

# Government Control of the Media

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## Abstract

We develop a formal model of government control of the media to illuminate variation in media freedom across countries and over time. The extent of government control depends critically on two variables: the mobilizing character of the government and the size of the advertising market. Media bias is greater and state ownership of the media more likely when governments seek to mobilize populations through biased reporting; however, the distinction between state and private media is smaller. Large advertising markets reduce media bias in both state and private media, but increase the incentive for the government to nationalize private media. We illustrate these arguments with a case study of media freedom in postcommunist Russia, where media bias has responded to the mobilizing needs of the Kremlin and government control over the media has grown in tandem with the size of the advertising market.

**Preliminary and incomplete.**

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# 1 Introduction

A substantial literature ties media freedom to good governance.<sup>1</sup> Less is known about the determinants of media freedom itself. Although correlated with the presence of democratic institutions, political institutions alone do not determine media freedom. As Figure 1 illustrates, many nondemocracies have higher levels of media freedom than many democracies, and there is enormous variation in media freedom among the least democratic countries.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, media freedom often fluctuates within countries even as political institutions remain unchanged. In this paper, we develop a formal model of government control of the media to illuminate differences in media freedom across space and time, focusing especially on less democratic states where the government uses the media to mobilize citizens in support of actions that may not be in their individual best interest.

Our modeling approach highlights a fundamental constraint facing any media owner and any government seeking to influence media content: bias in reporting reduces the informational content of the news, thus lowering the likelihood that individuals who need that information to make decisions will read, watch, or listen to it. One consequence of this relationship is that bias reduces advertising revenue. The extent of media bias depends on the degree to which media owners and the government internalize this effect.

We highlight two variables that may influence this tradeoff. First, the *mobilizing character of the government* determines the degree to which the government values the media as a means of encouraging citizens to take actions that benefit the government, but that are not necessarily in their own individual interest. Foregone advertising revenue diminishes in importance when the need for social mobilization is large. Media bias may therefore be greater in autocratic states whose leaders aim to transform society, or under populist governments that retain power through mass public participation, than in “kleptocracies” or “sultanistic” regimes.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, holding regime type constant, media bias will be greater in periods when mobilization is especially important, as during an election campaign. In addition, while cross-country empirical work suggests that media freedom may be greater when *ownership* of the media is primarily in private hands (Djankov, McLeish, Nenova, and

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<sup>1</sup>Much recent work on the topic is in the political economy literature. Representative papers include Besley and Burgess (2002); Brunetti and Weder (2003); Reinikka and Svensson (2005); Besley and Prat (2006); Prat and Strömberg (2006). The idea that media freedom may affect political outcomes rests implicitly on the assumption that individuals’ beliefs and preferences can be affected by what they see, read, and hear in the media. Numerous studies, most employing survey data, have examined and generally affirmed this proposition in the American context; see Kinder (1998) and Goldstein and Ridout (2004) for reviews of the literature. For more recent work exploiting various field and natural experiments, see Ansolabehere, Snowberg, and Snyder (2004); Della Vigna and Kaplan (2007); and Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan (2007). Studies in immature democracies have found media effects that, if anything, are stronger than those typically identified in the U.S. See, for example, White, Oates, and McAllister (2005) and Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya (2007) on Russia; Lawson and McCann (2007) on Mexico; and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) on the Mideast.

<sup>2</sup>Obviously, causality cannot be inferred from the simple bivariate relationship depicted in Figure 1.

<sup>3</sup>This argument has parallels in Wintrobe’s (1990) suggestion that repression will be greater under “totalitarian” than “tinpot” dictatorships. The distinction between mobilizing and non-mobilizing dictatorships has its roots in Friedrich and Brzezinski (1965). Przeworski et al. (2000) define mobilizing dictatorships as those with at least one political party. In the case study below we discuss the shift toward a more mobilizing government in Russia as the United Russia party and related organizations developed under Vladimir Putin.



the government implement a higher level of bias when it owns the media—an advantage that grows with the size of the advertising market—but it can economize on subsidies and acquire advertising revenue for itself. A surprising implication of this analysis is that the relationship between media freedom and the size of the advertising market may be nonmonotonic. Holding ownership constant, growth in the advertising market reduces media bias, regardless of whether the media are private or state-owned. However, the same growth may prompt the government to seize direct control of the media, which leads to a discontinuous jump in media bias.

To develop these arguments, we characterize a government that prefers that citizens take actions that may not be in their individual best interest, and that exercises control over the media to encourage citizens to take these actions. Such conflicts of interest between government and citizens may be smaller in mature democracies. To the extent that this is the case, our model should be viewed primarily as a portrayal of government control of the media in immature democracies and autocracies. However, there may also be circumstances in which mature democracies fit our stylized description of a relationship among the government, media, and citizens. As we discuss below, certain features of our model apply especially to government control of the *broadcast* media, the primary news source for citizens in much of the world, especially (though by no means only) in countries with substantial illiteracy.

We illustrate our theoretical model with a case study of government control of the media in postcommunist Russia. Largely created from scratch after the collapse of communism, Russia’s advertising market has grown dramatically in recent years, a development that would seem to bode well for media freedom. Yet by most accounts, Russia has seen an equally dramatic decline in media independence, as the Kremlin has seized direct control of large segments of the Russian media market. Our model suggests two complementary explanations for this phenomenon. First, Russian president Vladimir Putin seemed more predisposed to use the media to mobilize society in support of his rule than his predecessor Boris Yeltsin. Second, the Kremlin may have been motivated to prevent private media, newly flush with advertising revenue, from asserting their independence. Our model also provides a theoretical framework for understanding other developments in the relationship between media and the state in postcommunist Russia, such as the convergence in bias among private and state-owned media prior to the 1996 presidential election and the behavior of more and less commercial stations controlled by the government in the run-up to the 2007 parliamentary election.

Our theory builds on two modeling traditions in the political economy literature. First, we follow the approach pioneered by Shleifer and Vishny (1994) in modeling a bargaining relationship between a politician and a firm, which in our case corresponds to a media outlet. As in Shleifer and Vishny, we emphasize the allocation of control rights, which in our setting is the ability to decide what to report. Under state ownership, the government possesses this right. We refer to this environment as “direct government control” of the media, to emphasize that the government chooses media bias directly. In contrast, under private ownership, a private owner possesses the right to choose what to report. We term this situation “indirect government control,” as the government may still induce media bias but must pay for it by providing subsidies to the private owner.

Second, we build on a growing body of work that attempts to explain the origins of media bias. Relative to most of this literature, the key distinction of our approach is that we

model the government as a strategic actor. Besley and Prat (2006) do consider government influence over the media, but their emphasis is the impact of media freedom on government accountability in democracies. Our approach is complementary: we analyze the relationship between government and media in an environment that may best characterize weak democracies and autocracies.

Other models stress the inherent biases of media owners (Gabszewicz et al., 2001) or journalists (Baron, 2006; Puglisi, 2006); the market response to consumer demand for bias, which arises either for exogenous reasons (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005) or because firms skew their reporting toward consumer priors to build a reputation for quality (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006);<sup>6</sup> the interaction of market forces and the internal structure of the media (Bovitz, Druckman, and Lupia, 2002); and the purchase of journalists by special interests (Petrova, 2007). A useful distinction sometimes made in this literature is between “demand-side” and “supply-side” explanations of media bias. Our paper falls into the latter category: citizens in our model always prefer less bias to more.

