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PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPORT

INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

Barrales Outlines Bush Plans for Local Government

Ruben Barrales is a Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of Intergovernmental Affairs.

Victor Jones is noted for highlighting the critical role that local governments play in the marble cake of federalism that is unique to the United States. It is a world that I'm working in right now, which is an incredible world of elected officials and jurisdictions around the country.

There are, at last count, over 88,000 units of government in the United States: counties and cities, other local entities; states; federally recognized tribes; the territories; and other entities. That's a lot of different units of government, and all of them hold a different piece of political power. Our system is unique, and one of the reasons is because of this diffusion of power. Power is not all held at the federal level; it really is throughout the nation in different configurations.

In my day job I serve as an advisor to the president regarding the White House interaction with these thousands of jurisdictions around the country and about 500,000 elected officials who oversee these units of government. That's a lot of people, and we try as much as possible to make sure that the president has the latest information on them, and that we're incorporating state and local perspectives in the formation of public policy at the national level.


Ruben Barrales

When I was an elected official in San Mateo County, I never knew there was such a thing as Intergovernmental Affairs at the White House. And one of the missions I've taken on is to make sure that local officials around the country are aware that we really are a resource. We are a resource for state and local officials to be able to express the concerns that they have directly to the president, and also as a re-

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Are Patriots Bigots?

Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr. & Zachary Elkins, UC Berkeley

Does pride imply prejudice? A long record of ethnic and national conflict suggests that it does. Consistent with this evidence is a tradition of research on group conflict that suggests that group pride—whether ethnic, national, or gender based—is the positive half of prejudice. On the other side, a growing number of scholars point out that a strong group identity can be an empowering, affirming mechanism in the face of discrimination and chauvinism.

The debate may be most poignant in tragic cases of violent ethnic and national conflict. But even in multi-ethnic states that are not war-torn, the question of group pride divides politicians and intellectuals alike. Here, the division often surfaces in discussions over the merits of

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Nearing the end of two decades in the California legislature, State Senator Jack O'Connell took time off from his run for state school superintendent to visit IGS and talk about his views on education. During his career, O'Connell was the author of numerous landmark education bills. He will now have a chance to implement some of those programs as California's 26th State Superintendent of Public Instruction.

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Make a Gift!

A Message from the Director to the Faculty, Students, Staff, and Friends of IGS

In reflecting on my fourth holiday season as director of the UC Berkeley Institute of Governmental Studies, I am struck by how many of our achievements are the result, not of one person's efforts, but of the joint enterprise and energies of our experienced faculty and staff, our vibrant students, our supportive alumni, and our generous friends. IGS was Berkeley's first organized research unit, and thanks to all of you, it will always be one of the best.

In politics, government, and public policy, IGS leads the way. You have all been a vital part of our past accomplishments, and your continued hard work and support are crucial to maintaining this tradition of excellence. In the difficult budget times that lie ahead, the continued financial support provided by the **Friends of IGS** will be especially important. We hope you will find time to make a gift to the Institute's annual fund drive.

Your tax-deductible gift to IGS will support our efforts to bring leading foreign and domestic scholars to Berkeley, to continue the work of the Center for Politics, and to the excellence of IGS research efforts. As a valued **Friend of IGS**, you will be part of this vital intellectual community. Please take a moment now to make your tax-deductible gift to the **Friends of IGS** by using our new online giving website at *www.igs.berkeley.edu/about_igs/friends.html*

Thank you for your support.

Bruce E. Cain

Navigating the Murky Waters of Conflict of Interest:
Public Controversies at Home & Abroad

Friday, February 21, 2003
9:00am - 3:00pm (free)
Lipman Room, Barrows Hall, UCB

This conference will bring together distinguished scholars, officeholders, political practitioners, and reformers to navigate the murky waters of conflict of interest and offer a closer look at the controversies surrounding attempts to define and regulate conflicts of interest in public life. What is a conflict and what is not? Where are the loopholes and how might they be filled? How do public officials in other countries define and regulate conflicts of interest, and how might their efforts inform the way conflicts of interest are conceived of and understood in the U.S.? Congressman Robert Matsui will chair a panel on campaign consultants who become lobbyists. Keynote speaker former FPPC Chair Karen Getman will discuss the innovations of and challenges facing conflict of interest law in California.

Cosponsored by UCB's Institute of Governmental Studies, American University's Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies, UCB's Center for Campaign Leadership, and Col. Charles T. and Louise H. Travers Program in Ethics and Accountability in Government.

Willi Paul Adams Dies

Willi Paul Adams, professor of North American history at the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies and the Department of History at the Free University of Berlin, died on October 3, 2002, at the age of 62. His obituary described him as "a bridge-builder committed in both scholarship and professional activities to linking Americanists on both sides of the Atlantic and deepening German understanding of the historical processes that have shaped the American colossus." He will be warmly remembered by those of us who knew him for too short a time as a visiting scholar at IGS.

Bay Area Congressmen Come to IGS

Rep. George Miller Discusses Democrats' Efforts to Retake the House

George Miller, who has represented the 7th district of California just north of Berkeley since 1975, gave a brown bag lunch talk at IGS recently. Miller, one of four key authors of the historic education reform bill passed last year, talked about the maneuvering that went into the bill and his relationship with President Bush that grew out of what has been called the most important reform of federal education laws in 30 years. Miller made it clear that the nation still has a long way to go, and he will continue to battle to improve the quality of public schools.



A longtime friend and ally of new House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, Miller has been, and will continue to be a key figure in the Democratic effort to remake their image and regain power.

Rep. Pete Stark Criticizes Bush Administration's War on Terrorism

Congressman Peter Stark, whose 13th Congressional District runs along the east side of the San Francisco Bay from Oakland to San Jose, visited IGS to talk about the changes in Congress and the progress of the war on terrorism.



A senior member of the House Ways and Means Committee and a former chair of its Health Subcommittee, Stark presided over major reforms in Medicare, expanded benefits for the 35 million beneficiaries, and provided COBRA health continuation benefits to younger workers. He is currently ranking minority member on the subcommittee.

Stark currently serves as the senior House Democrat on the Joint Economic Committee. Under his direction, the Joint Economic Committee has produced reports on minimum wage increases, the economic impact of the government shutdown, and the effects of the Balanced Budget Amendment on seniors and low-income Americans.

This Year, IGS Polled the Pollsters

Once again this past November, faculty, students, and political junkies from across the campus gathered at IGS for the traditional election night party replete with big screen TV, computer links, and on-site analysis from graduate student experts.

Two days later, a postelection wrap-up followed with *San Francisco Chronicle* political reporter Carla Marinucci and columnist Debra Saunders joining pollster Merv Field, Democratic consultant Darry Sragow, Republican maven Dan Schnur, and Journalism School professor Susan Rasky to assess the outcome.

Leading up to the election, IGS polled the pollsters in a series of data-filled presentations that tracked the numbers from Labor Day into the final week of the campaign. The polling experts included Mark DiCamillo, director of the Field Poll, Mark Baldassare, director of research and senior fellow at the Public Policy Institute of California, Republican pollster Steve Kinney, a partner at Public Opinion Strategies, and Democratic pollster David Binder, whose San Francisco firm David Binder & Associates, polls for legislative and statewide candidates.

Steve Kinney

Mark DiCamillo



David Binder

Mark Baldassare

The Medina and the Islamic City: Colonial Terms and Postcolonial Legacies

Mia Fuller, UCB

Western scholars have attempted to define "the Islamic city" since the 1920s, despite occasional objections from some of them that the idea is an unjustifiably essentializing one: how can all cities that are inhabited by a preponderance of Muslims conform to a single physical, administrative, and/or cultural type? Meanwhile, in western scholarship as in western usage in general, the expression "the medina"—referring to the precolonial North African walled city—has become increasingly common.

Just as some scholars have pointed to the artificiality of the Islamic city notion by showing that it originated during colonial rule, it has been observed that Europeans' use of medina originated with their adoption of the Arabic word *al-madînah* (the city) in the course of colonial contact. What has not been noted is that the absorption of medina into Europeans' vocabulary preceded the formulation of the Islamic city, and that the two are directly linked—historically, semantically, and logically.

In my current research, I delve into the history of "medina" as it has been used by Europeans, and non-Europeans who have adopted European usage. My objectives are twofold. Europeans' use of medina preceded the Islamic city as the principal designation for the precolonial urban fabric, and I propose that we should regard the term (and the concept) as integral to the genealogy of the recurring debates as to what constitutes the Islamic city.

Given—as I show—that medina was a deeply ambiguous term, designating two different things that were not always synonymous, my first objective is to suggest that its ambiguity may help to explain why the Islamic city has been impossible to define to general satisfaction. Second, I analyze the entangled implications of the medina's continued postcolonial usage, on the part of scholars, planners, and preservation practitioners concerned with improving the quality of urban life while preserving old city fabrics.

The history of the western term "medina" is narrower than the generally understood fact that Europeans used it in the colonial period. Only the French used it, and their usage was limited to two North African settings, Tunisia and Morocco (both of them French protectorates rather than colonies). Because I distinguish between the original French usage and our own today, I use *la médina* to refer to the French category that led to the term that is used presently.

From the start, *la médina* conflated urban spaces with their occupants, fallaciously. At times, it was a morphological descriptor for old walled cities (or parts thereof); at others, it designated concentrations of ethnically Other inhabitants.

But it was also, often, *both* a morphological descriptor and an ethnic designator, even though, on the ground, city boundaries and the lines between ethnic groups did not coincide simply; and herein lies the problem.

The earliest use of *la médina* I have found so far dates to 1885. Prior French expressions had included the Arab city, the French city, the old city, and the new city; a Frankish quarter, a Moorish quarter, and an Israelite quarter; Muslim city, Jewish quarter; the European quarter and the Arab quarter; European part, Muslim and Jewish quarters, an old Casbah, and an Arab quarter. Such distinctions stayed in use alongside *la médina* in the following decades. All of them reflected one of three axes of difference: between old and new; European and non-European; and various local groups (usually Arab/Muslim vs. Jewish). *La médina* more or less summarized all three of these axes of differentiation, although in rough fashion.

The 1885 text in question concerned Morocco. *La médina* was principally morphological here: it was the old city, as defined by its walled enclosure. But even in this early usage, some slippage was already apparent: *la médina* was both the city as a whole *and* one of the quarters within the city.



The Walled City

"All the cities (*médina*) are surrounded by high walls—the city without a walled enclosure is not called *médina*. The *médina* usually comprises a fortress (casbah) and a Jewish quarter (mellah). In the cities of the interior, these three quarters [the *médina*, the *casbah*, and the *mellah*] are neatly divided by walls; in the coastal cities, they tend to overlap."

