).

³⁴ For recent examples of this view, see Fearon (1999) Chandra (2004), Posner (2004 and 2005) and Yashar (2005).

³⁵ Some accounts highlight how national political opportunity structures condition immigrant political behavior, and, by implication, potential immigrant political power. Ireland (1994) analyzes cross-national variation in the political behavior of immigrants in France and Switzerland; his findings derive from a careful examination of the ways in which national policies, such as citizenship regimes, affect local

environment, differences in the social organization of ethnic groups matter in producing distinct political outcomes. In combining anthropological and sociological insights with institutional analysis in the context of ethnic politics, I take up the call to study the “Micro-contextual factors [that] tend to be particularly decisive in determining the electoral success of ethnic minority candidates” (Bird 2005: 431).

The dissertation also contributes to the comparative study of intergroup conflict as it unfolds on ground. While there is a vast literature covering the incidence of ethnic conflict across the globe,³⁶ relatively few comparative works study the occurrence of conflict in localities of immigrant settlement.³⁷ Countless local single-case histories provide interesting and rich accounts of the immigrant experience, and this study draws on many of these. But these narratives generally do not aim for generalizable explanations. Even in the context of ethnic minority relations in the United States, a widely-studied topic, “there have been remarkably few comparative studies that bring...locally specific work together” (Jones-Correa 2001b: 2). In contrast to case studies, cross-national research shows how macro-level variables such as unemployment rates, immigration levels, economic restructuring and electoral institutions can account for the success and failures of anti-immigration parties, but their focus is generally not the area of immigrant settlement.³⁸ Moreover, survey research

incentives for immigrant political mobilization at the grassroots level. In a similar vein, Koopmans and Statham (1999), employing content analysis of daily newspapers, aim to show that Britain’s multiculturalist conception of citizenship is associated with immigrant mobilization along religious and cultural lines, whereas the national and ethnic origins and of migrants’ homelands shape immigrant claims-making in Germany, consistent with the country’s ethno-national citizenship model. For further accounts that take national political opportunity structures as the crucial variables explaining immigrant political behavior, see Koopmans and Statham (2000), contributions to the 2004 special issue of the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* and Garbaye (2005). See Marrow (2005) for a review of the determinants of immigrant political behavior in the U.S. context.

³⁶ For recent reviews and research on ethnic conflict and ethnic violence, see, for example, Brubaker and Laitin (1998), Horowitz (2001), Varshney (2002; see pp. 23-39 for a review of the literature) and Wilkinson (2004).

³⁷ For exceptions, see Weiner (1978), Olzak (1992) and Karapin (2002 and 2003).

³⁸ See, for example, Betz (1994), Kitschelt (1995), Golder (2003) and van der Brug (2005).

has demonstrated that opinions against immigrants and immigration can be shown to result from perceived economic costs in the form of lost wages, jobs or increased tax burdens.³⁹

Other opinion studies have pointed to the cultural threats that cause individuals to oppose the inflow of ethnically distinct newcomers.⁴⁰

These accounts provide important theoretical insights on which the following chapters build. But we should not assume that the national success of far-right parties can be cleanly disaggregated into a series of conflicts in the localities of immigrant settlement. Similarly, variation in individual attitudes is most likely not linearly related to variation in collectively organized local immigrant conflict. Furthermore, local problems often do not match up with their dissemination and perception nationwide. In Ireland, for example, where large-scale immigration is a relatively new and much discussed phenomenon, only eight percent of the population considered racist violence “not [to be] a problem at all,” but when asked about their local area, 61 percent of Irish respondents held this view. In Denmark, the rise of the xenophobic Danish People’s Party is often linked to Islam and its feared effects on Danish society. But researchers who have studied the party’s local campaigns have found

³⁹ Scheve and Slaughter (2001) find that less-skilled workers in the United States are more likely to favor restricting immigration, suggesting the importance of perceived adverse wage pressures in the low-skills sector. Relying on public opinion surveys in fifteen European countries, Scheepers and colleagues (2002) argue that native manual workers are more likely to favor ethnic exclusionism than members of the service class as the share of low-skilled, non-EU immigrants in a country rises. Mayda’s analysis (2006) of such attitudes in developed and developing countries likewise suggests the importance of the interaction between individual and national skill endowments and the skill levels of immigrants in shaping attitudes towards these newcomers. Finally, Hanson et al. (2007) find that differences in the fiscal costs that individuals expect to bear due to immigration inflows – which in turn are a function of state laws and individual skills – explain variation in attitudes towards immigration policy in the United States.