Among these contributions, our theoretical framework builds especially on Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006). As in their work, we model Bayesian citizens who may use information reported by the media when making a costly decision whose outcome depends on the state of the world. The questions we explore in this framework, however, are very different from those that Gentzkow and Shapiro pose. Our approach is also similar in some respects to Petrova (2007), who like us examines the tradeoff between advertising revenue and bias. In our case, however, we treat the government as the relevant special interest, an important distinction since the government may acquire control of the media by force. As we show, the government may be more motivated to seize private media when the advertising market is large, implying a relationship between advertising revenue and media freedom counter to that predicted by Petrova and observed in the Russian case that we discuss.

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we examine media bias under direct government control, i.e., when the media are state-owned. In Section 3, we analyze the case of indirect government control, i.e., state subsidization of privately owned media. We endogenize government control in Section 4, asking when the government would choose to take over privately owned media. We illustrate our model with a case study of media freedom in postcommunist Russia in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.

## 2 Direct Government Control of the Media

### 2.1 Environment

Consider a model with two sets of players: a continuum of citizens of mass one, indexed by  $i$ , and a government that directly controls, i.e., owns, a news outlet. As we discuss below, various features of the model lend themselves best to broadcast media. For concreteness, we therefore say that citizens “watch” the news, as when the news outlet is a television station.

At a cost normalized to one, each citizen  $i$  may “invest” in a single project,  $\pi_i \in \{0, 1\}$ . The private return from investment depends on the state of the world  $S \in \{L, H\}$ , where  $L$

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<sup>6</sup>The latter paper builds on the insight that rational individuals may have a preference for biased information. See Calvert (1985).

denotes a “low” state and  $H$  a “high” state. The government prefers more investment to less regardless of the state, and so may have an incentive to mobilize citizens to take an action that is not in their individual best interest. As we discuss above, this conflict of interest may best characterize autocracies and weak democracies, though there are circumstances in mature democracies to which the model may also apply. A “political” example of such investment is participation in a state-sponsored rally, where turnout provides legitimacy to the regime but citizens prefer to participate only if the government is capable of sanctioning nonparticipation. An “economic” example is as follows: the government prefers that economic actors behave as if the central banker is conservative, whether he is or not, but economic actors prefer to forego price increases only if he is.

In particular, when  $S = H$  the project yields a private return  $r > 1$ , whereas when  $S = L$  the private return is equal to zero. Citizens do not know the state but have a common prior belief that the state is high with probability  $\theta \in (0, 1)$ . We assume that  $\theta r < 1$ , which implies that in the absence of any additional information citizens do not invest.

Citizens may update their belief about the state of the world by watching the news. A news broadcast contains one of two messages,  $\hat{S} \in \{\hat{H}, \hat{L}\}$ . Rather than choosing the message directly, we assume that the government structures the news operation to attain the desired level of bias, with the message determined probabilistically by the structure after the state of the world has been realized. This assumption implicitly captures the need to delegate responsibility for the news to the reporters, anchors, and editors who make daily decisions about what to cover and how to cover it, with the government choosing the level of bias by who it hires. Importantly, we assume that this choice is observable to all citizens. This assumption seems especially compelling for broadcast media, the primary news source for citizens in most countries. For example, CNN programs hosted by Lou Dobbs and Anderson Cooper are easily distinguishable, and the replacement of conservative commentator Tucker Carlson on MSNBC was viewed by many (including Carlson himself) as a shift in editorial line.<sup>7</sup>

In particular, at the beginning of the game, prior to realization of the state of the world, the government publicly chooses an editorial policy  $\beta(S) \in [0, 1] \times [0, 1]$ , where  $\beta(S)$  is the probability that the media outlet reports the message  $\hat{H}$  when the state is  $S \in \{L, H\}$ . We abuse notation slightly to denote any citizen’s posterior belief about the state of the world, conditional on having received the message  $\hat{S}$ , by  $\theta(\hat{S})$ .<sup>8</sup> Thus, conditional on having watched the news and received the message  $\hat{S}$ , any citizen prefers to invest if  $\theta(\hat{S})r > 1$ .

Watching the news may therefore be profitable to citizens if the government’s editorial policy  $\beta(S)$  is such that the news is sufficiently informative. Potentially offsetting this benefit, each citizen  $i$  has an exogenous idiosyncratic opportunity cost of watching the news  $\mu_i$ , where  $\mu_i$  is distributed uniformly on  $[0, m]$ . We assume for simplicity that  $m > r - 1$ , which implies that for all  $\theta$  the proportion of individuals who watch the news in equilibrium is strictly less than one. We use the indicator variable  $\omega_i \in \{0, 1\}$  to denote the decision to watch the news.

<sup>7</sup>See, for example, “At MSNBC, ‘Tucker’ Is Out, and David Gregory Is In,” *New York Times*, March 11, 2008.

<sup>8</sup>For those who do not watch the news, the posterior belief is equal to the prior belief.

Our assumption that this opportunity cost is exogenous applies most clearly to broadcast media, where there is no purchasing decision to be made so long as a citizen already possesses a television or radio. In this context, the opportunity cost to watching the news may reflect a citizen’s work schedule, family obligations, and similar considerations. For print media, the opportunity cost would also reflect the purchase price, which would be a choice variable of the media owner. We choose to leave that extension to future research.

Summarizing, the timing of events is:

1. The government chooses an editorial policy  $\beta(S) \in [0, 1] \times [0, 1]$ , which is observed by all citizens.
2. Each citizen decides whether or not to watch the news,  $\omega_i \in \{0, 1\}$ .
3. The state of the world  $S \in \{L, H\}$  is realized, with the message  $\hat{S} \in \{\hat{H}, \hat{L}\}$  determined probabilistically according to  $\beta(S)$ . Only citizens who watch the news receive the message  $\hat{S}$ .
4. Each citizen decides whether or not to invest in the project,  $\pi_i \in \{0, 1\}$ .

In general, we assume that the government may value viewership as well as investment, to the extent that viewership increases advertising revenue of the state-owned news outlet. We model this concern in a reduced-form way, assuming that total advertising revenue is proportional to viewership. Let  $\gamma$  denote the size of the market. Further, assume that the government’s preferences over investment and advertising revenue are separable, such that those preferences can be represented by the following utility function:

$$U_G = \psi \int_0^m \omega_i(\mu_i) E \left[ \pi_i \left( \hat{S}(S) \right) \right] d\mu_i + \gamma \int_0^m \omega_i(\mu_i) d\mu_i. \quad (1)$$

The first term is proportional to expected investment (recall that, by assumption, citizens choose to invest only if they watch the news, i.e., only if  $\omega_i = 1$ ), with expectations over  $S$ , and the second term is advertising revenue. The parameter  $\psi$  denotes the mobilizing character of the government, i.e., the weight that the government puts on investment relative to advertising revenue.<sup>9</sup> To establish intuition, we begin by deriving equilibrium media bias as  $\frac{\psi}{\gamma} \rightarrow \infty$ , i.e., when the government values only investment. We then examine the general case where the government values both investment and advertising revenue.

## 2.2 Equilibrium When Government Values Only Investment

We solve for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this dynamic game of incomplete information, focusing in this section on the special case where the government values only investment. To begin, note that the government wants citizens to believe that  $S = H$ , as it is profitable for citizens to invest only when the state is  $H$ . Therefore, in equilibrium, it must be the case that  $\beta(H) = 1$ .<sup>10</sup> However, it cannot be the case in equilibrium that the media outlet always

<sup>9</sup>Although mathematically superfluous, the second parameter aids interpretation.