In 1899, *L'indicateur tunisien*, a detailed government publication itemizing the neighborhoods, communications, and so on, of Tunis, again equated *la médina* with "the city," which was both old and Arab. The "old city," which one entered from the European city comprised "its Maltese, Sicilian, Israelite, and Arab quarters," thus the "Arab" city subsumed all the other ethnicities present. Finally, we are told that "the old city simply refers to the Tunis of before French occupation," and that "it is the upper quarter of the city that was and still is inhabited by the Muslims."

Early French mentions of the medina used the term in two distinct ways: sometimes, it referred to the "old city," including the Jewish quarter, the quarters of Mediterranean European groups (Maltese and Sicilians), and the Muslim quarter. But sometimes, it also referred to the "Arab city."

The most important thing to note here is that the "old" and the "Arab" were treated as identical, even though the old city and the Arab city were not synonymous. The Arab city—part of the city—was used synecdochically to stand for the whole of the old urban configuration.

The single French term, *médina,* pointed consistently to two referents, two objects of study that were sometimes mutually distinct, and sometimes not: the urban system, or parts thereof (on the one hand); and the habitat defined by its predominant ethnic and/or religious character (Arab or Muslim) (on the other).

In the 1910s and 1920s, French colonial architecture and planning were in their heyday, most famously under the watch of Maréchal Lyautey and his team in Morocco. A great many civic buildings were erected, and these have been well studied; but what is especially relevant here is that the team did extensive typological studies of indigenous habitats, some of which even resulted in the design of *nouvelles médinas* (new medinas)—in Casablanca particularly. This period of French colonial architecture, and of study of the colonized populations, thus stands out as one in which the French administrators and planners proactively documented and then reformulated *la médina,* with the goal of scientifically reconstituting it as *both* an urban unit, and an ethnically defined one.

This analysis of *la médina*'s multiple meanings leads me to see the scholarly debates about the Islamic city as inevitably futile attempts to *combine* morphological analyses with religious or ethnic categories. The French scholar William Marçais inaugurated this perennial field of inquiry in 1928. The slippage of terms I have already described was equally integral to this new field: in a classic 1954 essay, Roger Le Tourneau used *la ville musulmane* ("the Muslim city") and *la médina* interchangeably.

It is fair to say that the goal of those who attempt to define *the* Islamic city has not been reached, for none of the analyses to date have succeeded in tying ethnicities or religion to the urban form so we have one single, consistent, and predictable model.

Knowing that the slippage inherent in the French use of *médina* preceded the discourse on the Islamic city, and that the latter discourse in turn absorbed the previous one—by defining *la ville musulmane* in terms of *la médina*, no matter how polyvalent and ambiguous *la médina* was—helps to clarify why the question of the Islamic city (Does it exist as a discrete, distinct model?) is so hard to solve.

The two objects it designates, morphological and sociological, only rarely overlap in fact. In this light, the Islamic city (as opposed to a variety of Muslim cities) is destined to remain an invention rather than a found reality, a scholarly theorization of a religious-morphological object of study.

Since the early 20th century, English, Italian, and other equivalents of *la médina* have entered European parlance to a remarkable extent. For decades, the word has been included in French dictionaries, where it is defined as "old Arab city," without any mention of the once-new colonial cities *in contrast to which* these were originally old and Arab.


Mia Fuller

In the 1970s, the word began to enter Anglophone scholarship, eventually becoming so familiar that translations are in many cases no longer supplied. In the next decade, Italian scholars began to use it in their studies of the Italian occupation of Tripoli. Today's usage, in other words, increasingly obscures the original, colonial conditions —visibly political, and always segregated to some degree— under which *la médina* was originally adopted.

In the 1970s and 1980s, North African planners also began to wrestle with the problems of preserving what was left of the old walled cities after decolonization. Typically, when the colonial era ended, the formerly colonized who could afford to do so moved out of the old walled cities and into the more recently built, former European quarters.

Those who remained within the old walls were the poor and the numerous in-migrants from rural areas. The old quarters became uniformly poor, while the old wealthy houses fell into decay. Thus what *had* been, under colonialism, an environment spatially structured along economic *and* ethnic lines, became more uniformly split along economic (class) lines, especially after the emigrations of Jewish populations.

After years of neglect, local planners (trained and practicing in French) became interested in preserving *les médinas;* and the term referred specifically to the *morphological* entity that the colonizers had designated by it, although not the same ethnically or religiously defined one.

Some recent scholarly works concerning North Africa show a few of the ramifications of planners' ongoing juxtaposition of present-day needs with the legacies (physical and semantic) of the colonial era. In 1997, Justin McGuinness showed very clearly the direct continuities between French colonial planning approaches to the existing, non-French built environment, and the approach of the present-day *Association pour la Sauvegarde de la Médina de Tunis* (Association for the Preservation of the Tunis Medina), including the Association's designs for a *"néo- Médina"* form—a clear reiteration of French colonial planners' path of study and planning.

Precolonial Nostalgia

Overall, the discourse of *la médina* and the inevitable dualization of cities that an emphasis on it entails, is kept in place by several pressures, as described by Nezar AlSayyad, who in 1998 identified scholars, architects, and administrators as the principal beneficiaries of this discourse.

In addition, postcolonial North Africans display a wide range of personal attachments to the old walled cities, and even to their designations as old and Arab (whether under the name *la médina* or otherwise). For many of them, not least those who live in recently built sprawl or in newer city centers, *la médina*, nowadays, represents a nostalgia for the precolonial, the "authentic," and even the "Oriental," that may superficially resemble Europeans' orientalizing projections but is, in fact, complex in entirely distinct ways.

For North African planners, there has been no avoiding the colonial-era legacies of *les médinas;* and even if they could, doing so would be problematic in its own right. As Janet Abu-Lughod, the preeminent scholar in this field, reminded readers in 1992, avoiding the colonial legacy by valorizing "traditional" forms could conceivably come hand in hand with obstacles to desirable social changes: "[D]oes the defense of traditionalism in architecture actually entail a defense of the status quo or even a regression in forms of social relations?

The traditional Middle Eastern house was designed primarily to perpetuate and enforce spatial segregation between males and females. Does our attempt to preserve this architecture support this system, even if it works to the detriment of women?"

These are only brief samples of a very complicated set of dilemmas: how to preserve the old cities without excessive demolitions? How to develop growing cities without repeating problematic patterns of the past? And how to do either without perpetuating colonial-era social divisions?

It is especially challenging to construct a postcolonial "traditional" heritage when a highly detailed "traditional" heritage was already constructed *during* the colonial era, *and* policies were shaped with reference to that constructed heritage, *and* so many North Africans internalized that constructed heritage as reflecting their traditions in contrast to the colonial modern. At a practical level, this means that the *médina* that planners strive to regain is imagined in many ways as it was described and captured under Lyautey and his colleagues.

Yet to some extent, North Africans do not want the precolonial cities to return to their precolonial form in every sense. Ideally, they want them to be solid, comfortable, traditional, and have up-to-date sewage systems and services. Thus the goal must inevitably be one not of return, but of a carefully shaped hybridization of precolonial and up-to-date forms and technologies.

In sum, the expression "medina," used so freely today by well-meaning scholars to denote non-European walled Arab cities in North Africa, is both historically specific and colonially encoded. An extreme reaction to this clarification might be that it is not appropriate for urban and social historians, nor, possibly, for postcolonial planners and preservationists themselves, to use medina or *la médina* as part of their working vocabulary, as their debates would risk being overdetermined by the histories of the analytical categories employed in them.

But postcolonial North African planners, and scholars in general, mean the term to refer, now, to the morphological object, the walled city, and most certainly not the social configurations that have dwelled in it at various times.

Arguably, then, there is no reason to discard the old colonial term. Nonetheless, I propose that greater clarity and historicization of terms can help to sort out some aspects of the dilemmas faced by planning practitioners, and not incidentally, to add some precision to scholarly analyses. I suggest we distinguish between the *médina* as the object of policy and study invented during colonial rule, and the historic walled city as the object of study that is a focal point of history, preservation, and planning today.

When we use the word "medina," do we mean the precolonial city as it once was? The precolonial city that continued to exist, or survive, alongside the colonizers' new city? Or the precolonial city that exists to this day? □

Latino Political Integration Follows European Pattern

Jack Citrin, IGS, Benjamin Highton, UC Davis

Some commentators view the onward march of the U.S. population toward a majority made up of ethnic minorities with alarm, prophesying linguistic fragmentation and the crumbling of American values and traditions. In the early twentieth century, they argue, the melting pot worked because of a self-conscious program of Americanization that facilitated cultural and political assimilation. Today, immigrants move easily back and forth to their countries of origin and maintain contact with their original cultures through videos and the Internet.

The idea of Americanization has lost ground and in some circles is regarded as oppressive. As a result, the historical pattern of "straight-line" assimilation, with each immigrant generation becoming more similar, economically, culturally, and politically, to the mainstream of society may no longer occur. Michael Barone vigorously disputes this argument, pointing to a body of evidence indicating that Latino and Asian immigrants generally follow the path of their Irish, Italian, and East European predecessors, becoming monolingual in English by the third generation and intermarrying with white Americans more often.

Clearly, assimilation is a multidimensional process, involving occupational mobility, language acquisition, and new leisure habits. There also is a political dimension of assimilation that involves naturalization, the acquisition of knowledge of American history and political institutions, and participation in the political process. Indeed, electoral politics was an important avenue for improving the economic and living conditions of Irish, Italian, and other European immigrants, many of whom were recruited as party workers and candidates.

Political, economic, and legal developments have changed the costs and benefits for immigrants facing the decision to vote, so it is difficult to compare today's immigrants and their predecessors. Nevertheless, we can examine the distinctiveness of immigrants from Latin America and Asia in two ways. First, we can describe their pattern of political incorporation, determining whether participation increases from one immigrant generation to the next. Second, we can compare the Latino and Asian newcomers with recent European immigrants and in that way identify whether specific national origins lead to political assimilation.

Latino and Asian immigrants do become politically incorporated over time. The longer they live in the United States, the more likely they are to become citizens, and the longer foreign-born citizens have been in the United States, the more likely they are to vote. Although the native-born Latinos and Asians do vote more frequently than the foreign-born, these differences are partly a function of differences in socio-economic status. There is no evidence that recent Latino and Asian immigrants are likely to be permanently disengaged from the electoral process, although the persistent finding that Asian-Americans vote less than members of other ethnic groups with similar social backgrounds does set this group apart from other immigrant groups.

This paper addresses the argument that Latino and Asian immigrants are less likely to become integrated into the American political system than their European counterparts, past and present. To do so, we compare the citizenship rates and turnout of foreign-born adult citizens in California with different national origins. In addition, we consider whether the "straight-line" pattern of assimilation applies to voting by comparing the political participation of different immigrant generations *within* each ethnic group.