⁴⁰ In a series of innovative survey experiments, Sniderman et al. (2004) demonstrate that both economic and cultural threats drive hostility towards immigrants among Dutch citizens, but that the effect of the latter are larger in magnitude. Moreover, if individuals are primed to think of their national identification, even citizens who otherwise do not feel culturally threatened by immigrants increase their support for immigration restrictions, suggesting that political actors who increase the salience of national identity may mobilize new segments of the electorate, rather than simply galvanizing the core anti-immigrant constituency. Employing the 2002-2003 European Social Survey, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) and Sides and Citrin (2007) find that economic factors matter less in shaping attitudes towards immigrants than cultural values and beliefs, which in turn are mediated by respondents’ educational attainment.

platforms to focus on mundane issues, such as public transport and care for the elderly. Similarly, the recent success of the British National Party in several London boroughs has less to do with the threat of Islamic terrorism in the wake of the 7/7 bombings; election leaflets instead focused on the shortage of public housing allegedly caused by recent immigrants.⁴¹

These examples are meant to highlight the potential disjuncture between local and national events, rather than rule out feedback between the two. As laid out above, national immigration regimes interact with local conditions to shape the incidence of immigrant conflict on the ground. Local conflicts can, in turn, gain the attention of national elites who, depending on incentives of their own, politicize immigration and the problems it produces on a nationwide scale. In doing so, political rhetoric (as well as media coverage) might reflect the content of local conflicts, or it might distort them. While local events can thus aggregate upwards to attain national salience, it is less likely that national discussion of immigration and immigrants can, *on its own*, produce lasting and organized conflict at the local level. Local grievances sustain local conflicts. Assessing the extent to which the economic, social and political repercussions of local immigration reverberate throughout a country to produce national outcomes (or the extent to which national discussion of the topic filters down locally) is important but different from investigating what determines these effects in the first place.⁴² By differentiating the local from the national and considering feedback effects

⁴¹ On perceptions of racist violence in Ireland, see EA & NCCRI (2005: 20). For a brief review of research on the Danish People's Party, see DACORD (2005: 15). On the BNP's exploitation of the housing shortage in Barking and Dagenham (London) and the local Labour MP's ensuing endorsement of a policy to put the indigenous population first, see *The Guardian*, "Hodges locals take softer line on migrants." May 22, 2007.

⁴² Hopkins takes up the relationship between local events and the national salience of immigration in the U.S. and argues that "when communities are undergoing sudden demographic changes, and when an available national rhetoric politicizes immigration, immigrants can quickly become the targets of political hostility" at the local level (2007: 2). See also Money (1997, 1999) and Karapin (1999) for the impact of local conflicts on immigration reform.

between these two levels, the dissertation also speaks to the scholarship on the production of conflict more generally.⁴³

Finally, the dissertation contributes to the debate about the relative role of economic motivations versus identity-based claims in structuring interethnic conflict. This debate has a long pedigree and has not been resolved. Realistic Conflict Theory states that conflicting material interests between social groups – themselves products of individuals’ self-interested calculations about the costs and benefits of membership – trigger inter-group antagonism. These processes are said to be especially pronounced when members of the dominant group, who have appropriated certain material goods as their own, have to share these resources with minority groups.⁴⁴ Social Identity Theory, by contrast, does not conceptualize shared material interests as a precondition for group identification or conflict, but rather views such membership as a natural outgrowth of individuals’ desire for enhanced self-esteem, which, in turn, leads to the categorization of groups and to a need to perceive the in-group as superior to outgroups. The state acts as the principal arena where contests for group self-worth take place.⁴⁵ At a theoretical level, both theories present cogent alternatives, and, empirically, many studies find evidence in support of both. For example, most investigations of anti-immigrant attitudes that highlight the role of economic considerations acknowledge that individual levels of tolerance also matter (e.g., Mayda 2006, Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter

⁴³ In the context of civil war, for example, Kalyvas (2003, 2006) has found that a conflict’s master cleavage is not necessarily replicated in local fights, where diverse motives can be at play. On literature discussing the relationship between local events and national outcomes in the case of the U.S. civil rights movement, see Morris (1999).