<sup>10</sup>This assumes that messages have the “natural” meaning. Otherwise, the equilibria that we describe could be relabeled such that the message  $\hat{H}$  is associated with the state  $L$ , and vice versa.

reports that the state is  $H$ , i.e., that it also chooses  $\beta(L) = 1$ , as then the news would be uninformative. Regardless of the message  $\hat{S}$ , any citizen who watched the news would choose not to invest; given the opportunity cost of watching the news, all citizens would therefore choose not to watch. Thus, in equilibrium the media must truthfully report the state with some positive probability when the state is  $L$ , i.e., the government must choose  $\beta(L) < 1$ .

To solve for the equilibrium strategy  $\beta^*(L)$ , we begin by considering the beliefs and investment behavior of those who watch the news. Using the equilibrium condition that citizens update beliefs on the equilibrium path according to Bayes' rule, we can derive the posterior probability that the state is  $H$ , conditional on having received the message  $\hat{H}$ , as

$$\theta(\hat{H}) = \frac{\theta\beta(H)}{\theta\beta(H) + (1-\theta)\beta(L)} = \frac{\theta}{\theta + (1-\theta)\beta(L)}, \quad (2)$$

where the second equality follows from  $\beta(H) = 1$ . The higher is media bias  $\beta(L)$ , the less likely citizens are to believe that the state is  $H$  when they receive the message  $\hat{H}$ . Similarly, we can derive  $\theta(\hat{L}) = 0$ , which follows trivially from  $\beta(H) = 1$ . Thus, citizens would never invest after receiving the report  $\hat{L}$ , but might invest after receiving the message  $\hat{H}$  if  $\beta(L)$  is sufficiently small such that  $\theta(\hat{H})r > 1$ . Intuitively, citizens invest after receiving the message  $\hat{H}$  only if the government is sufficiently likely to tell the truth when the state is in fact  $L$ . In the analysis to follow, we assume preliminarily that that is the case and then show that this condition holds in equilibrium.

Given the preliminary assumption that  $\theta(\hat{H})r > 1$ , which implies that citizens invest if (and only if) they receive the message  $\hat{H}$ , the expected benefit from watching the news is

$$[\theta + (1-\theta)\beta(L)] \cdot [\theta(\hat{H})r - 1].$$

The term on the left is the probability that a citizen receives the message  $\hat{H}$ , conditional on watching the news, whereas the term on the right is the expected payoff from investing, having received the message  $\hat{H}$ . This expression is decreasing in  $\beta(L)$ : demand for the news is greatest when bias is least.

With the opportunity cost of watching the news  $\mu_i$  distributed uniformly on  $[0, m]$ , the mass of all individuals who watch the news is given by

$$\int_0^m \omega_i(\mu_i) d\mu_i = \frac{1}{m} [\theta + (1-\theta)\beta(L)] \cdot [\theta(\hat{H})r - 1]. \quad (3)$$

Because citizens invest if and only if they receive the message  $\hat{H}$ , the probability that any citizen invests, conditional on having watched the news, is equal to the probability that the government reports  $\hat{H}$ ,  $\theta + (1-\theta)\beta(L)$ , which is increasing in media bias  $\beta(L)$ . Expected investment is then equal to the product of this probability and the mass of citizens who invest:

$$\int_0^m \omega_i(\mu_i) E[\pi_i(\hat{S}(S))] d\mu_i = \frac{1}{m} [\theta + (1-\theta)\beta(L)]^2 \cdot [\theta(\hat{H})r - 1]. \quad (4)$$

The government chooses  $\beta(L)$  to maximize Expression 4, given the posterior belief  $\theta(\hat{H})$  (Equation 2):

$$\max_{\beta(L)} \frac{1}{m} [\theta + (1 - \theta) \beta(L)]^2 \cdot \left[ \frac{\theta}{\theta + (1 - \theta) \beta(L)} r - 1 \right].$$

This is a concave problem, the solution to which is

$$\beta^*(L) = \max \left[ 0, \frac{\theta(r-2)}{2(1-\theta)} \right] \quad (5)$$

Equation 5 says that when  $\beta^*(L) > 0$ , media bias is greater, i.e.,  $\beta^*(L)$  is larger, the larger is the payoff from investment  $r$ . Intuitively, when the payoff from making the right investment decision is relatively large, citizens watch the news even when news content is noisy. In addition, media bias is (weakly) increasing in  $\theta$ , which measures the prior belief that the state is high. As Equation 2 shows, media bias plays a smaller role in determination of the posterior belief that the state is high when  $\theta$  is large, implying that bias must be greater to have the same marginal impact on investment.

In deriving Equation 5, we assumed preliminarily that  $\theta(\hat{H})r > 1$ . We may verify this by substituting  $\beta^*(L)$  into  $\theta(\hat{H})$  (Equation 2). In particular,  $\theta(\hat{H}) = 1$  when  $\beta^*(L) = 0$ —the message  $\hat{H}$  is sent if and only if  $S = H$ —so that  $\theta(\hat{H})r > 1$  holds trivially given  $r > 1$ , which is an assumption of the model. For  $\beta^*(L) > 0$ ,  $\theta(\hat{H})r > 1$  is equivalent to

$$\frac{\theta}{\theta + (1 - \theta) \left[ \frac{\theta(r-2)}{2(1-\theta)} \right]} r > 1,$$

i.e.,

$$\theta r > \theta + \frac{\theta(r-2)}{2} \Leftrightarrow 2\theta(r-1) > \theta(r-2).$$

Similarly, we may show that  $\beta^*(L)$  is strictly less than 1:

$$\theta(r-2) < 2(1-\theta) \Leftrightarrow \theta r < 2,$$

which always holds given the assumption that  $\theta r < 1$ .

### 2.3 Equilibrium When Government Values Investment and Advertising Revenue

In Section 2.2, we analyze the special case of the model where the government values only “investment” by citizens. This case illustrates the tradeoff between raising bias to increase investment by those who watch the news and lowering bias to increase the proportion of citizens who watch the news and thus receive the government’s message. In addition to these concerns, however, governments may be motivated to increase advertising revenue for media under their control. In Russia, for example, Channel One and Rossiya, the two most purely state-owned national television networks, run advertisements during their prime-time

news broadcasts. Nonetheless, these advertisements generally appear at the “corners” of the broadcasts where viewership is less. In contrast, NTV, the somewhat more commercial network controlled by majority-state-owned Gazprom, typically runs advertisements in the middle of its main evening news broadcast, suggesting a greater emphasis on advertising revenue.

How does a concern for advertising revenue modify the results above? To answer this question, we examine the general case of the model, where the government chooses media bias  $\beta(L)$  to maximize utility as in Equation 1. Using Equations 3 and 4, we may write this problem as

$$\max_{\beta(L)} \frac{\psi}{m} [\theta + (1 - \theta) \beta(L)]^2 \cdot \left[ \theta \left( \hat{H} \right) r - 1 \right] + \frac{\gamma}{m} [\theta + (1 - \theta) \beta(L)] \cdot \left[ \theta \left( \hat{H} \right) r - 1 \right],$$

where as before we assume preliminarily that  $\theta \left( \hat{H} \right) r > 1$ . This is a concave problem, the solution to which we provide in the following proposition, where for future reference we use the subscript  $G$  to denote direct government control.