Only citizens can vote. For immigrants, the legal requirement for citizenship is a minimum of five years of residence, but psychological and administrative delays typically prolong naturalization. For this reason, in investigating the determinants of naturalization among the foreign-born in California, we confine attention to those who have lived in the U.S. at least 10 years, assuming that most immigrants who have lived in the United States for at least a decade and have not become citizens remain alien residents by choice.

Among all ethnic groups, age, formal education, and income are positively associated with the decision to acquire American citizenship. Older, wealthier, and better-educated immigrants naturalize more quickly. There also are differences in the citizenship rates related to the national origin of immigrants, in part due to variation in the social background of immigrants from specific countries, as we will show. Among those in California who have lived in the U.S. for at least 10 years, the citizenship rates are highest among those from Vietnam (79 percent), the Philippines (78 percent), China (76 percent), and the miscellaneous group of whites (75 percent). Among the Asian immigrants with 10 years of residence, the citizenship rates of those from Korea (57 percent) and India (60 percent) lag behind. Latinos are especially unlikely to become citizens; immigrants from Mexico who have lived in the U.S. for at least 10 years have the lowest citizenship rate, 27 percent.

Undoubtedly some part of the variation in citizenship rates associated with country of origin is explained by differences in social background and length of residence in the United States. We constructed models to examine the "effect" of being born in a particular country on whether or not an immigrant has become a citizen after living in the United States for at least 10 years.

Socio-economic status, specifically age, education, and income all are strongly related to citizenship status. Adjusting for background differences among immigrants has only a minimal impact on the observed "effect" of being born in India, China, and the Philippines. Among immigrants from Korea, controlling for socio-economic status reduces the citizenship gap relative to whites, whereas among those born in Vietnam the "adjusted" citizenship rate becomes noticeably higher than that for foreign-born whites.

The relative youth and low socio-economic status of immigrants from Mexico means that controlling for background characteristics reduces the citizenship gap for this group by about a third. Nevertheless, the citizenship rate of immigrants from Mexico remains substantially below that of white or Asian immigrants even after this adjustment.

Taking into account the immigrants' length of residence in the United States, distinguishing among those who have lived here from 10 to 20 years, those with 20 to 30 years residence, and those who have lived here more than 30 years, the relationship between age and citizenship status largely disappears. This pattern suggests that age is merely serving as a proxy for how long a person has lived in the United States and that duration of residence is the critical factor. In terms of the racial and ethnic sub-groups, the citizenship gap among those born in Korea and India largely disappears once duration of residence as well as social background is considered.

The estimated citizenship rates among those born in China, the Philippines, and Vietnam are higher than that among white immigrants. The citizenship rate among those born in Vietnam is especially high. Finally, those of Mexican descent remain significantly less likely to become citizens. In previous research, Louis DeSipio has speculated that the proximity of Mexico to California and the numerous ways immigrants can remain connected to their original country help explain this residual difference in naturalization rates. Overall, the findings are consistent with our argument that the turnout deficit among Mexican immigrants is more a function of their

Table 1. Immigrant Generations in the California Electorate (1994-2000)

Nativity	White (%)	Black (%)	Latino (%)	Asian (%)
Native-born				
Third generation	89	97	46	16
Second generation	5	1	26	16
Foreign-born (first generation)				
entered US before 1980	5	1	19	35
entered US 1980-present	1	1	9	33
Percentage of adult citizen population	68	7	16	8

Note: 3rd generation is defined as being native born with at least one parent born in the U.S. 2nd generation is defined as being native-born with both parents being foreign-born.
Sources: 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Survey Voter Supplements, respondents pooled.

Table 2. Turnout Gaps by Immigrant Generation within the California Electorate

Race/ Ethnicity	Generation	Foreign-born, Dates of Entry	Turnout	Turnout gap (% points)	Turnout gap with SES controls (% points)
White (baseline)	3rd	–	67%	–	–
White	2nd	–	74%	+7	-2
White	1st	before 1980	70%	+3	-8**
White	1st	1980-present	47%	-20	-20**
Black (all native/foreign-born combined)			58%	-9	0
Latino	3rd	–	52%	-15	-2
Latino	2nd	–	49%	-18	-2
Latino	1st	before 1980	60%	-7	+3
Latino	1st	1980-present	36%	-31	-9**
Asian	3rd	–	59%	-8	-12**
Asian	2nd	–	47%	-20	-20**
Asian	1st	before 1980	55%	-12	-22**
Asian	1st	1980-present	42%	-25	-26**

Source: 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Survey Voter Supplements, respondents pooled.

lower socio-economic background and relative reluctance to become American citizens than a lack of interest in politics among those eligible to vote. By contrast, the citizenship gap is less important among Asian immigrants than the persistent reluctance of some subgroups to vote despite their legal eligibility and possession of relevant socio-economic resources.

The Current Population Survey data enable us to divide respondents into three groups: the foreign-born (first generation), the native-born whose parents were born abroad (second generation), and the native-born with parents who also were born in the United States (third generation). This classification permits us to disentangle the influences of immigrant generation, nativity, and country of birth on voter turnout.

Table 1 presents a portrait of the California adult *citizen* population with each of the four main ethnic groups divided into these three generational categories. The white and black populations are each over 90 percent native-born, with overwhelming majorities being third-generation Americans. Although about 70 percent of Latino *citizens* are native-born, almost one in four are second-generation—the first members of their family to be born in the U.S. In comparison, the native-born make up a much smaller proportion of Asian-American citizens; fully 68 percent of Asian citizens are foreign-born.

We have shown earlier that the year of entry into the United States of Latino and Asian-American immigrants is associated with turnout, with the earlier entrants being much more likely to vote. The small number of black immigrants (only two percent of the blacks residing in California) makes it impossible to replicate this analysis for African-Americans.

As the overall size of the white population in California is much larger, the small proportion of foreign-born citizens among them does not pose the same obstacle, and the analyses that follow estimate the effects of year of entry and generation for whites as well as Latinos and Asians.

Table 2 reports the turnout for adult citizens in each ethnic group, with respondents subdivided according to nativity, generation, and, for the foreign-born, date of entry into the United States. The table also indicates the turnout surplus or deficit (in percentage points) for a particular group when compared to the baseline category of third-generation whites. The final column estimates the residual turnout gap after groups have been matched by social background characteristics.

Native Born

Looking first at the turnout gap before adjusting for social background, an interesting finding is that second-generation whites (native-born with foreign-born parents) and white immigrants who arrived before 1980 are *more* likely to have voted than whites long established in the United States (with electoral surpluses of +7 and +3 percentage points, respectively).

Among whites the most recent immigrants did have the lowest level of turnout, but this curvilinear pattern deviates from the theory of straight-line assimilation predicting that each successive generation should be more likely to vote. All the other ethnic groups, however subdivided, voted less than the baseline group of third-generation whites. The turnout deficits were particularly large for recent Latino immigrants (-31) and recent Asian immigrants (-25).

Given the substantial differences in socio-economic status across ethnic groups and immigrant generations, the turnout gaps just reported do not isolate the unique influences of nativity and generation. To identify these, we once again estimate a multivariate model with controls for background factors (age, education, family income, residential mobility, and election year).

This matching procedure substantially alters the previously observed pattern of gaps in turnout. The third column in Table 2 shows that among whites, the only significant residual turnout gaps are between foreign- and native-born citizens. First-generation whites who immigrated before 1980 are less likely to vote than their third-generation counterparts by an estimated eight percentage points and the turnout deficit for the matched group of post-1980 white immigrants is 20 percentage points.

With social background differences taken into account, the deficit of Latinos relative to third-generation whites also is virtually eliminated. Only among relatively recent (post-1980) Latino immigrants does a statistically significant residual gap of nine percentage points remain. Most of the generational differences between Latinos and third-generation whites appear largely a function of socioeconomic background. As the length of residence in the United States increases the likelihood of voting, this turnout gap should diminish over time. In any event, the political incorporation of Latinos into the California electorate appears as rapid as that of white immigrants. But rather than a continuing increase in participation from one generation to the next, as implied by a model of straight-line assimilation, there appears to be one major disjunction for both these ethnic groups—between recent first generation immigrants and all other citizens.

Once again, the voting behavior of Asian-Americans is somewhat different. Table 2 confirms the earlier finding of comparatively low turnout among Asian-Americans. Within this ethnic group, unlike either whites or Latinos, third-generation immigrants have the highest level of voting (59 percent) and the overall pattern of turnout across immigrant generations is a closer fit to the so-called straight-line model of political assimilation, yet even after adjusting for differences in social background, third-generation Asian-Americans are less likely than the equivalent group of whites to vote by 12 percentage points.

This deficit rises as one moves to more recent immigrant generations, reaching a maximum of 26 percentage points among post-1980 Asian immigrants. Ironically, when it comes to political assimilation, the ethnic group frequently labeled the "model minority" because of its economic and educational achievements lags behind Latinos, who are more frequently the object of concern for anti-immigrant interest groups.

Participation

Our earlier analyses of Latinos and Asians revealed some internal differences in participation related to country of origin. Table 3 therefore introduces country of origin into the present framework of analysis, focusing only on foreign-born citizens (as noted earlier, the CPS does not permit an effective classification of native-born Asians by country of origin). Again, the first column in Table 3 presents the level of turnout for first-generation immigrants with different national origins, the second column computes the turnout gap *vis-à-vis* white immigrants, and the third column estimates this gap after the introduction of the standard controls (age, income, formal education, and residential stability) in a multivariate logit model.

Compared to white immigrants, those from Latin America and Asia are less likely to vote, whatever their country of origin. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, there are group differences related to national origin. Among the Latinos, the turnout deficit is greatest for immigrants from Mexico (17 percentage points). Among first-generation Asian-Americans, the turnout deficit relative to white immigrants is largest for Korean immigrants (22 points) and smallest among those from the Philippines (10 points).

After adjusting for group differences in socio-economic background and age, the differences across nationality groups found when we analyzed both native and foreign-born respondents reappear. Even after adjusting for background differences, immigrants from Mexico are less likely to vote than those from other Latin American countries. Chinese and Korean immigrants are less likely to vote than those from Vietnam or the Philippines.

Table 3 also shows that the levels of turnout for Mexican and white immigrants, once one adjusts for background differences, are virtually the same. And Latino immigrants from countries other than Mexico are, other things being equal, *more* likely to vote than white immigrants in California by an estimated margin of 12 percentage points. Among Asian immigrants, after adjusting for background differences the participation of Vietnamese and Filipino immigrants is indistinguishable from that among white immigrants. These two groups thus appear the exception to otherwise persistently low Asian-American turnout. The turnout of Chinese and Korean immigrants is more than 10 percentage points lower than that of white immigrants, even after adjusting for the background differences most strongly related to voting.

To summarize, both early political socialization, as indexed by nativity, and adult experiences, as indexed by length of residence in the U.S., affect the political incorporation of immigrants. With the exception of Asian-Americans, significant generational differences among the native-born are not evident. The recent wave of Latino immigrants shows patterns of integration like those of its European counterparts. Among immigrants from Asia, participation lags behind that of new citizens from other regions.