⁴⁴ On the rational sources of group identification, see, for example Hardin (1995). See Sherif (1966) for an early social psychological account of the nexus between group membership and competition and Hechter and Okamoto (2001: 195-197) for a review of the literature that links economic modernization and labor market stratification to ethnic conflict. For classic American texts on the relationship between racial threat and conflict, see Key (1949) and Blalock (1967).

⁴⁵ For a review of the earlier social psychology literature on inter-group relations, see Tajfel (1982). Horowitz (1985) remains the classic political science text proposing an identity-centered account for ethnic conflict. Sniderman and colleagues (2000) show how social psychological and instrumental theories of prejudice can be reconciled.

2007). Similarly, studies that draw attention to the importance of identity-based threats in determining opinions about immigrants tend to find that economic concerns also shape these opinions, but their effects are shown to be smaller in magnitude (e.g., Sniderman et al. 2004, Sides and Citrin 2007).⁴⁶

Drawing on half a century of immigrant settlement in two countries, the present study finds that competition over economic goods has been more significant in shaping immigrant conflict than struggles over identity-based claims. However, demonstrating empirically that economic conditions outweigh cultural differences is not the same as proving theoretically that economics should trump identity in the production of ethnic conflict. Rather, the analytic significance lies in specifying the conditions and mechanisms that make economically-driven conflicts more likely than identity-based rivalries. More generally, one productive way to adjudicate between the relative importance of material incentives on the one hand and cultural motivations on the other is to ask what general conditions and specific mechanisms will make economically-based individual and collective action against ethnic outgroups more effective than organizing around identity-based claims, and vice versa.⁴⁷ In the context of this study, the fact that immigrant conflict occurs within democratic settings that recognize both individual and group rights matters in limiting the content of and scope

⁴⁶ A few studies explicitly argue that both economic and cultural motivations impact opinions about immigrants and ethnic minorities. Citrin, Green and Wong conclude that “opinions concerning the economic effects of immigration are best regarded as an amalgam of material concerns and more purely affective responses to particular ethnic groups” (1997: 869). Tolerance and the individual characteristics that lead to variation in economic interests, i.e., education and skills, tend to be correlated and economically-driven opinions about immigration and immigrants might themselves influence tolerance judgments; these endogenous relationships are rarely explored (but see Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007).

⁴⁷ For a recent example of such an approach, see Mughan and Paxton’s study of voting for the right-wing One Nation party in Australia, which finds that anti-immigrant attitudes, themselves a product of perceived material and cultural threats, will only prompt right-wing voting if there is a party that specifically “promises to translate [native] fears into remedial government policy if elected to office” (2006: 357). This necessary fit between attitudes, policy preferences and party platforms may explain why the ecological literature on right-wing voting has not yet produced conclusive results; levels of and changes in unemployment and immigration, as well as their interactions, have not been consistently linked to support for anti-immigrant parties (cf. Golder 2003: 433, cf. van der Brug 2005: 540).

for effective anti-immigrant actions. At the same time, the present fear of Islamic terrorism has opened up avenues for restricting the cultural and religious practices of Muslim communities within Europe, which might also have implications for the local manifestations of future immigrant conflict.

1.4 Empirical Strategy, Case Selection and Plan of the Dissertation

This study's central interest lies in uncovering the dynamics that lead to variation in on-the-ground immigrant conflict. As a result, the empirical focus has to be at the subnational level. At the same time, I argue that national variation in immigration regimes importantly structure local interactions, requiring an awareness of the cross-national differences in such institutions. To strike a balance between these two levels, I investigate variation in immigrant conflict within Great Britain over time, across space, and across groups before turning to an examination of cross-national variation by contrasting patterns in Great Britain with developments in Germany.

In addition to the substantive reasons for focusing on subnational variation within one country, there are important theoretical reasons for doing so. Countries in Western Europe vary in many important dimensions: for example, in the economic and political rules that have governed their immigration regimes; in the organization of national and local political economies (including electoral systems and the rules that guide the allocation of state goods); and in the immigrant groups they have recruited (e.g., according to nationality, ethnicity, or religion). While these differences will allow for future tests of the present theory, they also make it difficult to identify causation, especially given the relative absence of existing comparative studies on the topic of local immigrant conflict. In light of such constraints, a research design that exploits subnational variation in the incidence of immigrant conflict helps to develop and test the present theory. Controlled within-country comparisons have advanced our understanding of important phenomena, such as the salience of political

cleavages (Laitin 1986, Posner 2005), ethnic riots (Keith 1993, Varshney 2002, Wilkinson 2004), ethnic voting (Chandra 2004), or violence in civil war (Kalyvas 2006). Honing in on subnational variation within Great Britain holds constant a host of confounding features, while still allowing for sufficient variation in the local-level independent and dependent variables across and within time and space to isolate causation. The existence of variation in local immigrant conflict within one country at one moment in time further illustrates that national anti-immigrant rhetoric alone is not sufficient in producing local conflicts.