**Proposition 1.** *Under direct government control of the media (i.e., state ownership), the equilibrium level of bias is*

$$\beta_G^*(L) = \max \left[ 0, \frac{\psi \theta (r - 2) - \gamma}{2\psi (1 - \theta)} \right]. \quad (6)$$

For  $\beta_G^*(L) > 0$ , media bias is greater when the government has a particular interest in mobilizing citizens to “invest” (i.e., when  $\psi$  is large), as during an election campaign when state-owned media are used to increase support for government-backed parties and candidates. More subtly, Equation 6 suggests that the impact on  $\beta_G^*(L)$  of a marginal increase in  $\psi$  is greater when the government values advertising revenue more to begin with (i.e., when  $\psi$  is low).<sup>11</sup> As we discuss below, this may explain the particularly noticeable increase in bias on Gazprom-owned NTV in the run-up to the 2007 Russian parliamentary election.

In addition, Equation 6 shows that media bias is less, the greater is  $\gamma$ , i.e., the larger is the advertising market.<sup>12</sup> This result supports the argument that the media may be less biased when the advertising market is large. As we discuss above, however, this argument is typically made in the context of private ownership of the the media, a case that we examine below. Our model shows that the same relationship may hold when the media are state-owned, so long as the government values advertising revenue from media that it owns. Intuitively, the equilibrium level of bias depends on the degree to which the government internalizes the negative effect of bias on viewership. That effect is greater when the advertising market is large, so long as the government places some value on advertising revenue.

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<sup>11</sup>To see this, note that for  $\beta_G^*(L) > 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial \beta_G^*(L)}{\partial \psi} = \frac{\gamma}{2\psi^2(1-\theta)}$ , so that  $\frac{\partial^2 \beta_G^*(L)}{\partial \psi^2} = -\frac{\gamma}{\psi^3(1-\theta)} < 0$ .

<sup>12</sup>Note that because equilibrium bias is less when the government values advertising revenue,  $\hat{\theta} \left( \hat{H} \right)$  is larger than in the special case examined in the previous section. Thus, the preliminary assumption  $\hat{\theta} \left( \hat{H} \right) r > 1$  must hold here, given that it does there.

### 3 Indirect Government Control of the Media

In the previous section, we assume that the government has direct control over the news outlet. Even if the owner of the outlet is private, however, the government may be able to indirectly control news content through the promise of subsidies. The problem is analogous to a lobbying model, where the private owner acts as policy maker and the government as lobby. As is standard in the political-economy literature, we model this process as a menu auction à la Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2001), where the government offers a contribution schedule that promises a particular contribution for every level of bias that the private owner might choose in principle.

Formally, assume that the government has preferences over citizen investment and contributions represented by the utility function

$$U_G = \psi \int_0^m \omega_i(\mu_i) E \left[ \pi_i \left( \hat{S}(S) \right) \right] d\mu_i - C, \quad (7)$$

where the first term is proportional to expected investment and  $C$  is a subsidy (contribution), defined below, from the government to the private owner. In this context, the parameter  $\psi$  measures the degree to which the government values investment relative to subsidies. Implicitly, we assume that subsidies and advertising revenue are denominated in the same units, so that  $\psi$  has the same meaning in Equations 1 and 7. Note that the government does not directly value advertising revenue received by the private owner.

The private owner, in contrast, has preferences over advertising revenue and contributions represented by the utility function

$$U_P = \gamma \int_0^m \omega_i(\mu_i) d\mu_i + C, \quad (8)$$

where the first term is advertising revenue and  $C$  is the subsidy from the government to the private owner. Analogous to the government's preferences, the private owner does not directly value citizen investment.

At the beginning of the game, the government names a contribution schedule  $C(\beta(S))$  that promises a particular subsidy  $C \geq 0$  for all  $\beta(S) \in [0, 1] \times [0, 1]$ , i.e., for any editorial policy that could be chosen by the private owner. As in Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2001), we assume that this promise is binding. This can easily be motivated either on reputational grounds or because lobbying is a spot-market transaction with few dynamic considerations, similar to the exchange of money for goods in a retail environment. The private owner then chooses  $\beta(S)$  to maximize Expression 8. The remainder of the game is identical to that in Section 2.1. Thus, the timing of events is:

1. The government names a contribution schedule  $C(\beta(S))$ , following which the private owner chooses an editorial policy  $\beta(S) \in [0, 1] \times [0, 1]$ , which is observed by the government and all citizens, and the government pays  $C(\beta(S))$ .
2. Each citizen decides whether or not to watch the news,  $\omega_i \in \{0, 1\}$ .

3. The state of the world  $S \in \{L, H\}$  is realized, with the message  $\hat{S} \in \{\hat{H}, \hat{L}\}$  determined probabilistically according to  $\beta(S)$ . Only citizens who watch the news receive the message  $\hat{S}$ .
4. Each citizen decides whether or not to invest in the project,  $\pi_i \in \{0, 1\}$ .

Given that subsidies enter linearly into both the government's and private owner's utility functions (i.e., because utility is freely transferable between the two actors), the equilibrium outcome is jointly efficient between the government and private owner, i.e., maximizes

$$\psi \int_0^m \omega_i(\mu_i) E \left[ \pi_i \left( \hat{S}(S) \right) \right] d\mu_i + \gamma \int_0^m \omega_i(\mu_i) d\mu_i.$$

But this is precisely the government's maximization problem under direct control of the media, implying that the equilibrium level of bias is the same as in Proposition 1. Intuitively, in making its offer  $C(\beta(S))$  to the private owner, the government fully internalizes the impact of bias on advertising revenue, as it must compensate the private owner for any advertising revenue lost due to bias in reporting.

The sharp prediction that media bias is the same under government and private ownership—a consequence of the Coase theorem—follows from the assumption that the government can costlessly transfer utility to the private owner. That assumption may fail for various reasons. For example, for political reasons the government may subsidize the private owner through non-monetary transfers, as when the government provides transmission frequencies to favored enterprises.<sup>13</sup> The opportunity cost to the treasury of providing those transfers may be greater than the benefit to the private owner. Alternatively, “subsidies” may actually be outright bribes from government officials, as in the well-documented case of payments made to the media by Peru president Alberto Fujimori's secret police chief Vladimiro Montesinos Torres (McMillan and Zoido, 2004). In the latter case, the effort to keep bribes secret might impose transaction costs.

We follow Besley and Prat (2006) in modeling these considerations in a reduced-form way, assuming that the private owner receives proportion  $\frac{1}{\alpha}$  of any subsidy paid by the government, where the parameter  $\alpha \geq 1$ .<sup>14</sup> Thus, the private owner's utility (Equation 8 above) now takes the form

$$U_P = \gamma \int_0^m \omega_i(\mu_i) d\mu_i + \frac{C}{\alpha},$$

which is equivalent to

$$\alpha\gamma \int_0^m \omega_i(\mu_i) d\mu_i + C.$$

In inducing  $\beta(L)$ , the government therefore puts greater weight on advertising revenue than in the case of direct government control. The following proposition provides the optimum  $\beta(L)$  under indirect government control of the media, where the subscript  $P$  denotes private ownership.

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<sup>13</sup>In Russia, the allocation of spectrum was instrumental in the creation of the NTV television network during the 1990s, as well as in the consolidation of Kremlin control of the media during the Putin era.