Indeed, among Asian-Americans participation is, if anything, higher among the relatively less-educated and poorer Filipino and Vietnamese subgroups than among residents with a Chinese or Korean background. The "resources" factor never is the only source of differences in political participation; clearly, though, this set of attributes is

Table 3. Turnout Gaps Among California Foreign-Born Adult Citizens, by Country of Origin

Group	Turnout	Turnout gap (Foreign-born Whites as baseline)	Turnout gap with SES controls
Whites (baseline)	65	–	–
Mexicans	48	-17	0
Other Latinos	61	-4	+12**
Chinese	47	-18	-14**
Koreans	43	-22	-15**
Filipinos	55	-10	-4
Vietnamese	50	-15	1
Other Asians	44	-21	-12**

Note: Foreign-born whites includes all non-hispanic white immigrants. Cell entries in the "turnout with SES controls" report the estimated difference in turnout, in percentage points, between the specified group and the baseline group (first generation whites) from a multivariate logit model that includes age, educational attainment, family income, residential mobility, election year, and year of entry to the United States. A * indicates p<.10 in the multivariate logit model. A ** indicates p<.01 in the multivariate logit model.
Sources: 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Survey Voter Supplements, respondents pooled.

less potent in stimulating turnout among Asian-Americans than any other ethnic group.

With this one important caveat, the evidence shows that the process of political incorporation of the current wave of immigrants to California is similar whatever their national origins. As in the case of white immigrants, the offspring of newcomers from Latin America and Asia are more inclined to vote than first-generation immigrants. For all the foreign-born, time spent in the U.S. boosts the level of political participation. Moreover, as socio-economic status improves, the participation of Latino and Asian-Americans increases, regardless of where they were born, another familiar pattern. Again, the one consistent deviation from the standard path of incorporation is, the low level of voting among Asian-Americans, and whether this endures will help determine the shape of California's electorate in the future.

This excerpt is based on a talk Citrin and Highton gave as part of the IGS Colloquium on Race, Ethnicity, and Immigration. The research was supported by the Public Policy Institute of California and the full text of the study is available at www.ppic.org. □

TRIVIAQUIZ

It's State of the Union time again. Some questions:

1. What was the State of the Union first called? When was it first delivered and where?

2. When was the speech first called the State of the Union?

3. When was it first carried live on television?

4. When was it first carried live on the Internet?

See page 22 for answers.

Barrales cont.

source for the president to communicate what his vision is and what his goals are to local officials. That's why I spend so much time traveling and searching for different tools to communicate to local and state officials around the country.

I'm very fortunate to have a hardworking and effective and wonderful staff in the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, and I have colleagues in every agency throughout the federal government who have a focus on intergovernmental affairs. With that network of colleagues, we are able to cover quite a bit of ground on issues related to homeland security, education, and other initiatives that the president has taken on, working together as a team.

Every morning when I drive through the gates of the White House, I know that my job is to move three things forward, the president's three main goals: to win on terrorism, to secure the homeland, and to increase economic security for Americans. With those goals in mind, I and my colleagues move forward in terms of the work we do on a day-to-day basis.

I served at the local level on the board of supervisors. And at the local level, intergovernmental affairs to me related to the kind of work I did in communities like East Palo Alto, where we were able to have a number of local and state agencies cooperate to help reduce the crime rate.

We created one of the first charter schools in the state. The county really doesn't have a formal role in education, but we drew on some county resources to help create and maintain a charter school.

Those are the kinds of experiences I had as a local elected official. I have a unique opportunity now, working at the White House, to apply the resources and the focus of the federal government to state and local issues, as it relates, to homeland security, and some other very, very big and important issues. But what I've come to appreciate is how important the work that's done at the local level is, because that's where the actual results come from.

Results Oriented

And if the president is anything, he's results oriented. He wants to make sure that we're able to demonstrate results for the American people. And the results generally don't come out of Washington, they generally are at the local level. We don't educate a lot of people at the Department of Education; it's in our local classrooms that students have an opportunity to improve their academic performance. With that in mind, we move forward, trying to provide resources and support for local government.

In terms of working for the president in this role, there are three things to keep in mind. Number one, the president was a governor; and governors tell me once a governor, always a governor. He understands the unique relationship between the states and the power invested in the states. He believes that innovation is found in the states and at the local level, and not through Washington.

I've worked in Silicon Valley and I've worked in Washington, D.C., and they're both wonderful places to be, but Washington, D.C., is not the center of innovation in the United States of America. It is in the state and local governments, where people are trying to figure out how programs and resources can be used to benefit people in their communities. People at the local level have a much better understanding of how to change a federal program to fit the local community in a better way. And that's something that the president feels very adamant about.

He's against unfunded mandates that require state or local governments to implement fantastic new ideas from the federal government that have no money or resources associated with them. And I know, as a local official, that's always been the bane of our existence; it's kind of like a food chain—local officials complain about unfunded mandates from the state level, and the state complains about unfunded mandates from the federal level. It's something he understands very well, and he understands you can't just make laws and expect state and local governments to raise the taxes to pay for those wonderful new ideas.

Having been a governor, he understands governors and has appointed a number of them to his cabinet. Secretary Tommy Thompson was a governor. Governor Ridge of Pennsylvania is now the director of homeland security. Christie Todd Whitman was governor of New Jersey. The president thinks that perspective is very important at the federal level.

The president also understands very well the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." The states' rights are very important. And as the

United States has evolved the Tenth Amendment might not seem as politically important today as it was during the creation of the United States of America, but it most definitely is important to this president, and he understands its value. The sovereignty of states is very important and should not be taken lightly by the leadership at the federal level.

That's the second thing about the president you should know, and the third thing is that he is focused on results. He cares more about being able to demonstrate results than to talk about the problem. He wants us to focus on results and to be able to demonstrate them.

It's important to keep that in mind, as you see him on television or hear about policies or things that he's promoting. It helps to put in perspective that his focus is not so much on the political process, but on the kinds of things we can do if we're committed to get something done and to address a problem.

Federalism in the 21st century is an interesting topic, and as I'm now a veteran of almost two years at the federal level, I'm going to share with you all my wisdom. That should leave a lot of time for questions and answers. Our approach towards federalism tries to move the federal government away from the role of a compliance monitor, setting rules and then building a huge bureaucracy to monitor and see if the state and local governments are checking the right boxes and jumping through the right hoops. We want to move from the role of compliance monitor to a partnership with state and local governments, respecting their autonomy, their constitutional role, and providing some flexibility for them to apply policies in a way that makes sense for their jurisdictions.

The needs of the citizens and not the needs of the government bureaucracy should be the focus of what we're doing. It's sometimes helpful to have new perspectives in Washington to de-emphasize the process and emphasize the relationships, formal and informal, that need to be developed, not just in Washington but throughout the nation.

The president believes that real change comes from the bottom, the grassroots—meaning state and local governments—and not from the top. A federalism that promotes innovation, flexibility, and accountability is the direction that we should move in.

In terms of my job in Intergovernmental Affairs, that's what we're focused on. We are trying to identify those functions that could be carried out more appropriately by state and local governments, rather than by the federal government. We're trying to provide opportunities for waivers and opportunities for innovation and flexibility at the state and local level.

Those are the kinds of things we're looking for. And we're constantly looking for partners in that endeavor, in the public and private sector. Sometimes folks in the private sector have suggestions in terms of what can be done at the federal, state, or local level, and we take good ideas wherever they come from.

American federalism is a unique construct that was created over 200 years ago. At the time, the framers of the Constitution did not envision a powerful national government, as we see today. It's evolved over time, especially in the postwar era in the 20th century, and the president feels that we need to make sure that we have a healthy respect for the Constitution, and for the rights and the powers vested in states and local government.

The challenges that we face are many, and I'll go through a few of them. Federal agency consultation with state and local governments on policies has, in many respects, been inadequate. We need to do a better job of consulting with state and local governments on issues before policy is made. That's a tremendous challenge because the federal government really is not a single entity, the federal government is made up of many different entities, departments and agencies, and many layers. And it's a very challenging experience to try to get a handle from the White House on all the different policies and regulations and impacts that might take place on state and local governments.

We're constantly chasing after and trying to get ahead of the different decisions that are made at the federal level that will affect state and local governments. And even though many presidents have passed executive orders on federalism, one lesson is very clear, and it's that implementation matters.

As I mentioned, the president is very much results focused. It's easy—relatively speaking—to pass an Executive Order on federalism, saying we respect states' rights. The challenge has always been on the implementation. How do you do that on a day-to-day basis when federal legislation or decisions that the federal government makes impact state and local governments? How do you ensure that state and local governments are notified or consulted and their input is part of the process that creates that policy? That's the challenge, and that's the thing that we're working on and looking at, and working with our state and local partners. Issues like the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act have given some reassurance to state and local governments, but have not eliminated the problem of unfunded mandates.

One thing we've heard from a number of state and local officials is that the waiver process is still much too long

The Victor Jones Memorial Lecture Commemorates a Champion of Bay Area Regional Government

"Victor Jones's knowledge and enthusiasm about regional and local government created a lasting legacy with ABAG. The Association of Bay Area Governments truly has been a model for regional cooperation, not just here in the Bay Area and locally, but throughout the country. You see the results of Victor's work in regional efforts related to environmental quality, land use, and public projects. He has had a lasting impact on the quality of life in the Bay Area. You can see his work reflected in other institutions like the BCDC, San Francisco Bay Conservation Development Commission, which I had the honor of serving on, and the Metropolitan Transportation Commission, and other forms now of regional intergovernmental cooperation." *—Ruben Barrales* and burdensome. Waivers are, again, an opportunity for state and local governments to modify federal legislation so that it more adequately applies to the local state or local entity. And many of our agencies now have been much more focused on providing waivers.

Tommy Thompson, former governor of Wisconsin, has created an office of waivers. And it literally sits outside of his office, so that when governors or state officials are asking for waivers, he can get an immediate status update on them and push them through relatively quickly. We think we've done a very good job, especially in helping him along those lines, and hope to do even more allowing for states to be more creative.

We understand that states are willing to be accountable for results, but they're seeking more flexibility in order to be more innovative in terms of how they reach those results. An example of that relates to the TANF, or the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block grant, which is part of the welfare reform legislation that will now have to be reauthorized if it's to move forward.

Flexibility there allows for states to use TANF monies to establish training accounts or other innovative ways to provide services to people on welfare and to get people off of welfare. We very much believe in providing support for the state governments to be even more innovative, much more flexible in their use of TANF funds, so that they can address the problems and get results.

It's not a measure of how many visits someone has made to a welfare office; it's how many people we get off of welfare and get into jobs that really should be the measure. That's our focus—how can we work with our state and local partners to get more people into jobs, off of welfare? And if they have innovative ideas that get those results, those are the kinds of things that we want to be able to support.