Notwithstanding the subnational focus, attention to the national institutions that structure immigrant conflict in Britain allows for testing the argument in the German context and for investigating cross-national variation in immigrant conflict more generally. Germany and Great Britain share a host of similarities: both countries opened their borders to large-scale immigration in the postwar period, resulting in the settlement of immigrant communities that are ethnically, culturally, and religiously distinct from the indigenous population and, on average, of a lower socioeconomic status than their native counterparts. While Germany is a federal system and Great Britain formally a unitary state, the local state has significant discretion over the allocation of public resources in both settings. Local electoral laws differ across countries – based on proportional representation in Germany and plurality in Great Britain – but should if anything make it easier for small, anti-immigrant parties in Germany to gain votes; for most of the period under study, this has not been the case. As mentioned above, the main relevant features that distinguish the two countries are the economic and political foundations of their immigration regimes and it is these differences that account for the observed cross-country variation in local immigrant conflict.

The dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter two, I first identify variation in the incidence of large-scale violent confrontations involving immigrants, one indicator of my concept of immigrant conflict, in Great Britain from 1950 until today. Disaggregating these

events establishes two patterns: first, both types of immigrant conflict vary across time and space and, second, immigrant-native violence occurs more often between South Asians and Whites than it does between Blacks and Whites, while immigrant-state conflict is much more widespread among Blacks than it is among South Asians. I next provide an explanation for these findings. I draw on archival materials (e.g., correspondence between politicians and policymakers and official reports on immigrant integration) that highlight the importance of economic competition and deprivation in structuring immigrant conflict and in influencing the strategic considerations that shape political parties' approach to the immigrant electorate. While these accounts are helpful for illustrating the economic basis of immigrant conflict, they ultimately fail to explain which groups and which locations will be affected by immigrant-native or immigrant-state conflict. I next elaborate my concept of immigrant political power by providing qualitative and quantitative evidence on differences in the social organization of South Asian and West Indians and how these in turn map onto electoral institutions to produce important differences in electoral power. This variation in political clout in economically deprived settings, I argue, explains the incidence of immigrant conflict.

In the following three chapters, I study five cases over several decades to test my theory of immigrant conflict. Since the dependent variable varies within all cases over time (or across space) as well, I obtain ten observations of immigrant conflict. My selection method is based on variation in the relevant independent variables, economic scarcity and immigrant political power. The first two cases, Ealing and Tower Hamlets, are two London boroughs which were both characterized by immigrant political power and economic scarcity in the first two decades of settlement. But whereas pressures on state-controlled resources did not persist in Ealing, the shortage of such goods intensified in Tower Hamlets. As a result, Ealing has overcome immigrant-native conflict even as the electoral power of its immigrant population has expanded. Tower Hamlets has witnessed a deterioration of inter-

group relations over the same time period and, moreover, immigrant-native conflict has varied within the borough due to a decentralization experiment which resulted in varied housing allocation rules across wards. I next contrast two Midlands cities, Leicester and Birmingham, which share similar economic trajectories, but vary in immigrant political power. In the first decades of immigrant arrival, amidst increasing economic scarcity, immigrants in Leicester were politically powerful, while their counterparts in Birmingham lacked electoral clout, leading to immigrant-native conflict in the former and immigrant-state conflict in the latter. As the local state moved to an allocation strategy that benefited both Whites and recent immigrants in Leicester and as economic shortages eased in both cities, Leicester gained its reputation for multicultural harmony, while immigrant-state conflict declined in Birmingham.

The northern city of Bradford represents an empirical test of the significance of economic competition as opposed to identity-based claims in the structuring of immigrant-native relations. Even though Bradford tends to be known for controversies centering on religious and cultural demands, I show that anti-immigrant mobilization was much more intense and extensive once its Pakistani-origin electorate also obtained scarce economic goods. The case of Bradford, where immigrants have long had local electoral leverage, thus also demonstrates the importance of identifying the *type* of claims immigrant leaders make and how these demands coincide with the needs of their co-ethnic constituents.