<sup>14</sup>Shleifer and Vishny (1994) also assume that subsidization is inefficient in their canonical model of bargaining between a politician and a firm.

**Proposition 2.** *Under indirect government control of the media (i.e., private ownership and state subsidies) the equilibrium level of bias is*

$$\beta_P^*(L) = \max \left[ 0, \frac{\psi\theta(r-2) - \alpha\gamma}{2\psi(1-\theta)} \right]. \quad (9)$$

The equilibrium level of bias in Proposition 2 differs from that in Proposition 1 in the multiplier  $\alpha$  on  $\gamma$ . Thus, to the extent that transaction costs prevent efficient bargaining between the government and the private owner, bias will be less under private than state ownership of the media.

Propositions 1 and 2 show that a marginal change in  $\psi$  (the value the government attaches to citizen investment) affects media bias more for private media than for state-owned media, so long as  $\alpha > 1$ . Intuitively, the tradeoff between citizen investment and advertising revenue is starker for private media, such that an increase in the value attached to investment is magnified relative to the case of state ownership. As we discuss below, this may help explain the convergence in media bias on private and state-owned media in the run-up to the 1996 Russian presidential election. More generally, the model predicts that private and state-owned media will be similarly biased in favor of the government in states that attach great value to citizen mobilization. As we show below, however, this does not imply a tolerance of private media in mobilizing states. Rather, the high cost of subsidization encourages governments to seize control of private media for themselves.

With respect to the second parameter on which we focus, the difference between direct and indirect government control of the media is greater, the larger is the advertising market (measured by  $\gamma$ ). To see this clearly, focus on the case where  $\psi\theta(r-2) > \alpha\gamma$ , so that media bias is strictly positive even under private ownership. Then the additional bias under state ownership is

$$\frac{\psi\theta(r-2) - \gamma}{2\psi(1-\theta)} - \frac{\psi\theta(r-2) - \alpha\gamma}{2\psi(1-\theta)} = \frac{\gamma(\alpha-1)}{2\psi(1-\theta)},$$

which is increasing in  $\gamma$ . This has an important consequence for media freedom: the opportunity cost to the government of allowing private ownership of the media, in terms of foregone citizen investment, is greater when the advertising market is large. As we show in the following section, in such environments, the government may therefore be motivated to acquire direct control of the media.

We may use Equation 9 to derive the subsidy the government pays the private owner to represent its point of view. To do so, first note that were the private owner to reject the government's offer, it would choose the level of media bias that maximizes viewership, which is clearly  $\beta(L) = 0$ . Because the posterior belief  $\theta(\hat{H}) = 1$  when  $\beta(L) = 0$ , this implies advertising revenue of

$$\frac{\gamma}{m} [\theta + (1-\theta)\beta(L)] \cdot [\theta(\hat{H})r - 1] = \frac{\gamma\theta(r-1)}{m}. \quad (10)$$

In contrast, advertising revenue in equilibrium is

$$\frac{\gamma}{m} [\theta + (1-\theta)\beta_P^*(L)] \cdot [\theta(\hat{H})r - 1] = \frac{\gamma\theta(r-1)}{m} - \frac{\gamma(1-\theta)\beta_P^*(L)}{m}, \quad (11)$$

where the equality uses the expression for the posterior belief  $\theta(\hat{H})$  given by Equation 2. Thus, the government must reimburse the private owner for lost advertising revenue, which is proportional to the equilibrium level of bias  $\beta_P^*(L)$ . Using Equation 9 and the assumption that the private owner receives proportion  $\frac{1}{\alpha}$  of any subsidy paid by the government, we can write this as

$$C^*(\beta_P^*(L)) = \alpha \left( \frac{\gamma(1-\theta)\beta_P^*(L)}{m} \right) = \max \left[ 0, \alpha\gamma \left( \frac{\psi\theta(r-2) - \alpha\gamma}{2\psi m} \right) \right]. \quad (12)$$

The government subsidy is strictly increasing in the value the government places on citizen investment (measured by  $\psi$ ) for all  $\beta_P^*(L) > 0$ . The greater the mobilizing character of the government, the greater the incentive to subsidize the private owner in return for favorable coverage. In contrast, the relationship between government subsidies and the size of the advertising market (measured by  $\gamma$ ) is nonmonotonic. To see this, note that an increase in the size of the advertising market has two effects. First, as the advertising market increases in size, the government must provide a larger subsidy for a given level of bias to compensate the private owner for lost revenue. Second, the government responds to the higher cost of bias by inducing a smaller  $\beta(L)$ . The second effect dominates the first when advertising revenue is especially important. Indeed, for  $\gamma$  sufficiently large there is no bias, and thus no subsidy, in equilibrium.

## 4 Endogenous Control of the Media

Thus far, we have treated control of the media as exogenous. What does our model say about the determinants of media control?

To answer this question, first recall that equilibrium media bias is the same under state and private ownership when the government may costlessly subsidize the private owner. In this case, if we assume that the government must purchase a news outlet to acquire control, our model offers no prediction about who owns the media. In principle, acquiring direct control provides two benefits to the government: it saves the cost of subsidization and acquires advertising revenue for itself. However, the private owner would accept nothing less than the value of government subsidies and advertising revenue in return for relinquishing control, thus eliminating the incentive for the government to pay for it.

As we discuss above, however, various transaction costs may prevent the government from costlessly subsidizing the private owner. In addition, the government differs from market actors in a crucial respect: it can acquire direct control of the media through force. Although this may come at some cost in political capital and international reputation, that cost is arguably unrelated to the market value of the news outlet.

Formally, assume that the media outlet is initially privately owned, but that at the beginning of the game the government may transfer the media outlet to state ownership at some fixed cost  $\kappa$ . The government thus acquires direct control if  $\kappa$  is small relative to the benefit of taking over the media outlet. As the analysis in the previous two sections demonstrates, this benefit comprises three elements: the greater bias, and thus citizen investment, under state ownership; the subsidy that the government need not pay if it chooses bias directly; and the advertising revenue that the government may keep for itself.

To analyze this tradeoff, consider first the payoff to the government from direct control:

$$\frac{\psi}{m} [\theta + (1 - \theta) \beta_G^*(L)]^2 \cdot \left[ \theta_G(\hat{H}) r - 1 \right] + \left[ \frac{\gamma \theta (r - 1)}{m} - \frac{\gamma (1 - \theta) \beta_G^*(L)}{m} \right]. \quad (13)$$

The first term is proportional to total expected investment, given that the government chooses bias directly, whereas the second is equilibrium advertising revenue (Equation 11 above). We adopt the notation  $\theta_G(\hat{H})$  to denote the posterior belief  $\theta(\hat{H})$  when  $\beta(L) = \beta_G^*(L)$ . In contrast, the payoff to the government from indirect control is

$$\frac{\psi}{m} [\theta + (1 - \theta) \beta_P^*(L)]^2 \cdot \left[ \theta_P(\hat{H}) r - 1 \right] - \frac{\alpha \gamma (1 - \theta) \beta_P^*(L)}{m}. \quad (14)$$

The first term is proportional to total expected investment, given that the government must subsidize the private owner to induce bias, whereas the second is the cost of the subsidy to the government (Equation 12 above). Analogously, we adopt the notation  $\theta_P(\hat{H})$  to denote the posterior belief  $\theta(\hat{H})$  when  $\beta(L) = \beta_P^*(L)$ .