The president has been very adamant about using technology to help implement more effective federalism. And e-government is something that folks in the administration are working on to create easier access for citizens. Here in the Bay Area the technology is taken for granted, but there's a lot of work to do at the national level.

We also think there could be a better use of the federal-regional councils. Federal-regional councils that relate to the secretaries of the different departments have representatives in regions throughout the United States. Those regional representatives do a very good job of working with state and local officials on problems specific to these regions. And those are the kinds of things that we think create wonderful opportunities for intergovernmental relations to solve problems.

We think that the federal government is best organized by function, but people live in places. If you can take the functions and departments that these individuals represent, and bring them together in places where people actually live and work, we can focus our attention on solving problems in those regions. And so we're very excited about the possibility of doing more.

It's important to focus on outcomes. And there should be basic measures of success when it comes, for example, to teenage pregnancy. The measure should be a reduction in teenage pregnancy, rather than number of visits to a clinic. There are ways that you can measure what you're doing and how your resources are being used to allow you to actually get results, rather than just to invest more in the process, checking off that compliance has been the focus rather than results.



Ruben Barrales speaking at the Institute of Governmental Studies at UC Berkeley.

Professor Jones focused on regional approaches, and there's an opportunity for the federal agencies to do more in terms of working at the regional level. Issues like homeland security aren't bound by political jurisdiction. State or city boundaries don't mean a lot to terrorists and the harm that they can inflict, so regional approaches to homeland security are the kinds of things that we're looking at.

Governor Ridge, in the Office of Homeland Security, has been working with his team to provide $3.5 million in funding for state and local first responders—the police departments, the fire departments, emergency medical personnel— and try to build in incentives for local jurisdictions to work with one another, to be able to spread those resources and maximize the use of those resources. Not every jurisdiction needs to have the latest equipment; they can share equipment within a region and spread those dollars even further, or do regional training, rather than just jurisdiction-specific training.

There are a lot of possibilities, and we're doing what we can at the federal level to try to achieve those results. I think homeland security issues present a wonderful opportunity for us at the federal level to try to solve problems on a regional basis, or provide security on a regional basis.

The president was very pleased to have bipartisan support for the Leave No Child Behind Act, the education reform bill that passed on a bipartisan basis. And that, I think, is a demonstration of intergovernmental relations in the 21st century as well. The federal government provides about seven percent of education funding in the United States. Not a lot when you think about it, but using that as leverage, we were able to put in place an education reform initiative that we think will have a major impact.

And it's not one that has a federal education program that we roll out in the states, but it's one that provides for accountability and results, one that provides for flexibility within the state and at the local level, and one that we believe works because it's going to be focused on proven educational methods. It's one where, again, it's not a federal program. Each state sets up its own education accountability, it's own standards, and they get federal funding if they're able to demonstrate results and reach results.

Those are examples of what intergovernmental relations look like from the White House. It's a wonderful opportunity to come from the Bay Area and serve the president at the White House on these kinds of issues, and it's an incredible honor to be there. And it's a great honor to be here with you all, because I always love coming back to California whenever I can. So thank you very much for bearing with me.

The complete webcast may be viewed at http://webcast. berkeley.edu/events/details.html?event_id=18. ☐

Question and Answer Session with Barrales

Q: In a series of recent decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court has by a narrow majority shifted the balance away from the federal government to local state government. How have these decisions affected your office?

A: The Court has been proactive in terms of the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution and pushing decisions back to the states that rightfully belong within the auspices of state control.

Q: How has being from the Bay Area affected you in your political career, specifically, as the highest ranking Latino in the Bush administration?

A: It's given me a greater appreciation for the diversity of the United States. Being a Latino in the White House, in the Bush administration, is a unique honor. There are a number of Latinos whom the president has picked to serve within his administration, and a number of Latinos from California. It's a unique opportunity, and one I don't take lightly. I make quite an effort to reach out to the Latino community through the media, through events, and hosting folks at the White House.

Q: The country has gone through a major economic shock over the past year. Can you give us an idea of how the administration plans to work with state and local governments to help them deliver services to their citizens?

A: Well, one of the focuses that we have is on flexibility within the state, allowing the federal government to work with the states in a way that gives states the ability to get waivers on a more timely basis, to be able to take federal laws and, if they think there's a better way to deliver the services, to aid them in their ability to get those waivers and to provide services to local constituencies.

Q: How do you encourage local control without undercutting state authority?

A: An example of where we're trying to aid local governments and at the same time respect the authority of the states relates to homeland security. The reality is that the first responders, the police and fire and ambulance personnel, are for the most part local, not state. In funding first responders, we proposed a formula that would provide the $3.5 billion to state and local first responders, but have a formula where 75 percent of that money is aimed specifically and directly to local governments and 25 percent to the state. The money would pass through the state, but would be mandated to go to the local governments.

Q: How do you think United States federalism is responding to globalization?

A: State and local governments increasingly have a more active role in international issues. Many more cities have sister city relationships, our mayors and governors are more active in international trade, sending trade delegations around the world. There are international issues, such as trade, where states and local governments have a much more active role. Some states and cities have departments focused on international trade. ☐

Sacramento Roundtables Analyze Tax Policy

Months ago, when California's budget woes were just beginning to form a dark cloud over the Capitol, Jerry Lubenow, director of the UC Berkeley/Sacramento Program, met with representatives of the Senate Office of Research, the Senate Revenue and Taxation Committee, the University of California, and California State University to organize a series of tax roundtables, which Lubenow then moderated. The first four sessions discussed the property tax, the sales tax, corporation taxes, and the personal income tax.

The final session provided an overview of the state tax system, with comparisons to other states, and a general discussion of tax policy. The panelists for the final session included Alan Auerbach, UC Berkeley; Charles McLure, Hoover Institution at Stanford University; Steven Sheffrin, UC Davis; Terri Sexton, CSU-Sacramento; and Annette Nellen, San Jose State University.

The audience for these sessions included key legislative and agency staff members as well as representatives of business, labor, public interest activists, think tank tax mavens, and academics. As had been the practice in earlier sessions, panelists from the previous roundtables and other members of the audience joined in the discussion.

The sessions, held in the Senate Office of Research Conference Room in Sacramento, were tape-recorded and a transcript was produced. The wide-ranging discussions were meant to inform the legislature as it wrestles with the prospect of closing a $34 billion gap in a $78 million budget.

The discussants generally agreed that California's income tax relied too heavily on high-income individuals, that earmarking revenues had severely limited legislative options, that multi-year budgets and a simple majority budget vote—rather than the current two-thirds required—would rationalize the process, that the sales tax base should be expanded to include services, and that the property tax roll should be split to treat business and residential property differently. Whether the legislature will take any of this to heart remains to be seen. ☐

Patriots cont.

"multiculturalism," with one side celebrating group differences and the other arguing that they be de-emphasized.

Both sides, ironically, are often united by their expressed distaste for ethnocentrism. Their disagreement turns on whether group pride—or *particularism,* more generally—is the solution to ethnocentrism, or its very embodiment. In order to settle this dispute, it seems natural to appeal to social psychology—a field of study devoted to understanding intergroup attitudes and behavior. Unfortunately, social psychologists also disagree about the chauvinistic inclinations of group pride. To clarify matters, we analyze evidence from a substantively interesting case of in-group/out-group attitudes—*national pride* and *hostility towards immigrants*. Our intention is to develop a reliable understanding of whether, how, and when pride overlaps with prejudice.

There are two central thrusts to our approach, each of which is intended to remove a source of confusion surrounding the relationship between pride and prejudice. The first focuses on the proposition that the confusion derives from multiple understandings of group pride. A reconsideration of the components of group pride reveals at least two dimensions—each of which has conceivably different implications for feelings towards relevant out-groups. Our solution is to identify such multidimensionality and evaluate the relationship between prejudice and each of the dimensions of group pride.

The second thrust of the analysis incorporates our belief that other emotions, attitudes, or conditions might interfere with the relationship between in-group and out-group attitudes. These variables can confound our understanding of pride and prejudice in two ways—either by their direct effect on one of the two emotions, or by their effect on the *relationship* between the two emotions. We therefore consider the relationship between pride and prejudice after compensating for the direct and moderating effects of other attitudes and conditions.

Our focus is on one particular kind of in-group/out-group relationship: attitudes towards one's nation and attitudes towards immigrants to that nation. The choice of these target groups is useful for both analytic and substantive reasons. Analytically, it is important that we have identified two groups that are reciprocally related, in that each is defined in terms of the other.

This condition is necessary in order to assure that we know the direction of, and can measure, any prejudice emanating from in-group pride. The choice of *ethnic* pride would be problematic since the multitude of ethnic groups makes it difficult to identify two reciprocal targets. In our case, the connection between groups is direct: the reference group for natives is clearly non-natives.

Substantively, the connection between national pride and xenophobia—the term we use to summarize hostility towards immigrants—is of profound interest. A suspicion that one breeds the other has long prompted dark warnings about national pride. Diderot considered such feelings for the nation-state immoral, Voltaire identified their constituent parts as self-love and prejudice, and Lessing regarded esteem for the nation as an "heroical weakness" in an individual, a sentiment reminiscent of Samuel Johnson's well-known epigram, "patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel."

These pronouncements tend to surface after major wars and large-scale national conflicts, and the unabated ethnic and nationalist conflict of recent years has generated a lively contemporary debate on the topic. On one side is the view, articulated elegantly by Michael Walzer, that love of country and tolerance hang in a careful balance and that the increase of the former comes at the expense of the latter. On the other side are political theorists such as Benedict Anderson and Alasdair MacIntyre who maintain that national pride is not at all rooted in a hatred of the outsider.

We conclude that this disagreement stems from a highly generalized understanding of national pride. We find two strongly correlated dimensions of pride that are just as strongly divergent in their relationship with prejudice. In this sense, our findings accord with a persuasive essay on the theory of national pride by Maurizio Viroli. Viroli insists, "Love of country can be generous, compassionate, and intelligent, but it can also be exclusive, deaf, and blind."

Indeed, these two versions of national pride—*patriotism* and *nationalism*—are easy to identify and distinguish. Theorists like Viroli have long been arguing for just such a differentiation. We agree and show clearly why it is important that they be distinguished. While nationalists are more ethnocentric than the average citizen, patriots are not necessarily so.

Previous Theory and Evidence

Pride implies prejudice. One of the fundamental tenets in social science is that comparisons to another are central to personal identity. The intuition underpins much of the scholarly work on intergroup conflict. Brewer concludes that the "prevailing approach to the study of ethnocentrism, in-group bias, and prejudice, presumes that in-group love and out-group hate are reciprocally related."