These cases cover most major immigrant groups of recent immigrant origin in Britain today: Indians (Sikhs and Hindus), Pakistanis, Bangladeshis (most of whom are Muslim), and West Indians (most of whom are Christian).⁴⁸ Moreover, I choose locations whose ethnic minority populations have increased over time. In all five cases, as well as in most urban

⁴⁸ African and Chinese immigrants, whose numbers have risen in recent years, are much smaller in number than the other groups in the selected areas.

areas across Britain, the White population has declined in absolute terms during the postwar years and the 1980s while the number of immigrant-origin residents has grown at the same time, ruling out the possibility that White out-migration accounts for differences in immigrant conflict.

Chapter six uses quantitative data to test whether the determinants of immigrant-native conflict that I identify to operate at the level of the locality also shape the incidence of racially-motivated violence caused by individuals. The aim here is not to argue that racist violence only follows the logic of immigrant-native conflict proposed here, but rather to show that patterns of racist violence are part of the larger fabric of conflict. I show that the in-migration of politically powerful South Asian migrants provokes increases in racist attacks against this group, which are further compounded by rising levels of economic deprivation. Conversely, in-migration of less politically powerful Black migrants has no effect on the victimization of this group. This micro-level evidence on racist violence thus links up to the community-wide conflict dynamics.

In Chapter seven, I apply my theory of immigrant conflict to the German context. I first demonstrate how the features of the country's guestworker regime have impacted the incidence of immigrant conflict, then move to a discussion of the effects of the immigration of ethnic Germans and asylum seekers, and conclude by comparing patterns of immigrant economic integration in Germany and Great Britain. Chapter eight concludes by discussing the implications of my theory for the integration of immigrants and highlights some of the political, economic and social tradeoffs that are inherent in different immigration regimes.

This dissertation employs a variety of data sources and empirical methods. For the British case, I collected evidence on large-scale violence from 1950 until today from two national newspapers, *The Times* and *The Guardian* and also draw on government documents and the secondary social science literature that describe these events. I obtained further

insights regarding the national government's assessment and handling of immigrant conflict by consulting documents produced by the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the Home Office and the Housing Department, held at the National Archives in London. These confidential sources are useful because, unlike public announcements which do not endorse the use of violence against immigrants and especially against state actors, they show that local and national officials, as well as the police, generally predict the outbreak of violence in specific locations, even though publicly they tend to express surprise and condemnation.

At the Labour History Archive and Study Centre in Manchester, I also gathered data on the Labour Party's national and local strategies in appealing to the new immigrant constituencies. A rich anthropological and sociological literature further illuminates differences in the social organization, settlement and political behavior of Britain's main immigrant groups. Nationally representative quantitative survey evidence on immigrant groups' political behavior demonstrate important group differences in turnout rates, as well as in the effect of ethnic neighborhoods on turnout.

My study of town-level variation derives from a variety of sources. I was able to draw on dozens of ethnographies, government reports and town histories as well as hundreds of local and national newspaper articles describing the local integration of immigrant groups in the cities and towns that I selected for study. I accessed local newspaper articles at the British Library's Newspapers Archive in Colindale and the Record Office for Leicestershire, Leicester and Rutland. Together, these sources provide rich accounts that allow me to assess both dependent and independent variables. I also make use of census statistics and local, ward-level election data spanning four decades to measure local immigrant political power. Census figures on economic indicators, such as unemployment rates and the size of the state-controlled housing sector, further measure economic scarcity. I also conducted elite interviews with current and former local officials. My examination of racist violence is

based on a dataset that the Metropolitan Police Service prepared for me. It racks the incidence of various types of racist crime over a six-year period in Greater London's 32 boroughs.

Turning to the German case, I also investigated archival government documents produced by the Ministry of the Interior, the Office of the Chancellor, the Ministry of Labor, the Federal Employment Office, and the Ministry of Land Use Planning, Building Industry and Urban Development (held at the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz). In addition, I draw on parliamentary records of the *Bundestag* (Lower House) and the *Bundesrat* (Upper House). These sources contain evidence of the rules and regulations of the immigration regime and how these were conceived to affect intergroup competition as well as immigrant economic integration. They also discuss the incidence of immigrant conflict, as well as its absence. Local election statistics and the secondary literature provide further evidence on the occurrence of immigrant conflict.