The additional benefit to the government from acquiring direct control is the difference between Equations 13 and 14. To fix ideas, focus on the case where  $\psi \theta (r - 2) > \alpha \gamma$ , which implies that both  $\beta_G^*(L)$  and  $\beta_P^*(L)$  are both strictly greater than zero. Then the additional benefit to the government of direct control is

$$(\alpha^2 - 1) \frac{\gamma^2}{4\psi m} + \frac{\gamma \theta (r - 1)}{m} + \left[ \alpha \gamma \frac{\psi \theta (r - 2) - \alpha \gamma}{2\psi m} - \gamma \frac{\psi \theta (r - 2) - \gamma}{2\psi m} \right].^{15} \quad (15)$$

The first term in this expression is the additional investment under state ownership, which results from the higher level of bias when the government chooses bias directly. The second term is total advertising revenue when the news is reported without bias. In equilibrium under private ownership, some portion of this advertising revenue is replaced with a government subsidy. Acquiring the news outlet saves the government that subsidy while providing the share of advertising revenue that remains. The third term reflects the elimination under state ownership of transaction costs associated with compensating the private owner for lost advertising revenue.

The government chooses to take direct control of the media outlet when Expression 15 is large relative to  $\kappa$ . Of particular interest is how the incentive to eliminate private ownership of the media depends on the mobilizing character of the government (measured by  $\psi$ ) and the size of the advertising market (measured by  $\gamma$ ). Consider first the impact of a marginal increase in  $\psi$ . As we discuss in the previous section, the additional bias under state ownership diminishes as the government values investment more. Thus, the advantage to the government of direct control for the sake of investment (the first term in Expression 15) is smaller when  $\psi$  is large. However, the government also values direct control for the

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<sup>15</sup>To see this, note that total investment under state ownership is  $\frac{(\psi \theta r)^2 - \gamma^2}{4\psi m}$ , whereas total investment under private ownership is  $\frac{(\psi \theta r)^2 - (\alpha \gamma)^2}{4\psi m}$ ; that advertising revenue under state ownership is  $\frac{\gamma \theta (r - 1)}{m} - \gamma \frac{\psi \theta (r - 2) - \gamma}{2\psi m}$ ; and that the subsidy under private ownership is  $\alpha \gamma \frac{\psi \theta (r - 2) - \alpha \gamma}{2\psi m}$ .

subsidy it saves in implementing its desired level of bias, and this benefit is larger when  $\psi$  is large. The following proposition establishes that the second effect outweighs the first, and more generally establishes that the incentive for the government to seize direct control of the media is increasing in  $\psi$ , so long as the government optimally chooses bias greater than zero when the media are state-owned.

**Proposition 3.** *If  $\beta_G^*(L) > 0$ , a marginal increase in  $\psi$  (which measures the mobilizing character of the government) increases the incentive for the government to acquire direct control of the media. If  $\beta_G^*(L) = 0$ , a marginal increase in  $\psi$  (generically) has no impact on the incentive for the government to acquire direct control of the media.*

*Proof.* Consider the following three mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases:

1.  $\beta_G^*(L) > 0$  and  $\beta_P^*(L) > 0$ : The derivative of Expression 15 with respect to  $\psi$  is

$$-(\alpha^2 - 1) \frac{\gamma^2}{4\psi^2 m} + (\alpha^2 - 1) \frac{\gamma^2}{2\psi^2 m} > 0.$$

2.  $\beta_G^*(L) > 0$  and  $\beta_P^*(L) = 0$ : Evaluating Equation 13 at  $\beta_G^* = \frac{\psi\theta(r-2)-\gamma}{2\psi(1-\theta)}$  gives

$$\frac{(\psi\theta r)^2 - \gamma^2}{4\psi m} + \frac{\gamma\theta(r-1)}{m} - \gamma \frac{\psi\theta(r-2) - \gamma}{2\psi m}.$$

Similarly, evaluating Expression 14 at  $\beta_P^*(L) = 0$  gives  $\frac{\psi\theta^2}{m}(r-1)$ . The additional benefit from direct control is therefore

$$\frac{(\psi\theta r)^2 - \gamma^2}{4\psi m} + \frac{\gamma\theta(r-1)}{m} - \gamma \frac{\psi\theta(r-2) - \gamma}{2\psi m} - \frac{\psi\theta^2}{m}(r-1).$$

The derivative of this expression with respect to  $\psi$  is

$$\frac{(\theta r)^2}{4m} + \frac{\gamma^2}{4\psi^2 m} - \frac{\gamma^2}{2\psi^2 m} - \frac{\theta^2}{m}(r-1),$$

which is greater than zero if  $\psi\theta(r-2) > \gamma$ , which is a premise of the proposition ( $\beta_G^*(L) = \frac{\psi\theta(r-2)-\gamma}{2\psi(1-\theta)} > 0$ ).

3.  $\beta_G^*(L) = \beta_P^*(L) = 0$ : The additional benefit of direct control is equal to total advertising revenue,  $\frac{\gamma\theta(r-1)}{m}$ , which is constant in  $\psi$ .

□

Now consider the impact on the government incentive to acquire control of an increase in  $\gamma$ . If  $\alpha = 1$ , so that there are no transaction costs associated with subsidization, then the incentive for the government to acquire control is unambiguously greater when  $\gamma$  is large. Although bias is identical to that under private ownership, the government can save the cost of subsidization and acquire advertising revenue for itself. More generally, for all  $\alpha \geq 1$ , Expression 15 is increasing in  $\gamma$ . Indeed, as the following proposition establishes, the incentive for the government to acquire direct control of the media is increasing in the size of the advertising market, even when there is no media bias under private and/or state ownership.

**Proposition 4.** *The incentive for the government to acquire direct control of the media is increasing in the size of the advertising market (measured by  $\gamma$ ).*

*Proof.* Consider the following three mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases:

1.  $\beta_G^*(L) > 0$  and  $\beta_P^*(L) > 0$ : The derivative of Expression 15 with respect to  $\gamma$  is

$$\gamma \frac{\alpha^2 - 1}{2\psi m} + \frac{\theta(r-1)}{m} + \frac{\alpha\psi\theta(r-2) - 2\alpha^2\gamma}{2\psi m} - \frac{\psi\theta(r-2) - 2\gamma}{2\psi m}$$

For  $\alpha = 1$ , this expression is clearly greater than zero. For  $\alpha > 1$ , this expression is greater than zero for all  $\gamma \in (0, \frac{1}{\alpha^2-1} [2\psi\theta(r-1) + (\alpha-1)\psi\theta(r-2)])$  and therefore for all  $\gamma \in (0, \frac{\psi\theta(r-2)}{\alpha})$ , i.e., for all  $\gamma$  such that  $\beta_G^*(L) > 0$  and  $\beta_P^*(L) > 0$ .

2.  $\beta_G^*(L) > 0$  and  $\beta_P^*(L) = 0$ : The payoff to the government from indirect control is constant in  $\gamma$ , so the derivative of the additional benefit of direct control with respect to  $\gamma$  is equal to the derivative of Expression 13 with respect to  $\gamma$ . Evaluating Expression 13 at  $\beta_G^* = \frac{\psi\theta(r-2)-\gamma}{2\psi(1-\theta)}$  gives

$$\frac{(\psi\theta r)^2 - \gamma^2}{4\psi m} + \frac{\gamma\theta(r-1)}{m} - \gamma \frac{\psi\theta(r-2) - \gamma}{2\psi m}.$$

The derivative of this expression with respect to  $\gamma$  is

$$-\frac{\gamma}{2\psi m} + \frac{\theta(r-1)}{m} - \frac{\psi\theta(r-2) - 2\gamma}{2\psi m},$$

which is greater than zero.