Early structural accounts assumed a competitive battle over scarce resources in which the out-group's loss was the in-group's gain. For example, Sumner's classic formulation of the concept of ethnocentrism explicitly fuses attitudes towards the two target groups into a sentiment that includes "loyalty to the group, sacrifice for it, hatred and contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within, warlikeness without." This

Omar Ali Raises an Independent Voice

"Americans do not simply want to switch parties, as the Perot phenomena of the 1990s should have taught us," says Omar Ali. "We are rejecting 'partyism' altogether." Ali, who is director of research at the Committee for a Unified Independent Party, gave a brown bag talk at the IGS Center on Politics as part of a national tour. Ali, an adjunct professor at Fordham University, worked on Lenora Fulani's independent presidential campaign.

Omar Ali

contention seemed to be clearly demonstrated at Sherif's famous summer camp *cum* laboratory. By pitting the Bull Dogs against the Red Devils in a series of competitive events, Sherif produced both in-group pride *and* out-group aggression in the campers.

In their monumental study of the origins of fascism, Adorno, et al. incorporated even more formally the same belief in the unity of in-group pride and out-group derogation. The Adorno group developed an influential measure of ethnocentrism (the E-scale) that included an entire dimension labelled "patriotism." To be sure, Levinson (who wrote the measurement chapters) was quick to clarify that by "patriotism" they meant not merely "love of country" but "blind attachment." That these authors—careful and comprehensive as they were about conceptualization and measurement—would combine elements of in-group favoritism in a measure of out-group hostility is noteworthy. Indeed, the unity of national pride and ethnocentrism could not be more explicitly or classically stated.

The influential social identity theorists, starting with Tajfel and his students, seem to imply this connection as well. In a series of arresting experiments, these scholars went beyond structural arguments by showing that classification alone—let alone group competition—could produce fierce in-group loyalty. A typical experiment would assign subjects to groups based on purported differences in performance on certain tests (e.g., an expressed preference for Klee's vs. Kandinsky's art, or the tendency to over- or undercount a set of dots).

In reality, the experimenters would divide subjects randomly. Nevertheless, given the opportunity to pass judgment or distribute rewards, subjects were quick to demonstrate favoritism towards members of their own "group" at the expense of the other. While these experiments never produced actual intergroup *hostility*, the implication was clear. For many, the step from the ingroup favoritism shown in the laboratory to out-group hostility and aggression in the real world is a short, necessary, and sufficient one.

Pride does not imply prejudice. Gordon Allport, a popular starting point for work on prejudice, maintains that ingroup loyalty is unrelated to out-group hostility. His argument is grounded on the idea that attitudes to the in-group are "psychologically primary." He allows that hostility towards the other—or at least the recognition of a common enemy—can increase in-group *cohesion*, but claims that hostility does not necessarily follow from in-group favoritism. Indeed, he suggests that ingroup favoritism can be accompanied by a full range of feelings towards the outsider (everything from hatred to tolerance to full appreciation).

In Allport's model, outsiders are not always outsiders. He imagines a series of concentric loyalties in which an individual may be considered an outsider at the micro level (say, the family) but an insider at a larger level (say, the village). While Allport intends his theory to apply to a range of groups, some of his most important examples emphasize the compatibility of patriotism and "world-loyalty."

A burgeoning literature dedicated to reproducing cases of in-group and out-group harmony has sprung from Allport's hopeful conviction. By manipulating conditions of contact and cooperation, scholars have shown that individuals can very quickly "recategorize" erstwhile out-groups into in-groups. Sherif, for example, manufactured harmony between the Red Devils and the Bull Dogs by disabling a school bus carrying the two groups and combining their efforts to push the vehicle to a "miraculous" running start. Collaboration, in that case, attenuated intergroup hostility.

Perhaps Gaertner, Dovidio, and their colleagues have gone the farthest in formalizing these sorts of processes in their "Common In-group Identity Model." In more than 10 years of experimentation, Gaertner and Dovidio show that activating superordinate identities—whether triggered by contact, cooperation, common fate, or interdependence —reduces intergroup hostility. In other words, the theoretical apparatus behind Allport's claim of independence of ingroup and out-group attitudes appears sound.

Even the Tajfel minimal group experiments do not support the unity of in-group love and out-group hate. Although these experiments offer a consistent and remarkably vivid demonstration of group favoritism, in not one of these studies is such favoritism accompanied by actual hostility or even dislike of the out-group. Subjects liked members of their group better, even preferring to maximize relative differences over absolute gains, but they did not actively dislike the other.

Outside the laboratory, there is some evidence—albeit inconclusive—that individuals can hold equally positive (or negative) attitudes towards both in-groups and out-groups. For example, in a study of 30 ethnic groups in East Africa, Brewer and Campbell found that individuals who showed favoritism towards their own ethnic group were not especially hostile towards the other. Others have found this same nonrelationship.

Pride implies prejudice only under some conditions. Scholars may resist the previous classification, preferring an interpretation of the relationship between pride and prejudice as one complicated by other psychological and ecological influences. Indeed, it is plausible that the relationship depends upon the kinds of groups in question, their environment, or any number of the individual's characteristics. This sort of thinking is very much evident in the research on prejudice by the influential *social dominance* theorists.

These scholars—drawing on authoritarian personality theories, Marxist class analysis, and social identity theory—emphasize that highstatus groups within society are significantly more likely to take hierarchy-enhancing positions than are lower-status groups. An implication of their theory is that the association between expressions of pride and those of prejudice will increase with group status precisely because higher-status groups feel a greater sense of "ownership" of the national identity.

Of course, the social dominance perspective is not alone in emphasizing such moderating effects. Surveying the accumulated wisdom on group dynamics leads us to suspect other conditions that might confound the direct relationship between in-group and out-group attitudes. In particular, we may expect that situations of realistic conflict among groups, a record of personal frustration, or certain learned personality traits, might moderate this relationship. We develop and test such hypotheses in detail.

How to reconcile these competing claims? Most of the relevant empirical studies to date offer piecemeal, context-specific insights. Our strategy is to assemble a more comprehensive set of evidence, available in the major cross-national public opinion studies, on the relationship between national pride and xenophobia. We begin by building general measures of these concepts across six different surveys in over 50 countries and observing how often those who express national pride also express hostility towards immigrants.

Having established a more comprehensive benchmark, we test the stability of this relationship in a number of ways. Specifically, we reason that three analytical problems may confound the results: conceptual invalidity, errors in measurement of the concepts, and spuriousness. We begin by exploring the concept of national pride more carefully and specifying its dimensions and core components. With these guidelines, and the insights from exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, we develop more precise measures of the relevant concepts. We then use structural equation methods to take account of measurement error and test the bivariate correlations more rigorously. Next, still within a structural equation approach, we test the relationship in a series of multivariate models to rule out spurious associations. Finally, we incorporate a number of interaction terms to determine whether certain conditions magnify or minimize the relationship. The results, we believe, represent a comprehensive and robust statement about the association between national pride and xenophobia.

Considering the correlation between national pride and hostility toward immigrants, we find almost no relationship. A preliminary finding, therefore, is that Allport and his followers are right. At a very general level, those who express group pride do not tend to disparage the other group to any appreciable degree. Nevertheless, given our skepticism about the measurement of national pride — namely, that it may indeed be multidimensional—we subject this relationship to greater scrutiny. Specifically, we are concerned that aggregating national pride measures conceals a relationship between one of its components and xenophobia.

Theorists of national identity often distinguish between two dimensions of national pride. One dimension, *patriotism*, refers to an affective attachment to the nation, its institutions, and its founding principles. The other, *nationalism*, refers to a cognitive belief in national superiority and dominance—a commitment to the denigration of the alternatives to the nation's institutions and principles. Certainly, meanings and distinctions vary across scholars and research purposes, but this sense of a "positive" species of national pride and a more "negative" relative are widely held.

These two dimensions of national pride imply very different consequences for attitudes and behavior towards outsiders. While we may expect nationalists to express negative feelings towards foreigners, it is unclear whether such a tendency is prevalent among patriots. This difference in behavior is often the motivation for the development of a two-dimensional understanding of national pride.

Viroli's well-told story of the evolution of nationalism as a corrupt form of patriotism is a very good example of this drive. Viroli's intention is to distinguish the two concepts in order to encourage a re-awakening of a more positive, less chauvinistic, version of national pride. However, his premise that the two sentiments have diverging relationships with prejudice is unproven.

Shreds of indirect evidence exist. Kosterman and Feshbach administered a rich set of patriotism and nationalism items to a sample of 239 college students to find that nationalism is strongly associated with pro-nuclear-arms positions while patriotism's association was only moderate. In similar-sized samples of Israelis and Americans, Sidanius et al. report that a social dominance orientation (that is, an inclination towards hierarchy-enhancing attitudes) relates more strongly to nationalism than to patriotism.

Conover and Feldman's memo on the patriotism and nationalism items on the 1987 National Election Study pilot study revealed a moderately different relationship between each of the two scales and items related to international cooperation and prospects for war. In short, there is good reason, but little evidence, to think that patriotism and nationalism compose two important dimensions of national pride with diverging effects on prejudice.

Given these expectations, we return to the interpretation of public opinion data on national pride. Three principal questions are before us. First, do responses to the national pride items hang together in two dimensions that are recognizable as patriotism and nationalism? Second, in the interest of building a structural model, how valid are the individual measures of the two dimensions? Third, and most importantly, do these two dimensions have diverging associations with prejudice?

Our first step is to clarify our understanding of the differences between patriotism and nationalism in order to classify our measures into one or the other category. Consider a number of definitions already in circulation. Feshbach writes, "*Patriotism* . . . entails attachment to one's nation as characterized by love of one's nation and pride in one's national identification. *Nationalism*, while related to patriotism, entails feelings of

IGS Donor Gabriel Almond, 91, Dies

Gabriel Almond, one of the country's most eminent political scientists and a friend and benefactor of IGS, died Dec. 25, 2002, shortly before his 92nd birthday. Professor Almond received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 1938 and taught at Brooklyn College, and at Yale, Princeton and Stanford Universities. *The Civic Culture*, published in 1963 is widely regarded as a classic in the social sciences, and the 8th edition of his textbook, *Comparative Politics Today*, will be republished this year. Almond was chair of the political science department at Stanford and received the James Madison Award from the American Political Science Association. At IGS, Almond is remembered for his generous donation of 500 books representative of his broad intellectual interests. Almond's gift supplements and enhances previous gift collections from other eminent friends of the IGS Library.

national superiority, of competitiveness with other nations, and of the importance of power over other nations."

According to Peffley and Hurwitz, *patriotism* is a "heavily affect-laden . . . positive regard that a citizen holds toward his or her own homeland," while *nationalism* is an, "implicit evaluation of one's country *vis-à-vis* foreign countries or international groups. Alternatively, in Viroli's terms, "The language of *patriotism* has been used over the centuries to strengthen or invoke love of the political institutions and the way of life that sustain the common liberty of the people, that is love of the republic; the language of *nationalism* was forged in late eighteenth-century Europe to defend or reinforce cultural, linguistic, and ethnic oneness and homogeneity of people." Conover and Johnson define patriotism as "a deeply felt affective attachment to the nation . . . [and] '*nationalism'* as feelings of superiority of one's own country *vis-à-vis* other countries."