3.  $\beta_G^*(L) = \beta_P^*(L) = 0$ : The additional benefit of direct control is equal to total advertising revenue,  $\frac{\gamma\theta(r-1)}{m}$ , which is increasing in  $\gamma$ .

□

The surprising implication of this analysis is that the relationship between the size of the advertising market and media freedom may be nonmonotonic. Holding ownership constant, growth in the advertising market reduces media bias, regardless of whether the news outlet is owned by the state (so long as the government places any value on advertising revenue) or a private entity. However, the same growth may prompt the state to seize direct control of the media, which leads to a discontinuous jump in media bias.

## 5 Illustration: Media Freedom in Postcommunist Russia

In this section, we briefly discuss the evolution of media freedom in postcommunist Russia. Our aim is not to provide a full history of the role of the media in Russian politics, a task

that others have admirably undertaken.<sup>16</sup> Rather, it is to show how our model can help to illuminate an important case, and so to illustrate the contribution of our theoretical framework. As we demonstrate, Russia is a particularly useful case to analyze, as media freedom, the mobilizing character of the government, the size of the advertising market, and the industrial structure of the media market have all changed substantially over the postcommunist period.

We focus here especially on television, which has been at the center of political conflict in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. From the failed putsch that triggered the collapse (Bonnell and Freidin, 1993), through the pivotal 1996 presidential campaign (e.g., McFaul, 1997; Mickiewicz, 1999; Oates and Roselle, 2000), and into the Putin era (e.g., Oates, 2003, 2006), what is reported on national television news has been a primary concern of political actors. True or not, there is a widespread perception that control of the airwaves is the *sine qua non* in the struggle for power in Russia.

The belief that television has the power to win elections is based in part on the overwhelming reliance of the Russian public on television as an information source. Despite Russia's vast size, by 1990 television coverage extended to nearly 100 percent of the Russian population (White and McAllister, 2006). In contrast, national newspapers are much less widely circulated—the collapse of Soviet-era subscription systems led to a decline in circulation of national newspapers of approximately 95 percent during the 1990s (Koikkalainen, 2007)—and are expensive relative to other goods (Fish, 2005; Lipman, 2006). National television is particularly important, far surpassing local television in viewership (White, McAllister, and Oates, 2002).

Consistent with our general modeling approach, Russian viewers often seem to recognize the bias in news broadcasts and to filter reports through that understanding. Summarizing the results of focus-group studies, Ellen Mickiewicz writes, “Viewers *expect* commercial and governmental involvement in shaping the news. They believe it is the viewer’s responsibility to extract significance and correct for bias” (Mickiewicz, 2006, p. 191, emphasis in original; see also Mickiewicz, 2008).

Nonetheless, as we emphasize, bias can be effective in shaping the beliefs of viewers, so long as there is some informational content in the news. This bias comes at a cost, however, as viewers turn away from broadcasts that are perceived to be insufficiently informative. The degree to which this reduces bias depends in part on whether a media outlet is private or state-owned, and thus on the extent to which the opportunity cost of lost advertising revenue is internalized. In Russia, these considerations were evident in the independent editorial line pursued by the television network NTV, a commercial entity launched in 1993. NTV aggressively reported on the war in Chechnya, drawing viewers and advertising revenue away from state-owned channels. The same was true at the smaller TV6, to which Eduard Sagalaev, a veteran of *perestroika*-era battles over television content, migrated after becoming convinced that the old system of censorship remained intact in the state-owned media (Benn, 1996).

Sagalaev later returned to run state television during the 1996 presidential election campaign, a period when the Kremlin sought to mobilize the public to prevent a Communist victory and the broadcast media—state and private—swung overwhelmingly behind incum-

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<sup>16</sup>See especially Mickiewicz (1999) and Oates (2006).

bent president Boris Yeltsin. Oates and Roselle (2000) examine election coverage during this campaign on NTV and state-controlled ORT, finding little difference between the two and concluding that “[a]lthough NTV was not under the direct control of the government, it still ‘promoted’ Yeltsin in its coverage” (p. 46). The emergence of pro-Kremlin bias at NTV is consistent with the prediction of our model that an increase in  $\psi$ , the value the government attaches to citizen “investment” (here, voting for Yeltsin), should disproportionately affect private media. At the same time, it is likely that the owners of commercial media shared the Kremlin’s preference that Yeltsin win, given the fear that a victory by Communist Party candidate Gennady Zyuganov would spell the end of independent media. In terms of our model, private owners also directly valued citizen “investment,” which increased bias relative to the case where private owners only value advertising revenue.<sup>17</sup>

Throughout the 1990s, the broadcast media remained heavily reliant on the state for financial support. The advertising market was essentially non-existent under communism, and could not develop quickly in the turbulent conditions that followed that system’s collapse. The reliance on state subsidies provided considerable leverage to state officials. This financial dependence situation was, and is, especially severe at the regional level: “As much local media funding comes from the local government (and its very existence often depends on the goodwill of local leaders), the media are quite vulnerable to local legislation” (Oates, 2007, p. 1287).

By the turn of the century, however, the advertising market was growing quickly. Figure 5 shows that between 1999 and 2007, advertising revenue for television, radio, and newspapers sextupled in size in real terms, a growth rate roughly three times larger than that for GDP over the same period. With 80 percent of all advertising revenue centered in Moscow (Azhgikhina, 2007), and with the proportion of all advertising revenue earned by television networks increasing over time, this development promised greater independence for the national broadcast media.<sup>18</sup> Yet media freedom declined sharply over the same period, counter to what the conventional understanding of the relationship between advertising revenue and media freedom would suggest. Figure 5 provides a rough measure of this decline, plotting the evolution of the Freedom House Press Freedom Score for Russia over the postcommunist period.


Earlier declines in press freedom in Russia, such as that which accompanied the 1996 presidential election campaign, can largely be attributed to changing incentives within a given media structure. The strengthening of government control of the media under Russian president Vladimir Putin was different, with the Kremlin taking over over and closing down previously independent media outlets. In terms of our model, this may have occurred for either of two reasons, and in practice some combination of the two may have been at work.

<sup>17</sup>Formally, assume that the private owner has preferences represented by

$$U_P = \lambda \int_0^m \omega_i(\mu_i) E \left[ \pi_i \left( \hat{S}(S) \right) \right] d\mu_i + \gamma \int_0^m \omega_i(\mu_i) d\mu_i + \frac{C}{\alpha},$$

where  $\lambda \geq 0$ . Then equilibrium bias is equal to  $\max \left[ 0, \frac{(\psi + \alpha\lambda)\theta(r-2) - \alpha\gamma}{2(\psi + \alpha\lambda)(1-\theta)} \right]$ , which is (weakly) increasing in  $\lambda$ .

<sup>18</sup>Television’s share of television, radio, and newspaper advertising revenue increased from roughly 60 percent in 1999 to approximately 80 percent in 2007. Data on advertising revenue are from Video International, Russia’s largest advertising marketer, and the Association of Communication Agencies of Russia. Revenue from advertising-only circulars (i.e., “shoppers”) are not included in newspaper advertising revenue.



**Figure 2:** Media freedom and advertising revenue in Russia. Media freedom is Freedom House Press Freedom Score, reordered so that higher values correspond to greater media freedom. Freedom House classifies countries as “Free,” “Partly Free,” and “Not Free,” as indicated. Advertising revenue for television, radio, and newspapers in billions of constant 2000 rubles, Video International and Association of Communication Agencies of Russia.

First, relative to his predecessor, Russian president Vladimir Putin seemed more inclined to mobilize the public in support of his rule. The Kremlin-backed United Russia party encouraged mass organization to a degree that the various “parties of power” during the 1990s never attempted, and various pro-Putin youth groups emerged with Kremlin support. Control of the media facilitated this strategy. Second, the timing of the Kremlin assault coincided precisely with the growth in advertising revenue that could have reduced state influence over private media. The sometimes assertive independence of the remaining private media suggests the threat that a financially secure and predominately private media could have posed to the Kremlin.

The particular methods used to assert direct government control of the media are also consistent with our theoretical perspective.<sup>19</sup> After taking over ownership of previously independent NTV (through state-controlled Gazprom), the Kremlin replaced the existing management. The new management in turn forced the removal of the station’s best-known journalists, replacing them with individuals presumably comfortable with the new owner’s preferences. Much of the NTV news operation subsequently migrated to TV6, which in turn attracted the Kremlin’s attention. At first it seemed as though a compromise might be reached, whereby ownership of TV6 would be transferred from Russian billionaire and Putin opponent Boris Berezovsky to a collective of establishment figures. In the end, however,

<sup>19</sup>For a detailed chronology of these events, see Lipman and McFaul (2005).

TV6 was simply shut down, its frequency transferred to a 24-hour sports channel.

Although the number of television channels in Russia has exploded in recent years, news broadcasts are today largely the preserve of three national networks under direct government control: NTV, Channel One, and Rossiya. As our theoretical model demonstrates, however, media bias has an opportunity cost even on state-owned stations, to the extent that the government values advertising revenue. We should therefore expect media bias on these networks to be largest when mobilization of the public is especially important. For example, we might expect media bias to increase in the run-up to a national election, as the government sacrifices any pretense of impartiality for the sake of a large turnout in support of government-backed parties. At the same time, our model suggests that such effects may be larger on state-owned stations with a more commercial orientation, i.e., those that face a larger opportunity cost from media bias. Gazprom-controlled NTV meets this description. Advertisements on this station generally appear in the middle of the main evening news broadcast, a position favored by advertisers as likely to draw more viewers. In contrast, on less commercial Channel One and Rossiya, advertisements are typically relegated to the unattractive “corners” of the broadcasts.<sup>20</sup>

We may examine these propositions directly, using data on television coverage collected by NewsLab Russia, a media monitoring project based at the University of Wisconsin. Through this project, the main evening news broadcast on each of the three national networks is digitally captured and archived. Native-speaking Russian students watch each broadcast, applying tags to each news segment (“clip”) to describe its content. Each student has access to a standardized clipping sheet that defines the allowable tags. Student workers are rotated randomly across the three stations to further reduce the risk that differences in clipping style might be confused with differences in content.

Figure 3 presents data for the period of the 2007 Russian parliamentary election campaign, which officially began September 5, 2007.<sup>21</sup> As a proxy for media bias, we measure the time advantage given to United Russia, the Kremlin-backed party that received an overwhelming majority of all votes cast in the election.<sup>22</sup> During the campaign, Russian president Vladimir Putin announced that he would head the party list for United Russia, further signaling the Kremlin’s support for that party. Although a full econometric analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, the data are suggestive. On all three stations, the time advantage given to United Russia was substantial, with the Kremlin favorite receiving approximately half of all time devoted to any of the eleven parties participating in the campaign. Moreover, as suggested by our theoretical model, two of the three stations exhibited a statistically significant increase in bias as the election date approached.<sup>23</sup> However, the increase was most pronounced on NTV. With a greater premium placed on advertising revenue, NTV


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<sup>20</sup>Our interpretation that NTV places greater value on advertising revenue was confirmed in an interview with a former editor of one of these evening news programs.

<sup>21</sup>Technical problems prevented one broadcast on Channel One from being archived over this time period.

<sup>22</sup>We include in the analysis only broadcasts in which at least one party was mentioned. When more than one party is mentioned in a particular segment, we allocate that time equally among all parties mentioned.

<sup>23</sup>The slopes for the linear projections depicted in the figures are as follows: for Channel One, -1.119 ( $p$ -value = 0.581); for Rossiya, 2.461 ( $p$ -value = 0.087); for NTV, 3.378 ( $p$ -value = 0.004). In a regression of the *ratio* of time devoted to United Russia to time devoted to all parties combined, the effect of time is positive and significant for NTV but not significantly different from zero for the other two stations.



**Figure 3:** Media bias in 2007 Russian parliamentary election. Time advantage for United Russia defined as number of seconds in evening news broadcast devoted to United Russia minus number of seconds devoted to all other parties combined. Day of campaign defined as days from September 5, the official start of the campaign. Day 27 (October 1) marks Putin’s announcement that he would head the United Russia list. Each plot depicts, for a single station, observed values together with fitted values and 90-percent confidence intervals from a linear prediction.

appears to ration its bias for when it most matters.

## 6 Conclusion

In this paper, we provide a theoretical framework to analyze government control of the media. We focus especially on less democratic states where the government uses the media to mobilize citizens to take actions that may not be in their individual best interest. Our model emphasizes a fundamental tradeoff for any media owner and government that hopes to control media content: bias in reporting reduces the informational content of the news, thus reducing viewership among those who value that information. The extent of media bias depends on the degree to which media owners and the government internalize this effect.

We emphasize two variables that influence this tradeoff. First, governments that seek to mobilize populations to take particular actions induce a higher level of media bias. The distinction between state and private media is small under such governments, but governments may nationalize private media to save the cost of inducing bias. Second, both state and private media exhibit less bias when the advertising market is large. However, the impact on private media is greater, implying that the government may seize control of private media in response to a growing advertising market. Because state media are generally more biased than private media, the relationship between media freedom and the size of the advertising market is thus potentially nonmonotonic.

Our case study of media freedom in postcommunist Russia illustrates these results. Under both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, media bias fluctuated in response to the mobilizing needs of the government, with the magnitude of the fluctuation depending on the ownership and commercialization of the media outlet. Under Putin, the fundamental structure of the media market has also changed, with the Kremlin seizing direct control of previously private media. Our theoretical framework suggests two complementary explanations for this development: a greater emphasis on use of the media to support presidential rule, and a dramatic increase in the size of the advertising market. In each case, the cost to the Kremlin of allowing private media was greater than before.

Future work might use our framework to explore other elements of government control of the media. In many countries, for example, the media are owned by individuals close to the government rather than by the state directly. An interesting question is why governments rely on this intermediate form of control of the media. In addition, media differ greatly within and across countries in the extent to which they provide “infotainment” rather than information. In terms of our model, the broadcast of human-interest stories rather than hard news might encourage viewership at the expense of reducing the time available to influence those who do watch the news. The attractiveness of this strategy may depend both on the mobilizing character of the government and the size of the advertising market.

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