A central distinction between the concepts is their point of reference. Whereas patriotism is *self-referential*, feelings of nationalism are inherently *comparative*—and, almost exclusively, *downwardly* comparative. Some theorists conceive of this distinction as one of competition: the patriot is *noncompetitive* and the nationalist *competitive*. For example, in an historical perspective on the concepts, both Dietz and Viroli show that the original concept of *patria* is one of *noncompetitive* love of country, a concept that develops nationalist elements when competitive attributes are added in the 19th century. A second distinction concerns the *content* of patriotic and nationalist expressions. Patriotism often takes the form of beliefs in the *social system* and *values* of one's country. Expressions of nationalism, on the other hand, are often appeals to advance the *national interests.*

When we disaggregate national pride into separate dimensions, we are forced to reconsider our initial finding of a weak relationship between in-group and out-group attitudes. National pride has not one but two components: a negative dimension (nationalism) and a positive dimension (patriotism). The finding that the two are positively correlated, but have very different (perhaps even opposite) relationships with xenophobia, explains in part the lack of a strong relationship between this variable and a more generalized measure of national pride.

An additional concern is whether this finding is due to some other variable that is related to national pride and hostility. In short, we must ensure that the findings are not spurious. A more contextualized analysis of these relationships incorporates wisdom from the rich tradition of prejudice theory in order to build a more complete model of out-group hostility. These theories of prejudice have two important implications for our analysis. On the one hand, each theory suggests a set of *main effects* for which we need to control. Without accounting for these explanations, we cannot be sure that the relationships we observe are not products of more deeply rooted psychological or contextual conditions. The second implication of this theoretical work is that the conditions that give rise to prejudice may intensify the relationship between in-group and out-group attitudes. We move to a multivariate structural model of prejudice in order to explore these potentially confounding and interacting effects.

Social psychology is not short on theories of prejudice, each of which has by now been subject to much empirical investigation. We make use of four such theories: authoritarian personality theory, realistic conflict theory, frustration-aggression theory, and social dominance theory. Our goal is not to test their validity so much as to understand how they affect the relationship between in-group and out-group attitudes.

The theories imply that how someone views outsiders is influenced by the individual's personality, emotional state, and economic position with respect to the outsider. Certain political beliefs, family backgrounds, or norms of expression will also affect their response. For example, prejudice is often associated with political conservatism. While it is not clear how tightly these attitudes hang together, they are correlated at the first order, as is nationalism with conservatism.

We believe that social and cultural norms condition the way individuals respond to interviewers' questions about immigrants. For example, it is reasonable to suspect that people of different educational backgrounds, age groups, and geographic regions will voice hostility to different degrees, not only because of internal beliefs or attitudes, but also because of different norms of expression within their peer group.

This tenet is the foundation of the influential symbolic racism (also known as aversive racism, racial resentment, and modern racism) literature. According to these theories, the decline in expressed racism over the years derives not from actual reduced racism but from a decline in willingness to express outright racism. That is, societal norms no longer permit such expression. We suggest this sort of effect likely exists with respect to immigrants and varies across urban and rural settings, age, educational experience, and social status.

Examining the particular *main effects* of realistic economic conflict, frustration, and personality we see mixed results. On the one hand, the effect of economic insecurity seems to have little direct contribution to attitudes toward immigrants, once we account for other factors. In contrast, both an authoritarian personality and personal frustration seem to be linked directly to prejudice. Such results suggest that hostility towards immigrants does not derive from any direct and specific threat immigrants pose but from a more general state of dissatisfaction within the individual. This conforms with consistent findings in the literature on immigration policy that economic self-interest is not a strong predictor of attitudes towards immigration policy.

With respect to the other conditions, we see mixed but clear results. Independent of personality, economic security, and emotional happiness, those with more education as well as those whose family arrived in the United States more recently, are less likely to deride immigrants. Ideology is a significant predictor only when nationalism and patriotism are excluded, suggesting that national identity somehow taps the aspect of ideology associated with xenophobia. This encourages us to think that while national identity may indeed be a component of certain political belief systems (specifically, conservatism), the two do not overlap neatly. Again, these results are extremely robust, surviving multiple specifications and estimation methods.

Our primary concern is whether national pride has anything to do with anti-immigrant hostility once included in a more general model of prejudice. The results are unambiguous. Nationalism is strongly associated with hostility towards immigrants while patriotism is unrelated or, if anything, negatively associated with hostility.

The direct effects of nationalism and patriotism are therefore quite clear. What can we say about the conditional effects? Are those who express national pride more likely to be bigoted under certain circumstances? More to the point, can patriots, whom we have observed to have no particular predisposition for xenophobia, evince some hostility under special circumstances? We find no evidence for these assertions. On the whole, the ethnocentrism of nationalists and the absence of such for patriots remain at essentially the same level irrespective of their economic plight, personality, race, or emotional state.

These results are similar regardless of how we estimate the relationships. We are left, therefore, with two consistent results. Nationalists are on average bigoted, but patriots are not.

We began with a sense of ambivalence about in-group pride, in particular, national pride. A subsequent analysis of the survey evidence of patriots, nationalists, and bigots explains this ambivalence. Pride, it seems, reveals itself in two very different forms, one positive (patriotism) and one negative (nationalism).

These two dimensions of pride have very different implications for prejudice towards immigrants. True, the average *nationalist* is hostile towards immigrants. However, the average *patriot* is *no more antagonistic to immigrants than is the average citizen.*

That is, those who express feelings of national superiority tend to derogate immigrants but those who express admiration for their country's principles and values tend to appreciate outsiders as much as anyone else.

We can assert these relationships with surprising certainty. They hold up across six data sets, 50 countries, and a variety of subsamples. They remain after accounting for measurement error, controlling for direct and indirect effects of other factors, and employing different model specifications and estimation methods.

For theorists like Maurizio Viroli who are optimistic about the existence of such an empowering, tolerant brand of national pride, our results amount to an empirical validation. The results also confirm the sobering connection between feelings of national superiority and the denigration of immigrants. But our findings with respect to such nationalism should surprise no one. Nationalists—as scholars define them—announce themselves as bigots almost as soon as they speak of their nation. That patriots tend to be tolerant and generous towards non-natives is striking. It is striking precisely because patriots and nationalists are alike in their deep esteem for the nation.

Patriotism is *not* some sort of indiscriminate "world pride" or "internationalist spirit" that Gordon Allport, William James, and others have suggested as a way to surmount bigotry. What we are conceptualizing and measuring as patriotism is a monogomous love of nation. It is particularism, not universalism. It is a German's love of Germany, an American's love of the United States, and a Brazilian's love of Brazil. What is intriguing is that such exclusive group loyalty does not come at the expense of tolerance.

The full paper from which this excerpt is taken is forthcoming in the American Journal of Political Science. It is also available at www.haas.berkeley.edu/~rui ☐

Underhill Endowment Establishes New Center for British Studies at Berkeley

A new center for British studies is to be created at the University of California, Berkeley, thanks to a generous endowment of $2.1m from the Robert Kirk Underhill Trust. The center, which officially opens in September 2003, will provide a platform for one of the largest and most distinguished group of scholars studying British culture, society and history—spread across the arts, humanities, social sciences and professional schools—in the United States

The center has three objectives: to strengthen Berkeley's intellectual and institutional ties to Britain; to develop new interdisciplinary research agendas for the study of Britain; and to support graduate and undergraduate research in British Studies.

These were issues close to the heart of Robert Kirk Underhill who graduated from Berkeley in 1928. A past president and emeritus chair of San Francisco's English Speaking Union, he actively supported many British charities and student exchanges between California and the UK (as his "Anglo-California Foundation" continues to do). The Queen recognized his work by awarding him a CBE.

Kirk Underhill was a long-standing member of the "UK Seminar" organized by UCB Professors Nelson W. Polsby and Sheldon Rothblatt. It was largely their work promoting British studies on campus that inspired Underhill to so generously support its future growth.

The renaissance of British Studies at Berkeley is reflected in a series of recent faculty appointments across the arts, humanities, social sciences and professional schools and a proliferation of related reading groups and seminars. The University of California's first 'international hub' at California House, opened in St. James' London in 1999, is powerful symbol of the campus' determination to expand its tries with Britain.

Appropriately, for an outward looking program in British studies, the new multidisciplinary center will be housed within the Institute of European Studies with the support of IGS under the division of International and Area Studies.

The center's director will be Professor James Vernon of the history department. "These are exciting times for British studies at Berkeley," he said "We have wonderful faculty and terrific students and they will get the center they deserve."

Friends of IGS Honor Roll 2002

The Institute established the Friends of IGS in 1995 as an official university-sanctioned support group. Everyone who gives a gift to the Institute becomes a Friend of IGS. The benefits are many, but most important is the fact that an individual, firm, or foundation who gives to the Institute contributes directly to the excellence of UC Berkeley.

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From Peacemaking to Peacekeeping in Haiti

Michel S. Laguerre, UC Berkeley and MIT

The UN Mission in Haiti was successful to the extent that it facilitated the return of President Jean Bertrand Aristide to Port-au-Prince and the restoration of the Haitian constitutional government. Without the U.S.-led UN invasion that culminated in the neutralization of the Haitian armed forces, it was unlikely that a national police force was going to be established and allowed to compete with the military establishment for government funds.


Michel Laguerre

But my purpose here is not to identify UN operational successes in Haiti, but rather to examine areas that may need some improvement for future UN missions. I have selected four areas to briefly comment on: the managerial crisis of transition from peacemaking to peacekeeping; the derailment of the UN mission concerning the modernization of the Haitian military (the inability of the UN mission to prevent the collapse of the army which led to the status quo ante, that is the establishment of a civilian police force without an army to provide checks and balances in the operation of the national security system); the conflict resolution role, which implies some cooperation from local political actors; and the digital factor.

In recent years, we have witnessed a number of U.S.-led UN missions in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, and there is a pattern that has emerged. The UN Strategy in Haiti as elsewhere entails three distinct objectives: peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.

Peacemaking implies military intervention and precedes peacekeeping and peacebuilding, which focus on fostering democracy. The first requires military engagement while the second implies military disengagement, but civilian police engagement. Because these three goals are complementary but asynchronous, the transition from one to the other may be fraught with ambiguity. For example, the military may pursue military objectives that go beyond the framework of intervention of the UN mission, as we have seen in the case of the FRAPH (Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti) documents. In other words, the military in such a scheme tends to develop its own mini-mission inside the UN mission partly because military operation entails different logics and logistics than is required of a pure peacekeeping operation that has a civilian objective.

A military intervention requires not only a strategy of entry, but also an exit strategy. The exit strategy developed on behalf of the U.S. military operatives by the U.S. Army War College was circulated for comments prior to the invasion. The exit was not only thought about, but planned in advance. In the peacekeeping part of the operation, it is more difficult to project a definitive exit strategy since this depends on conditions on the ground and since theoretically it is supposed to lead to the peacebuilding phase.

How does one harmonize these three objectives, and how does one manage the transition from peacemaking to peacekeeping and from peacekeeping to peacebuilding? The end of the military invasion led in the Haitian case to a "management crisis" because it changed the nature of the intervention from "military occupation" to a "peacekeeping" and then to a "peacebuilding" operation.

The first posture requires the UN to play a "leadership" role while the second entails it to occupy a "parternership" position, and the third places it in a "subsidiary" situation. In this new posture, both the civilian police and military police contingents are less involved in providing street security, but more involved in providing technical and professional assistance.

The transition from peacemaking to peacekeeping coincided with the beginning of the derailment of the UN mission. In the first mandate of the Unite Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in 1993 and the revised mandate in 1994 duly authorized by Security Council resolutions 867 and 940, a key role of the UN mission was the establishment of a civilian police force and the professionalization of the Haitian armed forces.

The mission derailed because of its inability to ensure the replacement of the general staff of the Haitian armed forces that was forced to resign as a result of the invasion and to help the military—while the U.S. troops were still in town—to effectively manage the transition. The UN mission by reassigning the most competent soldiers to newly created police positions completely undermined the ability of the military to reconstitute itself. By early November 1994, the demoralized troops were not returning to their barracks, and shortly thereafter on December 6 of that year the Aristide decree disbanding the army legalized consumed a de facto situation.

UNMIH shifted its strategic objectives and derailed because it was now in the business of erecting a structure similar to the one before, that is an omnipotent security system that fulfills both the function of police and army. Similarly the old army fulfilled the functions of both army and police. With the establishment of the national police force and the disbanding of the army, we end up having a change of name, but not of functions since the former is responsible for national security as well.

Unknown Factor

While it is important to ensure the smooth coordination of practices among the forces of the alliances, the unknown factor still remains the behaviors of the local leaders that the UN mission comes to help, which has the potential to fragment the coalition as some member-states may seek their own economic and strategic advantages to justify their participation in such an endeavor. A scenario methodology that helps us to understand the dynamics of the management of the peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding phases of the operation would entail the incorporation of the local political factions as part of the dynamics of the whole system of intervention.

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By Gerald C. Lubenow

Victims of Conceit

The first time I heard the term conceit applied to a journalistic endeavor I was covering a presidential campaign at *Newsweek,* and one of my colleagues used it to describe a rather unusual story idea. The dictionary defines conceit, in this sense, as "an elaborate or exaggerated metaphor." And that was just what he had in mind.

The political primaries, he said, were like a board game, an electoral version of Monopoly. Candidates maneuvered to victory by landing on squares like the Iowa Caucuses and the New Hampshire primary where they acquired votes, stopped at New York and California to pick up campaign dollars, and encountered other misadventures along the trail.

The result was a two-page spread with a Monopoly-like board running around the margins and an abbreviated story explaining the conceit. Was it entertaining? Absolutely. Did it enlighten anyone on how the process really worked? Not really.

I was reminded of this while reading Michael Ignatieff's recent cover story in *The New York Times Sunday Magazine* entitled "The American Empire (Get Used To It)." There was the board game metaphor—America maintains five global military commands, has men and women at arms on four continents, and deploys battle groups on every ocean. "What word but 'empire' describes the awesome thing that America is becoming?" asked Ignatieff.

Hegemony might do for starters, but why settle for that when, with a bit of conceit, one can fashion an "imperial rule for a postimperial age." But Ignatieff seemed unclear about the empire he described. America was "an empire lite" one moment and a heavy-handed military enforcer the next. And Ignatieff never answered the question raised in the teasing subhead, "Will this cost America its soul or save it?"

A more appropriate question might be: Does this sort of writing enhance an academic's reputation or ruin it? Ignatieff has signed on as a contributing writer for the magazine. One can only hope he doesn't take Paul Krugman as his model.

Krugman, a noted Princeton economist, writes a twice weekly op ed column for the *Times.* His early columns, focused largely on economic policy, were impressive. He is a first-rate international economist, but, as he got his footing, his columns seemed to stray from economics to politics, foreign policy, and legal issues where he has no particular expertise.

He spent a year in Washington as a staffer at the Council of Economic Advisors and never dealt with Congress. Yet, during the Trent Lott meltdown, Krugman said a two-faced Bush was proffering a public slap on the wrist while sending coded political assurances to Republican voters that Lott would stay. He wrote this as the Bush White House was orchestrating Lott's ouster. Apparently, Krugman misread the code.

Washington reporters spend much of their time trying to divine who drives domestic policy. Krugman, who boasts that he almost never goes to Washington, knows. Karl Rove is "the man in charge" of White House policy and is "clearly betting that the economy will recover on its own."

His heavy-handed, Republicans-are-stupid-and-venal approach has even begun to tarnish his economic analysis. Arguing against a tax exemption for dividends, he wrote: "lots of income faces double taxation." Workers, he said, pay income tax when they earn their money and sales tax when they spend it. By that logic, one could argue, dividends are taxed three times.

In its annual review of political columnists, Lying in Ponds, a website that tracks partisan bias, found that Krugman was far and away the most partisan. But Krugman, who clearly savors being a feisty media figure, disdains journalistic even-handedness as much as he does political compromise. He regularly criticizes the press for its watered-down coverage of events, claiming reporters back off for fear of being accused of liberal bias.

In a website note on his own "reporting" technique, Krugman asked a *Times* reporter to explain a tax loophole he wanted to write about: "We had a phone conversation that didn't make me a real expert on the subject, but was enough to let me play one on the op-ed page."

His work has become shrill and predictable as he has come to view his column as a blunt instrument with which to bludgeon his enemies. Telling readers over and over again that George Bush is an idiot is far too thin a conceit to sustain a twice-weekly column.

Krugman—and Ignatieff—would do well to study the work of two *Times* colleagues. Maureen Dowd's writing is loads of fun, but it's all conceit and no content. A recent column compared George Bush to the editor of Vanity Fair, and Dowd frequently seems unable to sort the real West Wing from the TV version.

Tom Friedman is the ultimate even-handed explainer. No matter how stupid or venal the policymakers, Friedman patiently sorts through every nuance of the policy, eschewing exaggerated metaphors for clear, honest prose. And, knowledgeable as he is, he never writes down to his readers. ☐

New Volume on Education Abroad Joins Kerr Memoirs Series

Neil J. Smelser, UCB, Sociology

The Education Abroad Program of the University of California enjoys the enviable status of being the finest of its kind in the world. The reasons for this deserved reputation are to be found in William H. Allaway's own unpretentious listing of "policies, practices, and programs that worked" in his new volume "The Global Campus: Education Abroad and the University of California." Condensing and taking a little liberty with his list, I would highlight the following set of reasons:

Bill Allaway

- Continuous involvement of the Office of the President in the development of the program. During his tenure as president, Clark Kerr was both attentive and supportive, and other presidents have followed his example.
- Integration of UC students in the courses of the host universities abroad, exposing them to the faculties of those institutions, and assuring open exposure to the languages and cultures of the host countries.
- Reciprocation with host universities, i.e., bringing numbers of their students to the University of California for a corresponding academic experience.
- Assurance of University of California standards of academic control through Academic Senate oversight, selection of UC faculty members as directors, insisting on the academic qualifications of students, and approving and translating academic courses and evaluations received abroad into UC equivalents.

This list is deceptively simple, but taken together the items constitute a sure formula for academically, socially, and culturally successful experiences for the students who have a season abroad.

In the pages of this book will be found a history of this remarkable program that is unique in two respects: first, such a history had never been written, and, second, it is written by the man whose nearly three decades of leadership of the program make his career as director and the history of the program itself almost coterminous. The story is straightforwardly told, and is especially rich in capturing how a process of continuous, inventive, and *ad hoc* incremental adaptation yielded an extraordinarily large and diverse set of academic arrangements country by country, all of which were forged in ways consistent with the recipe sketched above.

Through my own academic career at Berkeley I encountered the EAP in a number of different ways. I was director of the splendid program for the UK and Ireland in 1977–79 (escaping just before the "Thatcher crisis" descended). Subsequently I served as reviewer of the UKI program; as chair of the delegation that was instrumental in developing the Leningrad program; as invitee to the grand retirement party for Bill in 1989; as member of the search committee that found Bill's successor, John Marcum; and as sometimes advisor to Marcum. These experiences provided me with something of an "in-the-trenches" appreciation of the program. They also led me to develop a relationship with Bill as colleague, co-golfer, and friend, so I feel confident in offering the following brief evaluation of his historic role in building and solidifying the UC Education Abroad Program.

The one item that Bill omitted in his list of factors that worked was his own entrepreneurial style. Though he shuns all self-promotion in this volume, his effective leadership shines through. He never wavered from his simply articulated but sound vision of the value of an international academic/cultural experience for students. He made himself aware of new opportunities for development without overreaching. He was willing to dive into the smallest details of planning and implementation when necessary. He knew what constituents needed to be on board in order to initiate a program, and he was fastidious in including them, gaining their support through persuasion, and maintaining steadfast relations with them over time. He was a diplomat abroad. He was willing to take risks, but able to see when a program was running into trouble and to move aggressively to repair, divert, or end it. He worked well with his administrative colleagues. And lastly, he navigated through the complex international world with a personal style that was direct, free from arrogance, and marked by a droll wit.

It is a pleasure to welcome this volume into the Clark Kerr Memoirs Project. ☐

Haiti cont.

A critical factor is the role of information technology (IT) in enhancing or impeding the success of the UN strategy in Haiti. IT has changed the dynamics of the process precisely because the major actors—the government, the opposition parties, the army—all had extraterritorial tentacles that helped them reposition themselves *vis-à-vis* the crisis. IT made the process fully transnational and global in real time through the mechanism of virtual time. The rise of virtual diasporas expanded the sphere of interaction of traditional diasporas and fragmented the national public sphere beyond the reach of the UN actors in Haiti. One specific arena where this influence was felt was in the migration of the sources of initiatives from one site to another within the virtual diasporic circuit, and in the diasporic lobbies that fed the transnationalization of the crisis and in a sense complicated and magnified the mathematics of power relations among the local political actors.

This article is taken from a paper Laguerre wrote entitled "The UN Strategy in Haiti." ☐

TRIVIA QUIZ

Answers

1. The Annual Message, as it was then called, was first delivered in 1790 in Federal Hall in New York City.
2. 1947
3. 1947
4. 1997

Finally! A book about what really goes on behind the scenes in Sacramento!

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

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